

JPRS 82144

2 November 1982

Sub-Saharan Africa Report

No. 2714



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

2 November 1982

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

No. 2714

CONTENTS

BOTSWANA

- Soviet SAM Missiles Reported on Botswana SA Border
(Norman Chandler; SUNDAY TIMES, 3 Oct 82)..... 1

CAMEROON

- Decree Establishes Mass Communication School
(CAMEROON TRIBUNE, 29 Sep 82)..... 2

CHAD

- CDR Reportedly Fighting FAN
(AFRICA AFP, 15 Oct 82)..... 3

NIGERIA

- Ojukwu Factor in Nigerian Politics Discussed
(Arthur Agwuncha Nwankwo; WEST AFRICA, 11 Oct 82)..... 4
- Number of Homes Flooded by Dam Greatly Underestimated
(Emmanuel Yawe; SUNDAY NEW NIGERIAN, 19 Sep 82)..... 8
- Reduction, Other Factors May Permit Industrial Growth
(NEW NIGERIAN, 20 Sep 82)..... 10
- Reducing Dependence on Oil Revenue Said Necessary
(WEST AFRICA, 11 Oct 82)..... 11
- Briefs
- Governor Wants Policy Change 12
- Petroleum Deposits in Borno 12

SEYCHELLES

Reportage on Fourth SPPF Congress (NATION, 2, 4 Oct 82).....	13
President's Remarks Solidarity Urged	
Minister Servina Takes a Break To Further Studies (NATION, 4 Oct 82).....	17
Vital Role Proposed for New Manpower Board (NATION, 5 Oct 82).....	19
Briefs Far East Tour	21

SOUTH AFRICA

'Supping With the Devil'; Zimbabwe-South Africa Relations Reviewed (James Barber; INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BULLETIN, No 1, 1982).....	22
Proposals of Constitutional Committee of President's Council Examined (Michael R. Sinclair; INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BULLETIN, No 1, 1982).....	33
Leadership Crisis in Broederbond Alleged (Ivor Wilkins; SUNDAY TIMES, 3 Oct 82).....	46
Eshowe Moves To Allow Nonwhites on Council (Ticks Chetty, Fay Saleh; SUNDAY TIMES, 3 Oct 82).....	49
Buthlezi on Kwazulu's Legal Victory in Ingwavuma Deal (Ivor Wilkins; SUNDAY TIMES, 3 Oct 82).....	50
Survey Reports Blacks Prefer SA Employers (Vera Beljakova; SUNDAY TIMES-BUSINESS TIMES, 3 Oct 82)..	51
Big Surge in Job-Hopping Reported (Stephen Orpen; SUNDAY TIMES-BUSINESS TIMES, 3 Oct 82)...	52
Former NGK Executive Criticizes Church's Role (Madeleine van Biljon; SUNDAY TIMES, 3 Oct 82).....	54
Growth of Black Trade Unions in Pretoria Reported (Sheryl Raine; THE STAR, 6 Oct 82).....	55

Censorship Committees' Role Detailed (Sheryl Raine; THE STAR, 4 Oct 82).....	57
Sweeping Power Given To Key Points Guards (Trevor Jones; THE STAR, 28 Sep 82).....	58
Details of Grosskopf Committee Report Disclosed (Steven Friedman; RAND DAILY MAIL, 1 Oct 82).....	61
Urban Foundation Official Gives Details on Black Venture (RAND DAILY MAIL, 30 Sep 82).....	63
Outcome of Walvis Bay Election Discussed (Koos Coetzee; RAND DAILY MAIL, 1 Oct 82).....	64
Militia To Bolster Army, Police Forces (THE CITIZEN, 11 Oct 82).....	65
Need for Reform Considered Essential (Editorial; THE CITIZEN, 12 Oct 82).....	66
Economic Cards Stacked Against Us, Says SEIFSA (THE CITIZEN, 12 Oct 82).....	68
Living Standards on Way Down, Volkskas Reports (Daan de Kock; THE CITIZEN, 12 Oct 82).....	70
Terrorist Shoot-out in Kwazulu Reported (THE CITIZEN, 12 Oct 82).....	71
Broederbond Influence on Churches Deplored (Keith Abendroth; THE CITIZEN, 12 Oct 82).....	72
Influx-Control System Abhorred (Editorial; SOWETAN, 8 Oct 82).....	73
Depopulation of Rural Areas Feared (THE CITIZEN, 11 Oct 82).....	75
Economist Warns of Possible Tax Increases (Marilyn Cohen; THE CITIZEN, 13 Oct 82).....	76
Broederbund Proclaims Unity, Reelects Chairman (Jaap Theron; THE CITIZEN, 11 Oct 82).....	73
Manpower Crisis Is Exaggerated Says Etheredge (Patrick McLoughlin; THE CITIZEN, 9 Oct 82).....	80
Trade With Mauritius To Continue (Tim Clarke; THE CITIZEN, 11 Oct 82).....	81

Live Without Hate, PW Urges (THE CITIZEN, 11 Oct 82).....	83
Swart Calls for Repeal of Ban on Indians (Tim Clarke; THE CITIZEN, 13 Oct 82).....	84
Viljoen: SADF Can Repulse Any Attack (THE CITIZEN, 9 Oct 82).....	85
Sri Lankan Cricket Tour Called Off (Mervyn Orchard; THE CITIZEN, 9 Oct 82).....	86
Sri Lankan Cricket Team's Tour Announced (Derek Amooore; THE CITIZEN, 18 Oct 82).....	87
Commentary on PFP's Role in Reform Issue (Editorial; THE CITIZEN, 18 Oct 82).....	89
All-Race Toilets Row Looming (THE CITIZEN, 13 Oct 82).....	91
Protection of Oil Finds Assured (THE CITIZEN, 12 Oct 82).....	92
Oil Strike Gives Fuel for Thought (Editorial; THE STAR, 6 Oct 82).....	93
Lay-offs Sweep East Rand Industry (Erik Larsen, Sarah Pennell; THE STAR, 6 Oct 82).....	94
No Cash Relief for Jobless Metal Workers (Steven Friedman; RAND DAILY MAIL, 30 Sep 82).....	95
Cost of Electricity Up From January (THE CITIZEN, 13 Oct 82).....	96
Platinum Thieves Foil Security in Historic Heist (Norman Chandler; SUNDAY TIMES, 3 Oct 82).....	98
Briefs Synod Meeting Report	100

SWAZILAND

Growing Unemployment Overshadows Prosperity (Jasper Mortimer; THE STAR, 1 Oct 82).....	101
---	-----

TANZANIA

Economic Situation Said To Continue To Deteriorate (Francois Robinet; AFRICA AFP, 15 Oct 82).....	103
--	-----

UGANDA

Housing Called 'Number One Problem' in Kampala (Abdul Isodo; UGANDA TIMES, 30 Sep 82).....	105
Fishnet Plant Reported Resuming Production With IDA Aid (Betty Matovu, Tom Okello; UGANDA TIMES, 1 Oct 82).....	108
Briefs	
Aid to Widows	110
Japan Sends Relief Goods	110

ZAIRE

Briefs	
Opposition Movements	111

SOVIET SAM MISSILES REPORTED ON BOTSWANA SA BORDER

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 3 Oct 82 p 33

[Article by Norman Chandler]

[Text]

BOTSWANA has bought 100 surface-to-air missiles from Russia and they are allegedly being made ready for deployment along the country's border with South Africa — and Pretoria says it fears that Botswana could fall to the communists.

The weapons — part of a consignment of arms received last year from the Eastern bloc for the 3 000-strong Botswana Defence Force — are being placed in strategic positions, particularly in the Gaborone area, sources confirmed this week.

● A top-level informant said he hoped the weapons would "never be used in anger".

Napping

But other sources in Botswana pointed out that there have been frequent overflying incidents by military aircraft.

Confirmation of the arms purchase came this week from the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, but official Botswana sources declined to comment.

However, I was told that the reason behind the purchase of the missiles — most of which are the SAM-7 Grail — was "in the interests of Botswana to ensure that we are not caught napping in the event of unfriendly raids on our country."

● The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, Mr Pik Botha, told the American organisation, the Heritage Foundation, this week that South Africa feared Botswana would be the next country after Namibia to fall to the communists.

He told the foundation in an interview which took place about a month ago — the text of which was released in Washington on Thursday — that South Africa had no illusions what "this will mean for our survival and we are not going to sit back until it is too late to secure our survival."

Airport

When approached earlier, the South African Defence Force said it had "no knowledge" of Soviet armaments in

Botswana and surprise was expressed that the government of President Quett Masire would favour Red weapons over British and American military hardware.

The Sunday Times learned this week that foundations "for missiles" are to be constructed near Gaborone airport, which is almost certain to be taken over by the Botswana Defence Force when the new Gaborone international airport is completed in about four years time.

At present the BDF's air wing uses a portion of the existing airfield.

The missiles formed part of a huge order of Soviet arms and other military equipment off-loaded in Mozambique last year.

The purchase was negotiated in November 1980 by the deputy commander of the Botswana Defence Force, Brigadier Ian Khama — son of the country's first president, Sir Seretse Khama — and the former Permanent Secretary to the President, Mr Phillip Steenkamp, who is now in a senior banking position in Gaborone.

CSO: 3400/88

DECREE ESTABLISHES MASS COMMUNICATION SCHOOL

Yaounde CAMEROON TRIBUNE in English 29 Sep 82 p 2

[Decree signed by Ahmadou Ahidjo, president of the Republic,
4 September 1982]

[Excerpt]

CHAPTER I

General provisions

1. (1) An establishment known as *"The Advanced School of Mass Communication"* (ASMAC) is hereby set up within the University of Yaounde.

(2) ASMAC shall train :

- Mass Communication Technicians;
- Generalist Journalists;
- Specialist Journalists.

(3) ASMAC shall, in addition, be responsible for research in the field of mass communication and, subject to the availability of resources, for providing refresher and further training courses to both junior and senior employees working in the area of mass communication.

2. ASMAC shall be under the dual supervisory authority of the Minister of National Education and the Ministry of Information.

(a) The supervisory authority exercised by the Ministry of National Education shall concern mainly academic matters.

In this regard, all instruments governing establishments under the University of Yaounde shall be applicable to ASMAC.

(b) The supervisory authority exercised by the Minister of

Information shall extend in particular to the orientation and training policies of the School.

3. ASMAC shall comprise three divisions :

(a) Division I shall train technicians in the various mass communication skills and professions

At the end of the course, which shall last two years, successful students shall be awarded the *Certificate of Mass Communication Technician (CMCT)*.

(b) Division II shall train Generalist Journalists.

At the end of the course, which shall last three years, successful students shall be awarded the *Diploma of Generalist Journalist (DGJ)*.

(c) Division III shall train Specialist Journalists.

At the end of the course which shall last two years, successful students shall be awarded the *Diploma of Specialist Journalist (DSJ)*.

4. (1) Four departments are hereby set up within ASMAC :

- (a) the Press Department ;
- (b) the Radio Department
- (c) the Television Department;
- (d) the General Studies Department.

(2) Other departments may be set up as and when necessary.

CHAD

CDR REPORTEDLY FIGHTING FAN

Paris AFRICA AFP in French 15 Oct 82 p 18

[Text] Lagos, October 13--The Democratic Revolutionary Council, one of eight factions grouped in opposition to the Chadian regime of Hissene Habre, is continuing armed resistance against Mr Habre's forces in six regions of Southern Chad, the organization said here.

The statement also warned international groups "who, under cover of humanitarian aid, bring logistical support to the FAN" that the council "declines all responsibility" for any attacks.

Moctar Moussa, a member of the council here, said the organisation would pursue its attacks on supply convoys, and that "people who have nothing to do with Chad's problems could be victims."

The council, led by Sheikh Ibm Oumar, was fighting the Armed Forces of the North (FAN) in Chari-Baguirmi, east of the Chadian capital of Ndjamena, Guera, in South-Central Chad, Ouaddai, in eastern Chad, Salama along the Centrafrican border, Batha, in Central Chad, and Middle Chari in Southern Chad, he said. (AFP)

CSO: 3400/149

OJUKWU FACTOR IN NIGERIAN POLITICS DISCUSSED

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3401, 11 Oct 82 pp 2649-2653

[Article by Arthur Agwuncha Nwankwo]

[Text] IT WAS like the return of the inimitable Juan Peron to Buenos Aires after 18 years in exile. The crowd overflowed the runway as the Boeing 737 jetliner carrying Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu hovered over the Enugu Airport. The police were helpless in the face of the unprecedented surge of excited humanity.

The ex-Biafran leader was returning to Nigeria under an unconditional pardon by President Shehu Shagari, 12 years after he fled the country on the collapse of the Biafran secession in January 1970. Between 1970 and 1982, so much had happened that a leader who had lost a war, and who had been officially declared a villain, was now returning to his people in triumph, like a war hero back from a victorious expedition. To some people, the grand scale of Ojukwu's reception was bewildering; to others it was most frustrating. Retired General Theophilus Y. Danjuma, a former Chief of Army Staff, who was a kingpin in the Nigerian Army during and after the civil war, found this contradictory situation so annoying that he had to come out with an angry statement. Dr. Graham Douglas, a former Attorney-General of Nigeria, lamented in a publication in the *New Nigerian* newspaper that Nigeria was forgetting her war heroes, and that Ojukwu's reception gave the impression that rebellion pays.

When the war ended in the defeat of Biafra, the people feared and indeed expected a massacre from the victorious federal troops. It is still one of the greatest magnanimities in the history of fratricidal wars that there was none. It is a legacy of statesmanship for which Yakubu Gowon will always be remembered. This is not to

say that there were no altercations resulting in the seizure of people's property and, in some cases, the abduction of young girls by the soldiers. More seriously, a few prominent people did lose their lives under questionable circumstances: these were not uncommon events in similar situations elsewhere in history.

But it is to Gowon's official policy of "no victor, no vanquished" and the three Rs of Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reconciliation that Nigeria owes whatever peace it enjoys today. For in the last days of the defeat of Biafra, there were plans to organise the troops into small guerrilla bands. In any case, the fact is that most families kept their young men hidden in bushes until they were sure that there were no reprisals. The complete absence of public trials or of physical molestation on a grand official scale decidedly discouraged any sort of further armed resistance.

One of the last decisions of the Biafran leaders before the surrender, was that there should be no government in exile. As if to respect this wish, Ojukwu did not engage in any anti-Nigerian rhetoric throughout his stay in exile in the Ivory Coast. Therefore, the two major factors to which one can ascribe the rapid acquiescence of the Igbos to the new federal Nigerian situation were:

- (a) the absence of physical reprisals as a federal government policy, and
- (b) the wise decision of Ojukwu (perhaps, at the instance of his chief host, the veteran statesman, Felix Houphouët-Boigny) not to engage in any activities that might jeopardise the reintegration of the Igbos into the Nigerian fold.

Perhaps one should add here that an absent Ojukwu provided the Gowon government with an apologia to satisfy the hawkish opponents of the "no victor, no vanquished" policy, particularly among the military. The fashionable logic was that Ojukwu misled the Igbos into secession.

This expedient but untruthful verdict served a useful purpose, because the absent Ojukwu provided a scapegoat to vent all frustrations of the war on, and made reintegration with the erstwhile "enemy" easy.

Between the end of the civil war in January 1970 and the exit of the military administration in September 1979, the Igbos did suffer in various indirect ways. In a federal structure where the federating arrangement concentrates the resources of the union at the centre, the various national communities or interest groups comprising this federation compete for the benefit of the union's resources. There is therefore the tendency for those groups who have strong representations at the centre to enjoy an advantage over those that have not, even in the implementation of laid-down policies of equitable distribution of the resources of the country.

The development of federal roads in Anambra and Imo States are almost a decade behind those in the states in the North and West. The Lagos-Ibadan expressway, the Lagos-Benin expressway, the Makurdi-Lafia-Akwanga-Jos Road, the Kano-Kari Road, the Maiduguri-Potiskum-Kari-Bauchi-Jos Road, the Maiduguri-Bama-Mubi-Gombi-Yola Road, etc., were built in the early and mid-seventies as against the Port Harcourt-Enugu expressway, Enugu-Onitsha expressway etc., which were either recently completed, or are still under construction.

Before the exodus of the Igbos to their homeland consequent upon the crises of 1966, they had very strong representations in all facets of the federation, including more than an equitable share in the federal bureaucracy, the army, the police, the parastatals, the universities, the research institutions and even in business. By the end of the war, many Igbos returned to find that their positions had already been taken by others. This is in spite of the undertaking of the federal side at the Addis Ababa peace talks to return all Biafrans to their former positions. Most Igbo army, airforce, naval, police and prison officers were not reabsorbed. Those of them who were, had lost three or four

years' seniority. Igbo businessmen had to start from scratch, having lost money, stock and investments. Some, particularly those who were based in Port Harcourt, were permanently ruined, as they could neither start where they had stopped, nor retrieve their immovable investments which had been commandeered and declared "abandoned property" by the Rivers State Government, under a policy connived at by the Federal Government. Even today, the Federal Government administers and supervises the Abandoned Property scheme.

It is significant that most of the rich Igbo businessmen who had property in Port Harcourt began to die one by one at the time it became obvious that all they had built up over a lifetime of hard work and sacrifice was no more theirs. To make matters worse, everybody on the secessionist side was given a ₦40,000 ex-gratia award irrespective of how much they had in their bank accounts. To Federal authorities it may have been calculated that by denying the Igbos financial power, they would be delaying the emergence of an Igbo leader. To many Igbos, it was a most devastating economic leveller. It was in a situation like this that the Nigerian business indigenisation policy was implemented. With neither the financial resources nor the patronage in the finance industry (in which they were most inadequately represented), the Igbos did not have the means to benefit from the transfer of foreign ownership of business to Nigerians. In contrast, the Federal Government provided funds for the so-called indigenes of Rivers State to purchase the so-called "Abandoned Property." This is why the seizure of properties by the Anambra State governor, Mr. James Nwobodo, under the controversial Land Use Act, has touched the Igbos on a very sensitive nerve wound.

Politically, during the Gowon era the Igbos had only one member in the Supreme Military Council, the highest policy-making body in the country. Even that one member was somewhat handicapped being a civilian in a completely military show. The post-Gowon Supreme Military Council (under late General Murtala Mohammed and later retired General Olusegun Obasanjo) had only one Igbo member, a comparatively junior officer (Kanu and later, Ukiwe). Therefore, when new States were created by decree in 1976, the Igbos had only two states (Imo and Anambra) in comparison with the Yorubas, of compara-

ble population, who had four (Lagos, Oyo, Ogun and Ondo) and a strong presence in a fifth (Kwara).

There was unfair *Ibostan* action (analogous to the Bantustan's of South Africa) by the Murtala Mohammed/Obasanjo regime. The Military Government perpetrated serious injustices affecting the political entity of East Central State and the two Igbo States — Anambra and Imo — having an important impact on the revenue allocation and the resource base of the Igbos.

As if the carving away of important oil bearing areas which are indisputably Igbo from the East Central State (under Gowon's 12-State structure) were not enough, the post-Gowon Federal Military Government carried out a "boundary adjustment" exercise that further exploited the rich oil basin of Obigbo from Imo into the Rivers State. At the same time, it carved away the rich limestone deposits of Arochuku-Ewe from Imo into Cross River State at a time when it was fully aware that Imo State Government was negotiating contracts to develop the limestone for a cement factory.

The foregoing describes the disadvantaged position in which the Igbos lived during the post-civil war military period — 1970 to 1979. It is, some would say, a natural price for a people to pay for losing a civil war, and this price could be worse. However, it was a situation that the Igbos were finding more and more difficult to accept as the memories of their crushed rebellion dimmed.

It should be clear with this background that the Igbos were now desperately looking for a leader, a redeemer. This was the situation when Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, ex-President of Nigeria and the Oelle of Onitsha, re-emerged onto the Nigerian political scene and declared his interest in running for the Presidency of Nigeria. When the wily old man, following his registration problem, declared that he was being victimised because he was an Igbo, the gate of a long pent-up Igbo emotion burst open to him and in a dramatic swing, the Igbos voted overwhelmingly for the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP), Dr. Azikiwe's party. So very desperate were the Igbos for a leader that it was easily forgiven and forgotten that the same Dr. Azikiwe had deserted them in their greatest hour of need and crossed to the federal side during the civil war, for which his effigy had been symbolically and solemnly buried in 1969.

When the issue of Ojukwu's pardon became a national one, it did not help

matters that, unlike other Party leaders such as Chief Obafemi Awolowo and Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, Zik did not unequivocally and unconditionally support presidential pardon for Gowon and Ojukwu. During Zik's electioneering campaign he declared that if elected President he would conduct a referendum to determine Ojukwu's pardon. But then the President has prerogative of pardon in consultation with the appropriate organs (council of state, military command, police council etc).

When only Yakubu Gowon was pardoned on October 1, 1981, the Igbos were visibly depressed. When therefore President Shehu Shagari announced the unconditional reprieve for Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, the Igbos were wild in joyful expectation of his return. The massive turnout of the Igbos to receive Ojukwu was because the timing could not have been more appropriate. Secondly, the Igbos saw in Ojukwu an epitome of the leadership characteristics of which they have been starved for a long time: hard work, intelligence and dependability. Thirdly, the "Biafran psyche" is an irreversible phenomenon more so for people who were at their most impressionable age during the civil war. Those people constituted the majority of the multitude who turned out to receive someone whom they remember only as their hero, their revered "H.E."

The return of Ojukwu was to individual Igbos the symbolic release of their chained half, the concluding paragraph in the general amnesty essay. The scapegoat apology had served its purpose and was beginning to hurt. Most Igbo men knew that Ojukwu did not mislead them into a rebellion; although some wonder why he let events lead to a shootout when he had all the facts of the Eastern Nigerian military capability. That is not a challenge of the principles and position he represented but of the wherewithal for the successful maintenance of this position. Perhaps when he writes his memoirs, he will reveal his thinking at the time.

An editorial in the *New Nigerian* of July 6, said that "it is one thing to pardon a rebel leader and another kettle of fish to exploit his popularity for political purposes". The point the editor forgot is that Ojukwu was not a common robber. He led a Biafra that represented a certain point of view in a dialectical contention. The editorial admits it when it professed that Ojukwu "could not have successfully led it (the rebellion) for two and a half years if there

was no support for it". It just happens that in resolving the dialectics Ojukwu's side was defeated and therefore became a rebellion.

By his prompt commitment to an immediate general amnesty for Biafrans, Gowon had prevented a social wound from being cancerous, and has given the country the kind of peace which neither Northern Ireland, Kampuchia, Vietnam, not even Zimbabwe, may ever know. We believe that by granting pardon to Ojukwu, President Shagari has applied a balm that will dry up that social wound.

This is to all those, particularly non-Igbo Nigerians, who resent or are scared by the kind of welcome Ojukwu received. Please do not try to explain the civil war in terms of hero and villain. History, in a deeper sense, is the unfolding of trends, and not just the eccentricities of individual players. History is more of a dialectical evolution. The nation, Nigeria, continues to evolve out of the antics of the individuals whose roles are within the context of contemporary forces at play.

Ojukwu's tumultuous welcome is an expression of relief by a people who have now resolved a long gnawing contradiction. It is a logical chapter in the history of the political development of Nigeria. Those who argue that it gives the impression that rebellion pays or that it means that those who died to keep Nigeria one have died in vain, are brandishing the same lopsided argument that threw this country into civil war in the first place. It means that after 12 years of reconciliation they have not given a dispassionate thought to the events that led to that unfortunate war from points of view of both sides; an exercise which is necessary to avoid the mistakes of the past.

If they continue to show that they have learnt nothing, it is they who would be giving the impression that those who have made the ultimate sacrifice so that this nation may mature, would have died for nothing. And to all leaders or aspiring leaders, Igbo and non-Igbos alike, who are either stupid or criminal enough to whip up ethnic emotions by bellowing ethnic persecution, this writer says, it is a dangerous disservice to this nation. To Igbo leaders in particular, there is a risk of having a chronic persecution complex. It is counter-productive and it is our responsibility to keep this temptation in check.

Chief Ojukwu himself evidently does recognise the frightening responsibility that this situation places on him. All the journalists who were on that plane with him agree that even his usual iron mask of calm expression could not hide the feelings which welled up within him at the sight of the mammoth crowd at Enugu Airport on

that sunny morning of June 20, 1982.

What role would he play in the future of Nigeria? One can only hazard a guess based on deduction. The crucible of the civil war, followed by the lonely years in exile, should have given him time for review and reflection. The opportunity to detachedly watch a restrained elder statesman, Monsieur Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, in action, should have given Ojukwu a rare opportunity of further training in statecraft.

It is my belief and hope that with this background, Chief Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu will recognise that the Igbos have suffered from a misrepresentation of their aspirations by their leaders. And this has led to a misunderstanding of their intentions and the consequent unsavoury reaction against them by their fellow Nigerians. Undoubtedly, this misrepresentation may also have confirmed negatively those who have maintained an adversary position against this miscalculation — the very sort that led to civil war.

I believe that Ojukwu can now calmly lead the Igbos through a non-confrontational posture, recognising the Igbos' true friends and true interests within the context of the overall interest of Nigeria, respecting the legitimate aspirations of other constituent groups, while firmly but restrainedly demanding equity. I believe also that when he may have allayed the fears of those who are scared by his reputation, Ojukwu can contribute usefully to the overall development of the Nigerian nation, joining forces with all who care for progress, respect for human dignity and commitment to the uplift of the people.

I believe that Ojukwu recognises that the internal forces he released and galvanised in Biafra can also be released and mobilised in Nigeria. Let us put behind us memories of personal vicissitudes and work for the future of Nigeria. The forces that made those flying Biafran *Ogbunigwes*, and rockets and refinery, and set up that fantastic propaganda machinery, the forces that set a people to one united purpose, unshaken by internal bickerings and doubts, undaunted by formidable physical constraints, these can be put to work now to make Nigeria a great nation.

Recent events in international circles have consistently shown that a nation that demands respect must have the capability to convince others that she deserves it. The might that goes with this capability cannot be developed here unless the Nigerian people can be galvanised into commitment to the single purpose of true nation building. This is the potentiality of Ojukwu's return, and of Gowon's when he so decides.

NUMBER OF HOMES FLOODED BY DAM GREATLY UNDERESTIMATED

Kaduna SUNDAY NEW NIGERIAN in English 19 Sep 82 pp 1-2

[Article by Emmanuel Yawe]

[Text]

THE fate of the 12,000 villagers who were affected by the flooding of the multi-million Naira Kiri Dam in Gongola State still hangs on the balance. The villagers, some of whom were forced to move into a new resettlement area are living in fear on the grounds that the dam might submerge the area on which they are now settled.

Our Correspondent who visited the dam site reports that the floodings at the dam have far exceeded the limits which Impicon —the company that carried out the census of properties to be destroyed — had assured the villagers it would reach.

As a result of this development, those villagers whose houses had not been enumerated for compensation have been forced to move out as their houses and farmlands have been submerged in water.

Even those who have been

resettled by the Upper Benue River Development Authority, said that they are now living in fear because when the water at the dam reaches the maximum level, the new settlement may be submerged.

A community leader at Kiri village, Mr. Peter Biribodu-woin who took our correspondent round the affected areas, complained that even those people whose houses were enumerated for compensation were not paid the full value of their property and in some cases not paid at all because their names did not appear on the pay list.

Another villager, Mr. Jatau, also complained that even though they were promised bore-holes, electricity, and a police station when the area was chosen as the site for the project, none of these amenities have been provided. He pointed out that "even those of us who have been compensated cannot move to the new settlement site because there is no water in the area."

When contacted, the General Manager of the Upper Benue River Basin Development Authority, Alhaji Abubakar Hashidu said that even though essential work at the dam was completed, he had to intervene to stop the raising of the water to the maximum level of 170.5 metres above sea level because of the apparent danger it posed to the life and

property of the inhabitants of the area.

He revealed that out of the 4.8 million Naira needed to resettle the affected villagers, only .7 million Naira was made available to his authority adding that this was used in compensating 10,023 people and 28,317 economic trees.

Alhaji Abubakar promised that the compensation exercise would continue when a new comprehensive census of the affected people is carried out and the fund is made available for their resettlement.

On the progress report on the work done so far on the dam, the general manager stated that 57 million Naira had been paid out to the major contractors of the project — Nigerian Engineering and Construction Company — for completing all the essential work.

He disclosed that the Federal Government had authorised his authority to take a loan of 14 million Naira from the International Merchant Bank to complete all the

outstanding work on the dam.

Alhaji Abubakar however stated that, the original cost of the project was 44.3 million Naira explaining that because it could not be completed in 1980 as scheduled, it was caught up by the global inflation and the rising cost of labour in the country.

The acting project manager of NECCO Mr. C. Cvetanovic refused to comment when contacted on the grounds that he was unauthorised to speak to the press.

When pressed further, he denied a statement credited to the Minister of Industries, Alhaji Ibrahim Gusau, that 14 million Naira had been "injected" into the project and that work had resumed at the dam.

He confirmed that work had been suspended at the dam since February this year due to lack of funds and humourously asked A. B. Tapidi, the New Nigerian correspondent in Yola: "where is the 14 million Naira 'injection' you talked about in your newspaper?"

REDUCTION, OTHER FACTORS MAY PERMIT INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

Kaduna NEW NIGERIAN in English 20 Sep 82 p 2

[Text]

THE Federal Government is to alleviate the problems facing textile industry in the country by reducing excise duty payable on textile products from 10 per cent to five per cent.

This was announced recently by the Minister of State for Industries, Dr. I. J. Igbani, when he visited International Textile Industries (I.T.I.) Nigeria Limited, Isolo.

He stated that all industries' applications for Approved Users Licence and other concessions, including those for textile industries were being processed by the ministry as a matter of deliberate policy.

Dr. Igbani then enjoined I.T.I. and other industrial concerns to bring to his ministry genuine reports of constraints to the performance and growth of their activities.

The minister remarked that the request of I.T.I. and its Associated Ancillary Industrial Establishment for a timely approval of their other proposed projects in the rural areas of

Lagos State was being given due consideration.

Dr. Igbani later commissioned the recently installed Sulzer Weaving machines.

Earlier, the Administrative Manager, Mr. B. O. Ihekuna had acquainted Dr. Igbani with the expansion projects of the company which were embarked upon since 1977.

These include the establishment of a new spinning mill at Ikorodu; and a fishing industry and its cold store complex also at Ikorodu.

Others were Century Products Cube Sugar Packaging Factory and Food and Confectionery Products Complex for all of which the company had acquired 12 hectares of industrial plots at an annual rate of 150,000 Naira.

Dr. Igbani and his entourage later visited Ocean Trading Nigeria Limited where he inspected tugboats and trawlers and also toured the proposed industrial layout, all at Ikorodu.

CSO: 3400/132

REDUCING DEPENDENCE ON OIL REVENUE SAID NECESSARY

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3401, 11 Oct 8w p 2670

[Text]

In the course of his speech at Abuja President Shagari of Nigeria commented on the international economic recession and went on, "naturally, Nigeria could not have possibly escaped the adverse effects of this global economic crisis, especially in view of its over-dependence on a single export commodity, petroleum.

"It should be recalled that a year ago, our oil production level fell sharply from 1,900,000 barrels per day to a mere 600,000 barrels per day. Again, from early February 1982, the oil market suffered another serious slump when exports fell slightly below 600,000 barrels a day. Consequently, revenue from oil sales dropped from \$14,300m. to \$10,400m. in 1981.

"Although the market is gradually picking up, prospects of increased sales and higher revenues remain uncertain while our import propensity has risen to a record N1,200m. per month.

"It is against this background that I had to request the National Assembly to give me special powers to introduce appropriate austerity measures to prevent the total collapse of the economy with all the attendant consequences. These measures, which are being constantly reviewed for necessary adjustments, have already checked the hitherto unrestricted outflow of foreign exchange through excessive importation, and at the same time stepped up domestic production of goods.

"I call on all Nigerians to see the measures in their correct perspective, designed as they were to inculcate a sense of financial discipline and prudence in both public and private sectors as well as to promote self-reliance. I know that it entails sacrifice on the part of all of us but I am confident that we shall overcome the hard times and emerge economically stable.

"While we are still very largely dependent on oil revenue for all our financial needs, the necessity for an aggressive crude oil marketing strategy cannot be over-emphasised. Accordingly, I have directed the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) to evolve appropriate marketing strategies to ensure that we maintain our level of production within the Opec quota system.

"In furtherance of our objective to diversify our revenue resources, the highest priority rating is now being accorded the LNG (liquified natural gas) and phase two of the petrochemical project. The feasibility reports of the two projects are now being scrutinised."

The President's Director of Budgets, Chief Theophilus Akinyele, had earlier announced that the Federal Government has revised the estimated revenue of N11,600m. for this year which was based on crude oil production to nearly N9,000m. The revision became necessary as a result of the drastic reduction in the lifting of oil, Chief Akinyele said.

He explained that in order to

reduce the over-dependence on revenue from a single commodity, the Federal Government has been making efforts to widen its revenue base. To this end, the revenue collecting agencies have been told to examine the possibility of charging fees for some services hitherto free or raising the existing rate charges; for example, the Federal Ministry of Commerce imposed a fee on applications for import licences, which yielded over N700,000 last year.

Although some American oil industry analysts have been predicting that the end of the oil glut is likely during the current quarter, as companies begin to rebuild their stocks, generally down to about 70 days supply, to prepare for the heavy winter demand, the prospects ahead for oil sales are not rosy with major oil companies reorganising their buying patterns and reducing long-term purchasing contracts in favour of spot deals.

During a visit to Nigeria last month Mr. David Mellor, Britain's Energy Minister, explained that spot sales by the British National Oil Corporation at prices (\$33.50 a barrel) lower than the Opec level for oils of comparable quality was an attempt to dispose of existing stocks and maintain cash flow, not a move to force Opec producers to reduce their prices, which many experts agree could produce a disastrous surge in demand.

BRIEFS

GOVERNOR WANTS POLICY CHANGE--Governor Ambrose Alli of Bendel has called for a system whereby states are vested with powers to collect all the revenue within their area of jurisdiction and pay only a minimal percentage as tax to the Federal Government. Addressing a recent news conference in Benin he said that this would enable states to cope with the increasing responsibilities which the constitution and the presidential system had placed on them. He said his government had not been able to tap the existing sources of revenue because of the difficulty in finding an appropriate method of collection. Earlier, Governor Alli said his government was not prepared for the new national policy on education adding, "The system is very expensive to operate and we have not got the infrastructure to make it a reality." [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3401, 11 Oct 82 p 2680]

PETROLEUM DEPOSITS IN BORNO--Six locations of petroleum deposits have been discovered in the north-eastern part of Borno State. The General Manager, Exploration and Exploitation Division of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Mr. G. A. Adams made this known when he visited Governor Goni recently. Mr. Adams appealed to the State Government to construct a 30-kilometre road from Gongulong village to Masu District to enable the corporation transport machinery for the exploitation of the oil from early next year. Governor Goni in his reply assured Mr. Adams his Government's co-operation and assistance. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3401, 11 Oct 82 p 2680]

CSO: 3400/129

REPORTAGE ON FOURTH SPPF CONGRESS

President's Remarks

Victoria NATION in English 2 Oct 82 p 1

[Text]

"The fourth annual National Congress of the Seychelles People's Progressive Front re-affirms its unfailing confidence in the leadership of President France Albert René both as President of the SPPF and President of the country."

Thus have thousands of party members all over Seychelles shown the world, and especially foreign and local enemies of the people's socialist revolution that whatever the obstacles put in their path, they remain loyal to and determined to follow the man they voted to lead the SPPF and who the people as a whole elected to the helm of the ship of state.

Of all the resolutions passed yesterday evening, after two days of free and frank debate and exchanges of ideas and experiences, the loudest applause was reserved for this

resolution introduced by the party Secretary-General, Mr. Guy Simon.

Reflecting the rank and file's satisfaction with the way Mr. René has led and is leading the long, hard struggle to socialism and with the way he has handled the political, economic and security crises forced on the Revolution, the resolution recognised the SPPF leader's "selfless and devoted work for the well-being of the Seychellois people".

The same resolution also firmly re-affirmed the party members' "conviction in the socialist principles and policies of the Seychelles People's Progressive Front" in what was a clear message to the country's enemies that the struggle to create a new society would continue unabated.

CEC To Appoint Branch Committees

IN a major move to close party ranks to forestall any reactionary attempts to infiltrate the Seychelles People's Progressive Front at a time when Seychelles is facing increasing challenges to its Socialist Revolution, the National Congress yesterday evening voted unanimously to reorganise the Branch structure at the party's grass roots, before ending its discussions a day ahead of schedule.

At the end of the two-day fourth annual Congress at the Maison du Peuple, the 130 branch, union, women's and defence force delegates, led by the Central Executive Committee, amended three articles of the SPPF Constitution and voted through five resolutions on party, national and international affairs.

Reflecting the concern expressed by party members in recent district meetings that attempts would be made to deflect the avant-garde SPPF from its path to socialism after the failure of recent manoeuvres to overthrow the

government and create civil disorder in the country, the Congress voted that in future, each of the Republic's 23 SPPF branches should be governed by a Branch Executive Committee nominated by the Central Executive Committee and not elected by branch members as in the past.

The new committee will consist of five instead of ten members, one of whom will be nominated as Chairman by the CEC. As before, the Committee will meet twice a month.

A new addition to the branch structure will be Branch Advisory Councils also appointed by the Front CEC. A Council will be composed of an unspecified number of members "who have shown absolute devotion to the Front and its principles." It will meet at least twice a year in a purely advisory capacity.

The rules that each Branch will hold a general meeting at least once every three months

and that the district's Member of the People's Assembly should be a non-voting, ex-officio member of the Branch Executive Committee remain unchanged.

Other amendments to the SPPF Constitution concern party funds and membership dues, the latter being increased to R5. per month.

In a resolution concerning the Front, the Congress called on the CEC to appoint a working committee as soon as possible to set up a National Youth League affiliated to the SPPF as provided for in the Front's Constitution.

Mr. René later pointed out that this resolution had come at the right time since the first National Youth Service graduates would be leaving the Port Launay village at the end of this year and a national youth organisation would be needed to make the best of their revolutionary qualities.

A third resolution requested the Government to study the possibility of organising defence and security systems for Praslin and La Digue.

SAP

Solidarity Urged

Victoria NATION in English 4 Oct 82 pp 1, 2

[Text]

THE AVANT garde militants of the Seychelles People's Progressive Front were told on Friday by party leader Mr. France Albert René that they should make a special effort in their districts to try to combat the problems affecting the country.

In his closing speech at the 4th annual Congress, Mr. René told the representatives of the people to have more confidence in what the government was doing to create a better society and that we should have to work together side by side to turn our small country into a real paradise.

"If we are to reach our goal, all of us must analyse our consciences and ask ourselves if we are really contributing as much as we can to make this succeed," the President advised the militants.

The closing speech at the end of the Congress on Friday evening covered many aspects of the Seychellois society as it is today. The President spoke of party motivation, confidence in the government, drugs, black marketeering, indiscipline and other subjects which were discussed during meetings the SPPF leadership had in the districts and which were examined by the Congress.

Mr. René told the militants they should support the principles, beliefs and philosophies which the Front represents, rather than supporting certain individuals of the Party.

Reminding the militants not to let themselves be strayed from their beliefs just because people who had been punished for wrong doing happened to be their relatives or friends. "Why should we become upset for instance when we learn that our children have been punished at the National Youth Service?", he asked.

True militants, he said, must first try and ask themselves whether their children had not committed anything wrong to receive the punishment before criticising — as our enemy wants us to — the measures taken to instill discipline.

"If we are true militants we must accept to make certain sacrifices if we are to succeed".

The problems discussed by the Congress had been noted by the Central Executive Committee which will transmit them to the ministries concerned to take appropriate actions, Mr. René said.

"If we who are militant members of the Front are not ready to think about these problems, if we are not ready to give a hand we won't succeed in eliminating the problems plaguing our society," he told the branch representatives and called on them to be always vigilant.

On the problem of indiscipline, the SPPF President said efforts must be made to re-introduce the control over our children, control which "parents have lost over the past 10 years".

He described the resolution passed by the Congress calling for the setting-up of the Youth League as timely to receive the young people coming from the National Youth

Service and to organise them on the same line they are following in the service.

The SPPF President said that the National Youth Service had an immense task to train some 800 youngsters to live together like brothers and sisters, particularly as for many years previously they had been living a completely different life from the disciplined programme they now faced in the service.

But Mr René stressed that what needed to be appreciated in the NYS, as well as our society in general, was not the little problems which were always present in any enterprise, but the greater successes achieved.

Concluding his address, the SPPF's leader told the branches that during the coming month's he would make it a personal task to continue meetings in the districts to discuss problems affecting the society.

SAP

MINISTER SERVINA TAKES A BREAK TO FURTHER STUDIES

Victoria NATION in English 4 Oct 82 pp 1, 2

[Text]

DELEGATES to the 4th annual Congress of the Seychelles People's Progressive Front learned with sadness on Friday evening that the Deputy Secretary General and the Minister for Agriculture, Mr. Matthew Servina, was taking a break both from the Party leadership and the government, for some time.

Minister Servina told the Congress he felt he needed the break to further his studies and was looking forward to leaving next year for Yugoslavia, the German Democratic Republic, Tanzania and probably Cuba too. In all these countries, he said to reporters after the Congress, he would live with the systems of socialism that have been practised there for many decades and added he was hoping to gain more experience in politics.

But he gave Congress the assurance that he would remain with the Seychellois Revolution wherever he may be.

Minister Servina, who joined the SPUP at the age of 19, told the Congress: "I am still young and feel that though during the past 15 years I've participated in the struggle gaining much experience, I want to improve myself and gain further knowledge rather than simply continuing as I am doing until the age of 50."

The Agriculture Minister said it was wrong to interpret this break from politics as if he was abandoning the struggle at a time when the nation was facing many difficulties. "I believe that it is particularly these difficulties we are encountering which make it necessary for us to become

stronger, more militant and more efficient," he told the Central Executive Committee members, branch and national organisation representatives.

SPPF's President Mr. France Albert René, on his own behalf and that of the CEC and the Party in general, thanked Mr. Servina for his contributions to the Seychellois struggle and said he was sure he would come back to give a hand.

Also leaving for further studies are the National Treasurer of the National Workers' Union, Mr. France Bonté,

on a three-year law scholarship in Britain, and Mr. Vincent Méricq, a union sector secretary, for a five-year study course in economic and political science in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Shelton Jolicoeur, the Union's Secretary for Workers' Education, is already in Britain studying law.

They will all resume their duties on completion of their studies.

SAP

CSO: 3400/112

VITAL ROLE PROPOSED FOR NEW MANPOWER BOARD

Victoria NATION in English 5 Oct 82 pp 1, 2

[Text]

A NATIONAL Manpower Development Board, seen by both the public and private sectors as crucial if Seychelles is to achieve what the President has described as "self-sufficiency in trained manpower", will be set up in the near future if the People's Assembly passes an important bill on the matter.

President René, who is also responsible for government administration, noted in April this year while introducing the board to the public, parastatal and private sectors, that in spite of all the country's efforts since June 5, 1977, Seychelles still did not have enough trained people throughout the economy.

The National Manpower Development Board Bill published last week will allow a major national effort to be made to solve this by properly planning and co-ordinating the use of human resources in Seychelles.

The bill proposes to set up the Board as a corporation chaired by the President, with members appointed by him.

The Board will draw up a national manpower development policy and a national manpower plan, reviewing and revising them whenever necessary. It will co-ordinate all matters relating to manpower planning and development, whether in the public service, parastatal bodies or the private sector, co-ordinating manpower development with economic development.

The Board will ensure that proper training is provided in Seychelles and overseas to meet the country's manpower needs and promote and monitor training by employers. It will also ensure that financial support for training is available either from the Government or from other sources in or outside Seychelles and that funds allocated for training are used effectively.

In promoting the effective use of manpower, the Board will ensure the progressive replacement of expatriate employees by qualified Seychellois.

The administration and work of the Board will be done by a Directorate of Manpower Development under the control of a director appointed by the President.

The director will be responsible to the Board through the chairman for the day-to-day activities of the Directorate, which will advise the Board on the national manpower development policy. The di-

rector will advise and help employers and training institutions about manpower development, and be responsible for drawing up the national manpower development plan.

He will also monitor the employment of expatriates and their progressive replacement by qualified Seychellois, and all training provided for Seychellois, whether in Seychelles or overseas, and whether before or during employment.

The director will liaise for the Board with the public service, parastatal bodies and private employers, ensuring that decisions of the Board are carried out.

To enable the Board to do its job, the Director of Manpower Development will be able to require an employer to inform the Directorate of his plans for training his employees and any other information about the people working for him.

Introducing the Board in April, President René said that the need to ensure the full

and active participation of every citizen in the development of the country had to be one of the main pre-occupations of the Government.

"Every Seychellois has a duty to contribute to the development and progress of his country," Mr. René said.

"Human resources are the most valuable of all our resources and one of our biggest constraints in development is the lack of trained manpower. A nation can have all the physical resources possible but without trained human resources, the potential wealth of that nation could never be effectively tapped, he added.

"However, if a nation develops its human resources it can make considerable achievements, even if its physical resources may be limited.

"... We must aim at becoming self-sufficient in manpower as soon as possible. There is still much more to be done."

SAP

BRIEFS

FAR EAST TOUR--The Youth and Defence Minister, Mr Ogilvy Berlouis, accompanied by his Principal Secretary, Mr Ralph Adam, left Seychelles over the weekend for a working tour of the Far East which will last for several days. They will visit the Democratic People's Republic of Korea where Minister Berlouis will deliver a message from President Albert Rene to the Korean leader Marshal Kim Il Sung. The Seychellois delegation will also hold talks in Pyongyang with their Korean counterparts and other Korean Workers' Party and government officials. The mission will also spend some time in Tokyo to further develop the fruitful ties that have emerged through the Japan-Seychelles Friendship Association. Two leading officials of the Association, which has a branch here, recently spent some time in Seychelles for talks with Government representatives and to finalise cooperation projects. During their stay here, Professor Takesato Watanabe, Secretary-General of the Japanese branch, and M. Masaru Monzen also looked into the possibility of providing sports facilities for young Seychellois. Minister Berlouis is responsible for both sport and youth in Seychelles.--SAP [Text] [Victoria NATION in English 4 Oct 82 p 3]

CSO: 3400/112

'SUPPING WITH THE DEVIL'; ZIMBABWE-SOUTH AFRICA RELATIONS REVIEWED

Johannesburg INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BULLETIN in English Vol 6 No 1, 1982
pp 4-16

[Article by James Barber]

[Text]

"We've got to sup with the devil or starve, but if we starve many other African countries starve with us. And that's where South Africa knows it's got us cornered for a long time to come".¹ That was the judgement of one of Robert Mugabe's aides in October 1981.

Mr Mugabe and his colleagues have come to power after waging a "liberation struggle" to free Zimbabwe from "racial oppression" and "capitalist exploitation", but their triumph is clouded by the realization that on their border, and dominating the southern African subcontinent is the Republic of South Africa, which they believe is built on the very principles they have challenged and defeated in their own country. Not surprisingly the hostility and suspicion is reciprocated on the South African side of the border. To many White South Africans Robert Mugabe and his government are their "devils" — for they believe that Mugabe came to power through a terrorist campaign backed by communist powers, that he is now intent on introducing socialism in his own country, and on giving what support he dares to the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) in their "terrorist" assault on South Africa.

As the two governments and their supporters are divided by this gulf of attitudes and values, the relationship is always likely to be difficult — one in which suspicion rather than trust predominates — and that distrust will be compounded if each side continues, as at present, to interpret the actions and motives of the other in the worst light. Yet neither side can escape the other. Zimbabwe's economic dependence on South Africa is obvious to all. As a land-locked country she has to rely on her neighbours for access to the outside world, and South Africa's ports and transport system which have always been important became even more so in the 1970s, when, for one reason or another, the Mozambique ports were not available. It has been estimated that at the beginning of 1980 almost 90 per cent of Zimbabwe's traffic was passing through the South African ports, and while by 1982 with the reopening of the Mozambique border, the proportion had fallen to 70 per cent, the Zimbabwe Government is determined to reduce it even further. However, it seems probable that for the foreseeable future Zimbabwe will have to continue to move many of its goods through the Republic.²

Zimbabwe's reliance is not confined to transport, for South Africa is her major trading partner. In 1980 she took 17 per cent (Z\$59m) of Zimbabwe's total exports, while West Germany was next with 10 per cent (Z\$31m), and her position in supplying imports to Zimbabwe was even more marked, with 26 per cent (Z\$105m) while Britain followed with 9 per cent (Z\$32m)³. South Africa is especially important to Zimbabwe's manufacturing industries. In 1980 they sent 41 per cent of their products to the Republic and they would have difficulty in finding alternative markets because of the low purchasing power of neighbouring Black states.⁴ South Africa is also a major source of investment, tourists, and skilled labour, and is the home of many of the parent companies whose subsidiaries operate in Zimbabwe. All these economic links were greatly reinforced during the period of UDI when Rhodesia virtually became South Africa's client state. For instance, it has been estimated that during the 1970s the Rhodesian private sector was receiving up to US\$40m a year in credit from South Africa, and that from 1977 to 1979 the commercial banks negotiated loans of up to US\$200m to pay for the war.⁵ At the time of independence about three quarters of Zimbabwe's public debt was payable in the Republic, and similarly the influence of South African companies had increased as sanctions were applied and the Republic became the main conduit for Rhodesia's international transactions.

The new Zimbabwe Government cannot escape these inherited economic ties, and it was not without significance that one of the early visitors to Mr Mugabe after independence was the major capitalist figure of southern Africa, Mr Harry Oppenheimer, the Chairman of the Anglo American Corporation. Mugabe's aide was right when he said that "we've got to sup with the devil", but the reason is as much Zimbabwe's own economic dependence on South Africa as concern about the potential suffering of other Black states.

Yet while Zimbabwe's economic dependence on the Republic is so striking the balance of the relationship is not all one way. Even in economic terms there are advantages for South Africa. The Zimbabwe ministers sometimes claim that an economic break would hurt South Africa as much as their own country. That is gross exaggeration, for South Africa's is much the larger economy and only a small proportion of her economic activity is linked to Zimbabwe, but, as is clear from the previous discussion, South Africa does derive benefit. However, it is in security, diplomatic, and political terms that Zimbabwe's importance to South Africa really stands out.

First, the position Zimbabwe adopts towards the armed struggle of the Black liberation movements is an abiding South African concern, and the government's threats that it will attack Zimbabwe if bases are established there is indication of that.

Second, Zimbabwe provides an important link with the rest of Africa — not only in the physical sense of the routes into central Africa but also in the sense that the attitudes of the Black states throughout the continent will be influenced by the relationship South Africa establishes with her most important neighbour.

Third, and linked to this last point, South Africa's hopes of building a group of interdependent southern African states must be greatly influenced by the relationship she can establish with Zimbabwe.

Fourth, the relationship will have wider international implications, for the major Western states have given substantial backing to Zimbabwe.

Finally, Zimbabwe is important to South Africa because it acts as a mirror of herself, although the reflection is not an entirely accurate one, for South Africa is a much larger, richer, and more complex society. But Zimbabwe is the nearest parallel and inevitably South Africans are going to judge what happens there in the light of their own predicament.

The broad picture, therefore, is that South Africa and Zimbabwe are locked together, by geography and mutual interests as clearly as they are divided by political commitment and ideology. Being "locked together" is not an easy relationship, and there was tension and misunderstanding between the two countries long before Zimbabwe's independence. Despite the binding tie of White minority rule, the relationship between South Africa and the old Rhodesia was littered with disputes and misunderstandings — from the Jameson raid to UDI.

The structure of the subcontinent helps to explain that, for South Africa is so much the dominant element that all her neighbours must feel a sense of threat, irrespective of their political and ideological complexion. Of these neighbours Zimbabwe is clearly the most advanced economically, but that does not remove her sense of being under threat. The South Africans find this difficult to accept, but actions which they see as offering help and support will often be perceived by the neighbours as another reminder of their dependence.

The neighbours in trying to reduce their dependence have now formed the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), which has the dual aims of reducing economic reliance on the Republic, and demonstrating the Black governments' determination to keep her at arm's length politically. The SADCC is made up of nine Black states, including Zimbabwe. From its inception the emphasis has been on "economic liberation" — on reducing dependence on South Africa rather than confronting her. It does not aim at formal economic integration, but at developing alternative transport and communications systems, co-ordinating foreign aid, and promoting trade and industry.⁶

Zimbabwe is heavily involved in the enterprise, and because of her relative economic strength she could well become the cog around which it turns. Already she is to provide the first Secretary-General, and has responsibility for food security — a role especially attractive to Zimbabwe which is aware of its potential as the granary of central Africa. However, SADCC is a long-term venture and it will not be possible to evaluate its success for several years. If it is to come near to its objectives it will require not only external support, but internal political stability, continued co-operation among its members, and considerable administrative and technical competence. None of these can be taken as given. While a target date of ten years has been set for Zimbabwe to break all ties with South Africa it seems more realistic to assume that even if SADCC is a success it will reduce Zimbabwe's dependence on the Republic but not eliminate it.

Meanwhile South Africa remains the economic giant of southern Africa, and nothing can change that quickly. South Africa's Black neighbours will still have no choice but to rely on her, and, while a giant may command respect or fear, it seldom induces love. The inbuilt tension of being "locked together" will persist in Zimbabwe-South African relations.

In its attempts to solve the dilemmas created by its continuing relations with South Africa, the Zimbabwe Government has drawn two distinctions. The first is between economic and political relations. Shortly after independence Zimbabwe broke off diplomatic relations with South Africa and has also refused ministerial dealings with her, but repeatedly Mr Mugabe and his ministers have said that their political opposition does not imply any lessening of economic links. Trade and investment, they say, should continue despite political differences. In April 1981 Mr Mugabe stated; "Our position is that we shall continue to maintain trade relations with South Africa to the extent that South Africa makes it possible for us to do so. We would hope that South Africa would reciprocate and not resort unduly to hostile acts against us. . . . We are pledged to peaceful co-existence with it. We are opposed to the politics of South Africa, but we do not regard the people of South Africa as our enemies at all".⁷

The second distinction comes in Zimbabwe's support for the Black nationalists of South Africa — the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC). While the Zimbabwe Government says that it will give full political backing to these parties and endorses the Organization of African Unity's support for them, it also says it is not prepared to provide bases from which a guerrilla war could be waged. In June 1981 Mugabe said; "We are entitled to give political support to the liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia. It is our duty under the Organization of African Unity. We are committed to fostering the liberation struggle". But then he added; "We have said we will not create conditions in this country which can be used by any organization for carrying out military attacks against our neighbours, including South Africa".⁸

The first of the Zimbabwe distinctions — that between economic and political relations — echoes the appeals which South Africa's Prime Ministers, John Vorster and P.W. Botha, have made in their attempts to establish stronger contacts with their Black neighbours, first through the "outward policy", and later through the idea of a "constellation of states". In promoting these ideas they both argued that South Africa could enjoy good economic relations with her neighbours whatever their political complexion.

However, in its relations with Zimbabwe the South African Government often appears to have given priority to political objectives — to demonstrating its power over the new state by the use of economic links as political levers. That was particularly noticeable in 1981 when the South African Government decided: (a) To withdraw 25 locomotives it had loaned to Zimbabwe, at a time when Zimbabwe Railways were under great strain; (b) to give one year's notice of the end of a preferential trade agreement which had been in force since 1964; (c) to refuse to renew work permits for Zimbabweans working in the Republic; (d) to introduce visas for travel between the countries — which has adversely affected the Zimbabwe tourist trade; and (e) to impose delays on the transport of goods to Zimbabwe. In the case of oil the South Africans have insisted that full payment is received for each delivery before a new one is made.

Doubtless many of the reasons behind the South African decisions had nothing to do with the political differences between the two governments. For instance, the South African Government insists that it needed the locomotives at a time when South African railways were under heavy pressure. Even more obviously, it is in South Africa's interests to change the terms of the preferential trade agreement, which favours Zimbabwe, for while Zimbabwe is allowed to place quotas on South African imports there is no reciprocal arrangement. Furthermore, some of the goods covered by the agreement — such as tobacco, furniture and textiles — directly compete with similar South African goods, and, in South African eyes, have an unfair advantage because of cheaper labour in Zimbabwe.

There are, therefore, a number of reasons for the decisions, but if, as Vorster and Botha had previously suggested, South Africa's emphasis is on building economic relations with neighbours despite political differences, some of the reasons look thin.

For instance, the recalled locomotives may have been of some value to South Africa but the situation was not critical, and in the scale of railway operations in the Republic they can only have had a marginal effect. If the South African Government were intent on co-operation, the economic reward would not seem worth the political tension and misunderstanding which was created.

Another example is the decision to withdraw work permits for Zimbabweans. This followed a speech in which one of the Zimbabwe ministers, Dr Nathan Shamuyarira, said that the Zimbabwe Government did not approve of their fellow countrymen working in the apartheid state. It is easy to understand the South African resentment at such a statement, but the response was very strong, and came despite clarification from Zimbabwe that while the government did not formally approve labour relations with the Republic it left to individuals the decision of whether or not to work there. In sharp retaliation the South African Government decided that the annual work permits would not be renewed for any Zimbabweans, unless they had been resident in South Africa before 1958. It was estimated that about 30 000 people would be affected by this decision. That response suggests that the South Africans were prepared to emphasise political differences at the expense of economic co-operation. They might argue that they were only exercising a "tit for tat" policy, but if they were, it was an economic "tit" (the withdrawal of the work permits) for a rhetorical "tat" (Shamuyarira's statement).

South Africa's attempts to use economic links as political levers was virtually admitted in Parliament by the Minister of Transport, Mr Hendrick Schoeman. In replying to questions about the withdrawal of the locomotives he said that before agreeing to their return the South African Government wanted to have direct talks with Zimbabwe ministers, not only about locomotives but about other matters such as the role of the ANC in Zimbabwe, and the dangers of allowing terrorist bases. Schoeman's mention of the need for direct talks with the Zimbabwe ministers is a persistent South African theme. The refusal of the Zimbabwe ministers to meet their South African counterparts — on the ground that this would represent a political recognition of the Republic, and anyway the relationship can be handled by officials — has angered the South Africans. They argue that in

the end it is the political ministers and not the officials who run governments, and if the Zimbabwe Government wants to deal with South Africa it has to recognize that.

Why has South Africa adopted such a tough approach to Zimbabwe? One explanation is that, consciously or unconsciously, the South African Government has shifted its priorities in southern Africa, so that instead of trying to build a group of states bound together by economic interests its top priority is now to build fortress South Africa, ready for the total onslaught.

The emphasis on security has increased following the collapse of the Portuguese empire and Ian Smith's Rhodesia, as the challenge of Black nationalism has come to lap directly against South Africa's own borders. With this change the old distinction between economic and political ties becomes insignificant, as does another of the old South African distinctions — that it would co-operate with other states but not interfere in their internal affairs. That claim can no longer be sustained following South Africa's military interventions in Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia.

A second and related reason for the change in priorities is the postponement of hopes of building a southern African group of states. Although the South Africans have presented their aims in the subcontinent in terms of the primacy of economic relations these have always been linked to the political hope that a group of "moderate" Black states would emerge ready to adopt a passive role towards South Africa. If that hope is to succeed it requires a compliant Zimbabwe, and the South Africans believed they were about to achieve that with the return to power of Bishop Muzorewa. Mugabe's election victory frustrated that belief and, with communist governments in Mozambique and Angola, the South Africans had little choice but to withdraw into themselves. In consequence the South African Government, although keeping alive the broad hope of co-operation, gives less prominence to the concept of "a constellation of states", and when it is discussed it is usually confined to relations with the "independent homelands", and so is a matter more of domestic than foreign concern.

A third reason for the South Africans' tough line towards Zimbabwe is their inability or unwillingness to reconcile themselves to the political outcome of the struggle for Zimbabwe, and to amend their hostile image of Mugabe's Government. As noted above the outcome of the independence election came as a terrible blow — all the worse because the South African Government had played an active part in the diplomatic efforts leading to the Lancaster House Agreement. While the South Africans had confidently backed Bishop Muzorewa, they had portrayed Robert Mugabe as a Marxist terrorist whose victory would be the worst of all possible outcomes.

With such a firmly implanted image it is not surprising that White South Africans, both in the government and among the general public, have come to perceive Mugabe's Zimbabwe as a threat. The Minister of Police, Louis le Grange, has warned Zimbabwe that South Africa will hit back at any country that harbours terrorists. And he went on to say; "We are aware of the African nationalist terrorists in Zimbabwe . . . We are not prepared to co-operate with a country which harbours terrorist forces against the Republic and we will attack and destroy such bases".⁹ The White public view is also hostile and suspicious. There is evidence that a high proportion of White South Africans, particularly supporters of the

National Party and to a lesser extent other groups, too, are inclined to believe that the Government of Zimbabwe constitutes a threat to South Africa's safety.¹⁰

The hostility and suspicion is reciprocated in Zimbabwe. Although there are no comparable opinion polls it is reasonable to assume that a similar hostile picture would emerge if the Blacks of Zimbabwe were asked to give their views of South Africa. Certainly such fears have been expressed by political leaders. In March 1982 when Robert Mugabe announced that all citizens would have to do military training, he said; "We have enemies in South Africa who are trying to destroy us. You never know when your enemy may strike".

While on their side South Africans believe that Zimbabwe may well be prepared to help the Black nationalist forces, the Zimbabweans suspect that the South Africans want to destabilize their country, and recent cases in which White members of the security and police services have been uncovered as South African agents reinforce that view. Further fuel for Zimbabwe's suspicions was provided by attacks on the supply lines through Mozambique by the Mozambique Resistance Movement, a guerrilla group which is said to be supported by the South Africans. The assumption is that South Africa wanted to demonstrate Zimbabwe's vulnerability and dependence on South Africa.

Also, regular reference is made in Zimbabwe to 5 000 Muzorewa supporters ("dissidents") who are said to be training in South Africa, ready to infiltrate into Zimbabwe. That may or may not be true but it reflects a state of mind, and decisions are made on what is believed to be true, not what is true.

The gulf of attitudes between the two sides is further reflected in their interpretations of the past and their predictions of the future.

Looking to the past there is a striking contrast in views of the Lancaster House Agreement which led to Zimbabwe's independence. In Zimbabwe ministers, such as Mr Edson Zvogbo, complain that the agreement is unfair to the Blacks because it entrenches unreasonable rights and privileges for the White minority, and they accuse the British Government of secretly inserting clauses in the agreement which further strengthened the White position.

Many Whites in South Africa have a very different view. They see Lancaster House as a betrayal. That is clear in attitudes to Lord Carrington who steered the Lancaster House Conference to agreement. Far from gaining prestige for that, he became a villain in the eyes of some White South Africans. When Carrington resigned as Foreign Secretary over the Falkland Island dispute, the leader in *The Citizen* newspaper was headlined "Good Riddance". It started by saying "Phew! What a relief. Lord Carry-on-Selling-the-White-man-down-the-River Carrington, the British Foreign Secretary has resigned", and concluded, "To Lord Carrington we say: Good riddance. You deserve your comeuppance. The only pity is that it didn't come sooner".¹¹

In predicting the future, both sides anticipate conflict and instability in the other state — the Zimbabweans assume that there will be a Black liberation struggle in South Africa, while the South Africans assume that

Mugabe's Government is inherently unstable because of tribal rivalries and socialist policies coupled with administrative incompetence. Ministers in both countries express concern about a potential refugee problem that will arise for them when the conflict on the other side explodes.

One of the lessons that emerges from the discussion so far is that it is impossible to divorce political and economic relations. If you believe that you are supping with the devil, it will affect your appetite and the way you handle the meal. There is sure to be strain between a government that practises apartheid and one that has come to power in a liberation struggle to overthrow White minority rule.

The dual policy of contact with confrontation produces apparently contradictory attitudes, and the problem for those who are trying to make the distinction is that people on the other side have different perceptions. This is certainly a problem for the Zimbabwe Government, and the difficulty extends not only to the attitudes of the South African Government but also to businessmen.

As Zimbabwe was entering its third year of independence, Robert Mugabe made a speech which was plainly intended to reassure foreign investors and businessmen. He said that "Every investment, whether South African, American, or British which we find in the country is equally secure. Whatever investments South Africans have in this country is not prejudiced by the fact that it is from South Africa." Although Mr Mugabe made no mention of "nationalisation", he did speak of government "participation", but assured businessmen that the government had no plans for taking over management as it did not have the expertise or ability.

Yet even in a conciliatory speech Mr Mugabe could not avoid restating his government's position on issues which have caused concern to businessmen, however unreasonable that concern may be. Because of past fears, because his government still carries the "socialist" label, its every move is viewed with suspicion by those who are committed to the "free market". In the interview, Mr Mugabe mentioned the government's decisions to lay down a minimum wage and to introduce worker participation in management. "These", he said, "are some of the notions that frighten people who want a completely free situation where government has not got a regulating hand, otherwise we will be running an exploitive system and we don't intend to encourage exploitation in this country".¹²

Equally, the distinction that the Zimbabwe Government draws in its support for the Black nationalist groups is not easily accepted by the South African Government. While the Zimbabwe ministers have repeatedly said that there will be no bases on Zimbabwe's soil, the South African Government also pays attention to statements such as those made by Mr Mugabe at the funeral of Mr Joe Gqabi, the ANC representative in Salisbury, who was assassinated. (There was suspicion in Zimbabwe that it had been done by South African agents.) At the funeral Mr Mugabe said that apartheid was an insane policy and those who adopt it must themselves be insane. He pledged the people of Zimbabwe to the common struggle with the ANC. Statements like that, visits to Zimbabwe by Mr Sam Njoma, the SWAPO President, and also by the Cuban Foreign Minister, and speeches by Zimbabwe ministers in which the Republic is branded as a racist, exploitive society whose days are numbered, have infuriated the South African Government and persuaded them that Zimbabwe may well give active support to guerrilla groups.

Another lesson that can be drawn is that the tension between the two countries has obvious implications for the southern African subcontinent as a whole and could gain increasing international attention to become an area of potential global tension and rivalry. The South African Government never tires of emphasising the dangers of communist expansion, and doubtless that danger exists, but there is no agreement about the source of the danger. While South Africa sees it as an external threat, most Western states believe the danger lies mainly inside South Africa itself — in the government's racial policies and the threat of internal disorder that arises from that. Western attitudes are especially important in the case of Zimbabwe because the Western states have committed themselves to giving aid and support. This places Zimbabwe in a different category to Angola and Mozambique. In their case, when the hostility has flared into armed conflict with South Africa the Western response has been muted because it has few direct commitments, although the Eastern bloc has become involved. However, if there was direct conflict between South Africa and Zimbabwe the Western position would be very different, and it would be difficult to avoid involvement.

So far the dangers and difficulties of the Zimbabwe-South Africa relationship have been stressed, but the picture is far from one of complete antagonism. There is constant interaction between the two states, most of which is peaceful and mutually beneficial. There is the possibility that both governments will increasingly recognize the advantages of tolerating the other. In the early months of 1982 there were signs that this might be taking place, as Zimbabwe ministers usually avoided provocative speeches, and on the South African side the locomotives were returned and the trade agreement was extended while negotiations continued. However, if mutual tolerance is to grow there will have to be a revision of the image each side has of the other. If this is to happen it will probably come from a calculation of hard-headed interest.

On the South African side, the first realization could be that it is strongly in the Republic's interests to have a stable Zimbabwe. A breakdown of order there would not only adversely affect the South African economy and the Republic's links with the rest of central Africa, but could also create the conditions for the penetration of guerrilla groups. A stable government in Zimbabwe will seek to avoid direct military confrontation with South Africa, because of the heavy cost, and Robert Mugabe offers the best hope of stability. However much he and his ministers dislike apartheid, they appreciate that their interests are served by avoiding conflict with the Republic.

A further hard-headed South African calculation would be to recognize that their faith in Muzorewa was misplaced. It was most improbable that after a bloody civil war "a moderate" would emerge as Zimbabwe's leader — a compliant phoenix arising from the ashes. Moreover if Muzorewa had succeeded, his power base may have been insecure, partly because of the difficulties he would have faced in dealing with the Patriotic Front's armies (ZANLA and ZIPRA), and also because personally he was not a strong or competent leader. Ironically, therefore, Mugabe turns out to be the best choice as leader from South Africa's point of view because he can offer the best chance of stability and of strong leadership.

If White South Africans are to change their image they will have to recognize the considerable achievements of the new Zimbabwe, and to abandon their reflex reaction of dismissing it as an inherently unstable state heading for economic ruin. Undoubtedly Zimbabwe faces major problems as the government tries to retain a vigorous economy while fulfilling its commitment to a more even distribution of goods and rewards.¹³ It has made promises about the provision of social services and the redistribution of land, which are impractical. There is also the danger that the rapid growth of the public sector will lead to problems encountered in other Black states of nepotism, corruption and inefficiency, and the outward flow of skilled White workers is another worry. Yet, while recognizing such problems, the achievements of the new Zimbabwe Government are substantial. The rival armies have been successfully merged into a single national army, and while there are still bands of armed "dissidents" — offshoots from the old guerrilla armies — these are a relatively small problem when measured against the prospect of renewed civil war that could have confronted the new state. Also, and despite the split with Mr Joshua Nkomo, Mr Mugabe has achieved considerable political stability, and seems firmly in control without introducing the personality cult which is found in some Black states. That has been reinforced by his policy of reconciliation between the races. It is difficult to believe that two and a half years ago a bitter and bloody civil war was being waged, in which up to 30 000 lives were lost. The healing of wounds has been a major achievement of the Zimbabwe Government.

On the economic side there is also much to admire, as well as obvious problems. Overall, the Zimbabwe economy is much stronger than that of other Black states, not only in the level of sophistication but in its relatively broad base — with important mining, manufacturing and agricultural sectors. In the first two years of independence there was an impressive growth rate of 14 per cent and 8 per cent, and while there was a downturn in the mining industry which reflected the international recession, the manufacturing and agricultural sectors did well, with marked revivals in areas such as tobacco. The railway situation has improved with the arrival of American locomotives and Indian mechanics. Also the land resettlement scheme has got off to a reasonable start, although there will be future problems if the government attempts to implement its undertaking to settle 160 000 families in two years.

Looking to the future, it would be advantageous for both South Africa and Zimbabwe to build on Zimbabwe's economic strength, but if that is to happen it will need continued co-operation — the supping with the devil will have to go on. One of the dangers for Zimbabwe is that the South African gloomy predictions will become self fulfilling, and in this respect the attitude of businessmen is as important as that of the government. Zimbabwe will face a serious economic position if business confidence collapses, and that confidence is fragile. For instance, the mining companies are deeply suspicious of the government's proposed mineral marketing board. The government protests that the fears are unfounded, but if, for good or poor reasons, the companies lose confidence the important mining sector could go into decline. Mr Mugabe has the delicate task of balancing on the one hand White fears, and on the other Black expectations and his

government's commitment to a more equal society. In doing that he walks a tightrope. The tightrope will, however, be more difficult to walk if the relationship with South Africa deteriorates further, for not only will it increase the political problems but also the task of reconciliation between the races in Zimbabwe.

What of Zimbabwe's future attitude to the liberation struggle in South Africa? The commitment is likely to remain and so will the tension with the South African Government. It seems unlikely that Mugabe's Government will be prepared to abandon its political hostility or to establish contacts at a ministerial level, despite the continuing economic dependence. It also seems most unlikely (unless there is a break down of order in South Africa) that the Zimbabwe Government will allow guerrilla bases to be established in its country because of the fear of South African reprisals and the local instability that is created by such bases.

Accepting that limitation, Zimbabwe's greatest contribution to change in South Africa could be to demonstrate that a Black government has the ability to run a country with a flourishing economy and with racial tolerance. The achievement of internal objectives by the Mugabe Government could therefore become its greatest contribution to change and reform in South Africa.

*Professor James Barber is Master of Hatfield College, Durham. From 1978-1980 he was the co-director of the Chatham House "Southern Africa in Conflict" project. Amongst many other publications, Professor Barber is the author of *South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945-1970*, and *Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion*.*

Notes

1. *Rand Daily Mail*, (Johannesburg) 13.10.1981.
2. Figures drawn from article by Larry Bowman, Michael Bratten, and Rukudzo Murapa "Zimbabwe and South Africa: Dependency, Destabilization and Liberation" to be published in Thomas Callaghy (Ed.) *South Africa in Southern Africa* (N. Y. Praeger 1982).
3. *Zimbabwe Digest of Statistics* (Zimbabwe Government Printer) December 1981.
4. See David Wield "Manufacturing Industry" in Colin Stoneman (Ed.) *Zimbabwe's Inheritance* (Macmillan 1981).
5. Bowman *et al.* *op cit.*
6. See Gavin Maasdorp *New Economic Groupings in Southern Africa: the PTA and the SADCC* (Economic Research Unit, University of Natal).
7. *Sunday Times* (Johannesburg) 19.4.1981.
8. *Star* (Johannesburg) 9.6.1981.
9. *Star* (Johannesburg) 9.5.1981.
10. Unpublished opinion poll conducted on behalf of the South African Institute of International Affairs in early 1982.
11. *The Citizen* (Johannesburg) 6.4.1982.
12. *The Cape Times* (Cape Town) 20.4.1982.
13. See Colin Stoneman (Ed.) *Zimbabwe's Inheritance* (Macmillan 1981).

PROPOSALS OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE OF PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL EXAMINED

Johannesburg INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS BULLETIN in English Vol 6 No 1, 1982
pp 26-40

[Article by Michael R. Sinclair]

[Text]

The imperative for constitutional reform in South Africa and the perceived inadequacy of the so-called Westminster system in providing for political development and stability in South Africa was first officially raised in 1975 by the Theron Commission of Inquiry into matters relating to the Coloured population group. In the political context, the Theron Commission found that the now defunct Coloured People's Representative Council (CRC) was discredited and lacked any political legitimacy within the Coloured Community. The Commission circumspectly recommended the restoration of the Coloured vote in the central Parliament, but acknowledged that a new constitutional dispensation might be necessary to achieve this. A Government White Paper on the recommendations of the Theron Commission subsequently spurned most of the Commission's advice.

Nevertheless, the Theron Commission, I believe, is a watershed in the political history of this country, since it set in train the debate on constitutional reform and a process of consultation for a more just and viable social, economic and political dispensation. The debate among the Afrikaner political and intellectual elite on political reform was sharply focused by the riots of 1976 and the publication in 1977, by the Nationalist Party, of a constitutional blueprint intended to bring the Coloured and Indian people into the central decision-making process.

The 1977 National Party constitutional plan proposed three separate Parliaments for White, Coloured and Indian people. The White Parliament would transfer all matters which specifically concerned Coloured people and Indians to their respective Parliaments. Each of these population groups would have its own Prime Minister and Cabinet. The ratio suggested was 17 Ministers for the 185 member White Parliament, five Ministers for the 92 member Coloured Parliament and three for the 46 member Indian Parliament.

A further proposal put forward a Council of Cabinets consisting of the three Prime Ministers, six White Ministers, three Coloured Ministers and two Indian Ministers. The Council of Cabinets would deal with matters of common concern. This Council of Cabinets, which was clearly intended to be the central decision making body, was to be headed by an Executive President. The President would be elected by an electoral college made up of 50 White, 25 Coloured and 13 Indian members of Parliament.

Lastly, the proposals made provision for a non-parliamentary President's Council which would advise the Council of Cabinets on matters of common concern. The President's Council, it was proposed, should consist of 20 members elected by the White Parliament, 10 by the Coloured Parliament and 20 appointed by the President.

This plan was endorsed by the provincial congresses (the main party policy making institution) of the National Party and subsequently formed one of the main planks in the party's election platform which saw the National Party gain its biggest majority in Parliament ever. (It is indeed ironic that this plan should appear to be the main point of dispute between the National Party and the splinter Conservative Party.)

In April 1979, these constitutional proposals were embodied in a Bill for a new Constitution and laid before Parliament. However, before the Bill was read for the first time, it was referred to a Joint Select Committee of Parliament for further consideration, and to allow "adequate time and opportunity for representations". In July 1979, the Select Committee was converted into a Commission of Inquiry into the Constitution, under the chairmanship of Alwyn Schlebusch, then Minister of Justice and the Interior. (All parties represented in Parliament served on this Commission which reviewed a considerable volume of evidence.)

The Schlebusch Commission laid an Interim Report before Parliament in May 1980 and recommended: the abolition of the Senate; the introduction of an additional 20 members of the Assembly appointed by the State President on a proportional basis; the creation of a new office of Vice-State President; the establishment of an advisory body composed of black South African citizens (this recommendation was accepted and embodied in section 106 (4) (b) of the Constitution Act (No. 32 of 1961) but was not implemented); and lastly, the Schlebusch Commission recommended the establishment of the President's Council.

The President's Council, in the words of the Schlebusch Commission, would be an advisory body composed of nationally-acknowledged experts in their respective disciplines drawn from the White, Coloured, Indian and Chinese communities and persons recognised as leaders by their respective communities.

The institution of the President's Council took place on the 3rd February 1981 and now, less than sixteen months later, the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council has made its first recommendations to government.

Turning to the reports of the Constitutional Committee, I shall look first at the report on government at the national level and then at the proposals on local and regional management systems, although the two are obviously completely inter-related.

Clearly there are two dimensions to constitution-making — first, a philosophical dimension, and secondly, a structural dimension. A constitution is a set of principles and technical regulations, encompassing, and largely determined by, the values of the society it is designed to govern. Thus the formal constitutional framework of a state ought to reflect the aggregate of values, interests and motivating premises of the society concerned.

The Constitutional Committee has recognised this fact, and presents its recommendations for the constitutional restructuring of the South African polity through the weighing of alternatives and the drawing of conclusions in the light of specific premises or assumptions. On this basis the Constitutional Committee identifies eight broad assumptions which constitute the parameters or framework within which the evidence before the Committee was weighed and the proposals formulated.

Firstly, the Committee stresses the need to eliminate and obviate group or segmental domination. While the salience of this point is more or less self-evident, it is useful to quote the Committee's motivation for the normative premises adopted; "The normative premises adopted by the Committee pre-suppose the establishment of a system of government which is broadly representative of, and accountable to, the communities it is intended to serve: in a nutshell, a democratic system. The Committee's commitment in this regard applies to all levels of government in the new constitutional order. However, as the Committee has come to appreciate, positing a democratic system as a goal is one thing; realising it in South Africa's particular circumstances is something else . . ."

Secondly, the Committee expresses its opposition to discrimination in all its forms. In the constitutional context, it states that whatever governmental forms it may recommend, and however inclusive in their application they may be, these forms should satisfy the requirement of equal civil and political rights. This means that in respect of the groups which, initially at least (in the view of the Committee), should participate at the level of central government — the Whites, Coloureds and Indians — there should be fully equal treatment. (It may be noted that members of the Committee have subsequently claimed that the "door has not been closed" on the participation of urban Blacks in central government at some future stage.)

Thirdly, the Committee stresses the necessity for political development, as judged by such values as democracy, liberty, justice, prosperity, equality of opportunity, security, efficiency, self-respect and the protection of identity and culture. The Committee emphasizes the need to increase the degree of democratization in South Africa as measured by; (a) the inclusiveness of the franchise, and (b) the extent of freedom of opposition. The Committee argues that the inclusiveness of the franchise matters in respect of the degree of democratization only in so far as, and to the extent that, freedom of opposition exists. (For example, universal suffrage exists in the Soviet Union, but not democracy in its Western sense.)

In the fourth place, the Committee makes the point that its proposals must be premised by the "plural" (heterogeneous/multi-ethnic) character of our society. It argues that failure to adapt their proposals to these realities would not be conducive to political stability.

Fifthly, the Committee argues that its proposals assume the need for strong central government, since "strong" government is necessary to make possible both order and progress. (It is interesting that the Committee has opted for the use of the word "strong" and not stable in this context.) Furthermore, in an almost contradictory fashion, the Committee declares itself in favour of limited government, but argues that "limited government" is compatible with strong government, since a government (in the words of the Report) may be strong without being "widely interventionist".

Sixthly, the Committee accepts the need for constitutional mechanisms which will effectively protect group as well as individual rights. This, I think, is made clear by the foregoing assumptions and specifically the Committee's rejection of majoritarianism.

In the seventh place, the Committee assumes that a single political system which included all groups, whether on a simple majoritarian or an all-embracing consociational basis, could not function as a successful democracy in foreseeable circumstances. This point is later qualified in so far as it is stated that if the consociational model were to operate successfully in the context of the White, Coloured and Indian communities, if in particular it were to bring about a more democratic political system, then "other possibilities might present themselves".² However, the Committee observes, that a single political system which included permanent Blacks could not function as a successful democracy in foreseeable circumstances and suggests that this "... has little to do with differences of colour as such and much to do with cultural differences, relative numbers, conflicting interests and divergent political objectives."³

Finally, the Committee assumes that a single political system in South Africa which included Coloureds and Indians on an equal basis with Whites could function successfully as a consociational democracy. Consociational democracy refers to the system evolved in certain highly plural societies (e.g. the Netherlands, Austria and until a few years ago the Lebanon) in which the segmental or group nature of the society is recognised, the leadership elites and the various groups are consciously involved in decision-making, and certain techniques (notably vetoes, depoliticization, proportionality and coalitions) are used to regulate potential group conflict. The theory of consociational democracy has been developed in opposition to the orthodox majoritarian "winner takes all" model.

In the theoretical concept of consociationalism, most commonly associated with Arend Lijphart, there are four key features: (a) all significant segments of a society co-operate in government; (b) each segment of the coalition government has a right of veto when its own vital interests are threatened; (c) power is distributed or "shared" on a proportional basis; and (d) purposive depoliticization through the devolution of political authority and responsibility to the parochial or local levels. Clearly, the essence of consociationalism is government by compromise and consensus between all major groups to what Lijphart calls the "grand coalition".

Lijphart has subsequently suggested that the Constitutional Committee's notion of consociationalism is a travesty of his conception of the theory, most specifically since the majority Black sector of the South African political community is excluded from the so-called consociational dispensation. Clearly implicit in the classic theory of consociationalism is the collaboration of all groups in the society, in the process of government.

Furthermore, consociationalism assumes a socialization process in which all societal groups develop sufficient common ground to make their collaboration in government feasible, while simultaneously maintaining group autonomy. This situation clearly does not pertain in South Africa, and besides the fact that the Constitutional Committee (both in its constitution and recommendations) perpetuates the South African penchant for the arbitrary institution of political structures on South African society, its disregard for the social preconditions for consociationalism, as well as Black opinion, must indeed render questionable the use of the term "consociationalism" in the context of its report.

Turning to the structural aspects of constitution making, the Committee on the basis of the above premises, considered six options: simple majoritarianism in a single state ("one-man-one-vote") — the Committee rejected this option on the grounds of their rejection of group domination. It was argued that a majoritarian system, regardless of the constitutional fetters and regardless of whether the state was unitary or federal, would lead to Black domination.

Secondly, the Committee dismissed the idea of radical partition, which would imply the creation of independent homelands for the Coloured and Indian communities, in addition to the Black "national states". The premise underlying the Committee's rejection of this option is apparently the Committee's commitment to increasing the degree of democratization in South Africa.

Thirdly, the Committee does not recommend a continuation of the policy of national states for Africans and one person, one vote for Coloureds, Indians and Whites. (That is to say, a simple majoritarian system for these three groups, implying a common voters' role and multi-racial political parties.) However, it is the latter aspect which finds disfavour with the Committee, since the Committee goes to some lengths in stating its support for the policy of separate national states. This stand is premised by the need to minimise group domination and inter-group conflict, the need to promote the conditions of self-respect by avoiding both Black and White domination, and the need to safeguard the culture and identity of individuals and groups.

Option four found favour with the Committee, namely, "multiple partition" and consociational democracy for Whites, Coloureds and Indians, i.e. the notion of "segmental autonomy". This implies that all groups — African, Coloured, Indian and White retain their group/ethnic autonomy; the Africans in the national states and the Coloured, Indian and White groups in a single political system. It is this option which underlies the recommendations of the Committee.

The fifth option of an all embracing consociational system (including Blacks) was considered by the Committee as unlikely to operate as a democracy and therefore dismissed. In the sixth place, the Committee rejected the option of a continuation of the policy of separate Black national states together with a consociational or majoritarian (one-man-one-vote) dispensation for Blacks outside the national states, Coloureds, Indians and Whites.

Government, according to the proposals, ought to be headed by an Executive President (initially to be elected by the present Assembly) for a

term of seven years. The formal functions envisaged for the President include appointing the Premier (or Prime Minister) and in consultation with the Premier appointing members of the Cabinet, dissolving Parliament, holding referendums, and in conjunction with the Cabinet, initiating legislation. In the Committee's view, members of the Cabinet should not simultaneously be members of the legislative body. However, except for the fact that they will not be allowed to vote, the premier, ministers and deputy ministers could be expected to participate in the deliberations of the legislative, exactly as they do at present.

It is these specific aspects of the proposals which have drawn most fire from the Committee's critics. One must acknowledge two points though: firstly, that the Committee's report (by its own admission) is incomplete; and secondly, that if reform in South Africa is to be successfully implemented in the face of the very considerable odds then, indeed, a strong political leader is necessary. However, whether an executive presidency will in itself help to resolve the underlying and deeply entrenched conflicts in South Africa is open to serious dispute. Given South Africa's tradition of entrenched political leadership, working for the preservation and consolidation of political power, as well as the merger of party, state and national interest and the inseparable identification of all three with Afrikanerdom, the apparent failure of the Committee to insist upon closely prescribed checks and balances to curb the power of the President is indeed an understandable cause for concern.

Criteria against which "responsible", Western-style Presidencies are measured include direct participation by the mass of the electorate in the choice of candidate for executive office, a restriction on the length of time any one person may hold office, and a network of legislative and judicial checks on executive power. For members of the Constitutional Committee to claim, *post facto*, that they did not foresee the necessity of allaying fears of the inherent dictatorial potential in their proposal, when measured against South African political reality, is an astounding revelation which flies in the face of several motivating premises, not least the value ascribed to "democracy, liberty and justice".

Essentially the criticism of this proposal stems from the fact that the Executive (i.e. both President and Cabinet) would not be responsible to the electorate. One assumes that the legislature would be able to pass a vote of no confidence in any member of the Cabinet and that the legislature could actually decline to pass the budget. But, as it stands, it appears as though the President has the power to dissolve the legislature as and when he sees fit, which is bound to be seen to imply that if the legislature should adopt an attitude contrary to the President's will, the President may dissolve the legislature and call new elections in the hope of having the electorate return a more favourably disposed legislature. At worst, the Executive could rule without the consent of the legislature if a situation of prolonged political crisis occurred.

Nevertheless, I think one must accept the Committee's motives in proposing an extra-parliamentary executive precisely in the spirit which it is put: "The Committee has answered the need for reform by proposing a non-parliamentary executive headed by a president; and it has answered the needs of the poly-ethnicity of the society by insisting that the president

be elected in such a way as to encourage him to be supra-ethnic, because true to the *leitmotiv* of the state, he should govern in the general interest and not in pursuit of sectional interests."⁴ The reality, however, as the Committee ought to have recognised, may be somewhat different.

Turning to the legislative body, the Committee proposes a single chamber (unicameral) legislature in which the White, Coloured and Indian electorate is represented, structured on the principal of "segmental autonomy". In other words, representation in Parliament should be on a group basis, as opposed to cross-cutting, intra-communal party-political representation. While it is suggested that special provision be made for matters essentially of interest to a particular community, the successful functioning of the legislature will depend on the degree to which the political leaders of all three communities are able to achieve a consensus. (This is fundamental to the notion of consociationalism.)

The Committee does not specify the exact ratio of proportional group representation, but clearly the White group will be overwhelmingly dominant. The legislature, therefore, will necessarily function on the basis of issue alliances forged across party lines. Thus, for example, the PFP representatives within the White group (should this party collaborate in the implementation of the new system) would need to forge alliances with, say, the Coloured Labour Party and/or one or more of the Indian political parties represented in Parliament in opposing or advancing a particular issue in Parliament. One could envisage a situation where the Coloured and Indian groups are unanimous on a specific issue and in alliance with, say, the PFP representatives in the White group could defeat the predominant sector of the White group.

The Committee's concern for "segmental autonomy" would seem to indicate a preference for racially separate voters' rolls, but this is left undefined. So too, the legislative process has been left undefined, but clearly the power of Parliament, as the organ of government directly elected by, and directly answerable to the electorate, has been greatly reduced. This pattern is in keeping with general theories for political development which acknowledge two parallel developments in a process of political reform: first, the concentration of power in the hands of the executive; and secondly, a devolution of power and authority to the local level, or the so-called second and third tier of government.

The Constitutional Committee's proposals for government on the second and third level are contained in the Joint Report (with the Committee for Economic Affairs) on Local and Regional Management Systems. The overriding objective of the recommendations contained in this report is maximum devolution of power to local and regional authorities. To define the exact relationship between the central executive and the local/regional authorities and to co-ordinate this relationship, the Committee recommends the institution of a Ministry of Local Government, represented by a Minister in the Executive.

At the level of Provincial/Regional Management the Committee envisages that South Africa should be divided into eight regions for the purpose of regional administration. As to the structure of regional administrations, the Report presents two alternatives: (a) eight regional/provincial racially mixed (Coloured, Indian and White) executive committees *appointed* by the

central executive (President and Cabinet); or (b) eight *elected* provincial councils, consisting of Whites, Coloureds and Indians, but deprived of all legislative power, (The Councils thus becoming purely executive/administrative bodies.) Furthermore, the Committee recommends the establishment of seven metropolitan authorities, encompassed by the four major urban/industrial complexes in South Africa; namely, Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereniging (PWV) Area, the Cape Peninsula, Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage complexes and Durban-Pinetown-Pietermaritzburg areas. It is suggested that the seven metropolitan bodies should have authority in the following areas: Pretoria and environs; Central Witwatersrand (including the West Rand); the East Rand; the Vaal Triangle, Durban, Pinetown and environs; Port Elizabeth, Dispatch and Uitenhage; the Cape Peninsula and environs.

These metropolitan authorities will consist of representatives of elected local authorities (Black, White, Coloured and Indian) and will be responsible for so-called "hard" services. That is to say, those infrastructural services which are of common importance to all areas: metropolitan planning; road/street and stormwater control systems; electricity and water supply; transport; fire services; sewage and waste disposal. Representation on the metropolitan authorities will be proportionate to the extent of taxable immovable property, thus ensuring White predominance. (It is significant to note that there are no overtly racial criteria for local government, but this is negated by the fact that the iniquitous Group Areas Act survives unscathed.)

Finally, the Committee argues strongly for a far greater degree of autonomy and power for elected local authorities (or municipalities). It is proposed that the franchise at local authority level be open to all residents of the area over the age of 18, with a loaded system of additional votes being accredited to individual and corporate owners of immovable property. Thus, considering the laws restricting land ownership in this country, elected local authorities could be White, Coloured, Indian or mixed, on the one hand, while Black local authorities (which in terms of the Local Authorities Act pertaining to Black Urban Areas just passed by Parliament, are to acquire status akin to their White municipal counterparts) will stand as racially exclusive.

These local authorities are to be entrusted with the so-called "soft" functions, which implies the power to make regulations and by-laws, and to function in a general administrative capacity.

In sum, the characteristic pattern of these two inter-related reports is the simultaneous concentration and devolution of power. The reasoning in this is clear; for the best part of thirty years the South African Parliament has been dominated by the National Party and the party caucus, which, as we have so often witnessed, acts as a powerful brake on political reform. The

President Council's stratagem is to defuse the potential for party-political conflict by retaining Parliament, but depriving it of any real power. Effective political power is divided between the lowest rung of authority, the local and regional councils, and the highest — an all powerful executive president. This plan would insulate the executive from the characteristic party political bickering and dissension which the continuing process of reform is likely to evoke. At the same time, however, the plan makes provision for a far greater degree of democratic participation at the local level.

The overriding motive is simply that the issues of open swimming pools and theatres, for example, should not be a concern for central government; the local authorities will be required to deal with issues of this nature, while the executive rules the country in the "national interest".

This is the theory, in practice it depends entirely on how much the government finds acceptable, and more importantly, the pace of implementation of those aspects which are found acceptable. In the wake of the National Party Caucus meeting on 5th June, the so-called "guidelines" which are to form the basis for negotiation with the Coloured and Indian communities, appear to be far closer to the 1977 proposals than the President's Council plan.

Reports are that the Government's "guidelines" are for an indirectly elected Executive President to preside over a multi-racial cabinet where members of the executive will retain their seats in Parliament. No Prime Minister or Premier, this function being taken over by the President, while the leaders of the three groups represented in Parliament would fulfil an important role. The Parliament would be one sovereign body with three separate chambers, that is to say the Coloured, Indian and White members of Parliament would meet in the same building but not in the same chamber. A process of joint consultation through a system of committees is proposed so as to negotiate consensus between the groups before Bills are submitted in each chamber. (Doubtlessly, this aspect of the proposals is premised on the fear that inter-group coalitions within a single chamber parliament might jeopardize National Party dominance.) Furthermore, the government seems intent on expanding the size of the President's Council to include members indirectly elected.

It appears likely that the proposals for second tier government (the abolition of the Provincial Councils and the creation of eight new regional administrations) will be temporarily shelved, not the least because of the considerable expense involved, the lack of trained officials of all races, and the sensitivity of this far-reaching restructuring, but also because the implementation of the proposals for second tier government are dependent on the institution of the recommendations for local authorities first. There does not appear to be any reason why the latter proposals should not be implemented at the same time as those at central government level.

This appears to be the Government's framework for negotiation. However, voices on both left and right of the South African political spectrum are likely to be raised in anguish before the implementation of any of these proposals.

The fundamental inadequacy of these constitutional plans, from the perspective of the liberal political constituency in South Africa, is the exclusion of Blacks, both from the drafting stages and the final blue-print. Claims by members of the President's Council that the "doors have been left open" or that "other possibilities may present themselves" are perceived as shallow after-thoughts. Furthermore, it is argued that the President's Council, because it is a nominated body, inevitably is dominated by members sympathetic to National Party views, and that the Indian and Coloured members of the President's Council are not representative of these communities. However, the choice of participation or rejection is not

a simple one. As far as the Progressive Federal Party is concerned, if it declines to participate in the new constitutional scheme, because of the exclusion of Blacks, it will be excluded from Parliament and will face the political wilderness. If the PFP co-operates on the understanding that Blacks will be incorporated at some later stage, then there will be a considerable loss of face, in the light of the PFP's refusal to join the President's Council.

Either way, it seems to me that the PFP is set to lose support, on the one hand, because the bulk of the PFP supporters are only marginally supporters of Progressive policy (as made clear in the Johannesburg Municipal elections). The Prime Minister and the Nationalist Party, regardless of how much of the proposed reform is implemented, have acquired the undeniable aura of reformers, prepared not only to do battle with their own party-spoilers, but boldly to confront Nationalist shibboleths. It can be expected that the Nationalist Party will gain considerable support from the middle-of-the-road English voter in their appeal to the electorate for support in carrying out the reform programme.

On the other hand, if the PFP does co-operate and join the new political dispensation it will almost certainly alienate many of its more liberal supporters (most especially its younger supporters). Furthermore, it will certainly have difficulty convincing the more radical Black constituency of its *bona fides* in joining what the PFP camp has called a "sham". Indeed the PFP will become part of the "non-black" bloc which Blacks perceive as ganging-up against them.

The Coloured leaders, and perhaps to a greater extent, the Indian leaders face very much the same dilemma. At what price collaboration? Certainly those community leaders who refuse any share in the new dispensation will face the prospect of political isolation, simply because they will be peripheral to the issues most intimately affecting their communities and will not have the power to influence such issues. However, the price of collaboration, in terms of future relations between Coloureds, Indians and Africans will inevitably be high. Co-operation will imply a sell-out, an alliance of non-African groups against the African majority. Africans are not likely to take kindly to the idea of Coloureds and Indians championing their cause in the corridors of power.

From the perspective of the right, most notably the Conservative Party and the HNP, the choice is no less complicated. Clearly the opposition of this sector is against any form of power-sharing. Now that power-sharing is on the verge of becoming a reality, will they continue to oppose liberalization from within Parliament and the local authorities, despite the risk of sitting cheek by jowl with Coloureds and Indians? If they refuse to face this prospect, then effectively these parties will not be able to participate in elections without compromising their declared policy position. At the same time, it seems to me that this constituency is set to gain a large degree of grass root rural Afrikaner and some conservative English voter support.

The most overwhelmingly important factor in the consideration of the prospects for constitutional stability is the attitude of the Black majority. Excluded from the President's Council and largely ignored in the constitutional proposals, it is unlikely that Black attitudes will be favourable. Blacks perceive the extension of the central political family to include

Coloureds and Indians as a clear polarization of non-Blacks against the African majority. Many cries have been heard against the exclusion of Blacks from the negotiation process, but what Blacks do these critics mean? The authoritative investigations of the Buthelezi Commission established that a clear majority of Blacks support the ANC, it is also established that a majority of Blacks harboured feelings of deep militancy. The answer, it seems, is clear: until the ANC is legitimised and accepted as a partner in the negotiation process, then the Black majority will spurn the efforts of government. Of course, it may be argued that the introduction of sweeping reforms will defuse the militancy of the ANC cause, I believe the reverse to be true; that is to say, that reform will in fact heighten Black awareness of their disadvantaged position *vis-a-vis* the other groups and will also lead to higher levels of political expectations among this majority sector of our population. (If Coloureds and Indians can be accepted into Parliament, can the rights of the Black majority be of any lesser worth?) The formal rejection, by the White power structure, of even a token Black share in central decisionmaking processes obviates any belief among the Black majority in the possibility of modest or evolutionary options.

In theory, the President's Council was to be autonomous and unfettered by political preconditions. However, in reality the Council (and the Constitutional Committee specifically) has deliberated within closely prescribed political parameters. Besides the fact that the majority of the members of the Committee are public supporters of National Party policy, both the Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs have, on numerous occasions, pre-empted the Committee's recommendations by unambiguously dismissing universal franchise, a common voters' roll, a unitary state, a consociational system, a federation in any form, or any suggestion that urban Blacks be included in the new dispensation.

Now that the Constitutional Committee's plan and the Government's response has crystallized as almost a carbon copy of the National Party's 1977 proposals, one may justifiably wonder why it was necessary for Government to subject its established objectives to such an elaborate (and indeed, costly) series of enquiries, when the volumes of expert evidence accumulated over the five year period have ultimately been moulded into a rubber stamp for Government objectives. However, there can now be little doubt about the nature of Government strategy.

The Constitutional Committee has opened the way for the institution, by a simple majority vote of the Assembly (probably early in 1983) of an Executive President with all the characteristics of an autocrat, who will hold office for a seven year period, without any restriction on the President's eligibility for re-election after that period. This "strong-man" (variously described as a potential De Gaulle, Mussolini or Bonaparte) will embody the ultimate political authority in the South African polity. This move is designed as much to nullify PFP influence in the decision-making processes, as that of the Conservative Party. Furthermore, taking the point already made, that neither of these two parties could participate in the new constitutional dispensation structure without severely compromising the principles upon which their policies are premised, it is possible to argue that the prospects of a one-party Parliament are about to become a reality.

It is also a fact that an extra-parliamentary opposition is inevitably far more radical or reactionary (as the case may be) and thus, the potential for violent conflict must escalate.

Central to the Government's strategy are considerations of political arithmetic. Government objectives have recently been articulated by the Minister of Co-operation and Development who has stated that after the independence of Qwa-Qwa, Kwa Ndebele, Gazankulu and Lebowa there would only be 6,25 million Black citizens of KwaZulu and Kangwane still under Parliament's control. With the excision of Kangwane and northern areas of KwaZulu from South Africa, this figure now stands at approximately 4,75 million — just over half the number of Whites, Coloureds and Asians in South Africa.

Such motivations, on the part of Government, have been confirmed by Dr Jan Grobler (National Party information chief) in published correspondence with Dr Andries Treurnicht at the time of the Conservative break-away. The Government's aim is to create a "non-black" bloc, structured in such a way as not to jeopardize Afrikaner political hegemony, and to widen the White power base by incorporating the 3 million Coloureds and Indians, who might otherwise ultimately align themselves with the Black majority.

Naïveté, or eternal human optimism, leads one to grasp at straws of hope in the political dispensation now being shaped, but such straws are few and weak. The fundamental flaw in all this politicking is that it merely seeks to alter the power-structure in South Africa, by encompassing Coloureds and Indians within the White political family. The Constitutional Committee appears to have failed to grasp the dynamics of constitution making, that is to say, the process by which dynamic social forces combine and interact to bridge the cleavage between divergent group interests in the first place, and shape political institutions, in the second.

The shaping of political institutions, the reform of these institutions and the potential for political innovation is determined by the nature of the process by which divergent and conflicting social forces and group interests are reconciled and common ground identified by free bargaining and "trade off" between groups reacting to market forces. I believe that a process of this nature contains an inherent potential for the self-stabilization of the community. On this basis, I suggest, there is substantial possible overlap between Black and White interests, even on the constitutional level.

In this context, the one redeeming feature is the recommendation for local and metropolitan government. But then again, considering the laws on property ownership, rights of residence and the socio-economic disadvantage of Blacks, this is purely a theoretical redemption. Unless one considers the normal, unstoppable processes of Black advancement: by the turn of the century the Black population will double; 75 per cent of Blacks will be urbanized; 81,2 per cent of the total labour force will be Black; eight out of ten skilled workers will be Black; there will be two million Black pupils in secondary schools; Black consumer spending will account for by far the major share of total.⁵ Clearly thus, the proposals for central government, as they relate to Blacks are a fantasy.

Indeed, the ramifications are manifold, but in conclusion, I think two points are pertinent. First, that the success of the reform process will

largely depend on the creation of the appropriate climate for reform. If reform is to succeed then it is imperative that intra-communal alliances, mutual trust and loyalty, as well as a common national bond be nurtured. This depends on the belief among all groups that government is acting in their interests. I believe that this latter point has been recognized by the Constitutional Committee, in so far as it calls for a government declaration of intent, which would seek to establish government's *bona fides* and good intentions.

However, government intentions are clear and the present reality is quite the opposite. There is a deep mistrust of government and a deep-seated disillusionment among a significant proportion of all sectors of the population. The highly autocratic nature of the legislation which has passed through Parliament during this last session has served to heighten tension and suspicion. One may certainly argue, as I have suggested earlier, that security and stability must be maintained during the inherently unstable period of reform, but without any indication of the time-scale for the implementation of reform, or any constitutional guarantee of a return to "freedom of opposition" and hence maximum democracy (the parallel used by the President's Council) our recent political history lends credibility to the widely held notion that reform is merely a stratagem for the entrenchment of White political dominance. The institution of political reform, without parallel development in social and political attitudes does not offer any guarantee of stability and conflict avoidance.

The second concluding point (closely allied to the first) arises from the Report on regional and local government. The Committee, in a little noticed paragraph, identifies what, in my opinion, is the key to our future; namely that neither forced segregation nor forced integration ought to pattern our political and socio-economic development. This in effect means that South African society should be structured by voluntary group alliances and associations formed along lines of common and converging individual and group interests. This suggestion turns the concept of ethnicity and apartheid on its head. However, it is a fact that the plethora of discriminatory legislation which characterizes our statute books makes this impossible for the foreseeable future.

I make these points with the purpose of illustrating that constitutional reform is really only a small (and in my opinion lesser) part of the statutory reform necessary to ensure the stability of South Africa's future: politically, economically and socially.

Dr Michael Sinclair is a lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand and editor of the *South African Journal of Political Science*.

Notes

1. Republic of South Africa, *First Report of the Constitutional Committee of the President's Council*, P. C. 3/1982, Government Printers, para 3.19-3.20 at pp. 17-18.
2. *Ibid.* para 4.34 at p. 40.
3. *Ibid.* para 3.20 at p. 19.
4. *Ibid.* para 6.20 at p. 57.
5. Welsh, D., *The Liberal School of Thought in South African Politics*, Address to the Political Science Association of South Africa, June 1982.

LEADERSHIP CRISIS IN BROEDERBOND ALLEGED

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 3 Oct 82 pp 2, 35

[Articles by Ivor Wilkins: "Broeders in Leadership Crisis"]

[Text]

AT a remote venue in the Drakensberg this week the Afrikaner Broederbond will gather in secret conclave for what could be the most troubled meeting in its long, clandestine history.

Intense interest has been focused on the annual Bondsraad (congress), where all the signs are that the current chairman, Professor Carel Boshoff, will survive a leadership struggle and be re-elected.

The secret organisation, traditionally a major element of successive Nationalist government's power, is now riven with ~~feuds~~ between the bitterly opposed political streams in Afrikanerdom.

Concern

Informed sources say there have been attempts by factions both the left and right of Professor Boshoff to make a run for the leadership.

But it seems that efforts to find suitable candidates have been unsuccessful and that Professor Boshoff stands a better than good chance of re-election.

He is widely regarded as a rightwinger, although he has been careful not to formally align himself with the Conservative Party.

Pro-Government elements are concerned at the pre-

dominance of right wing elements in the organisation. They are anxious to ensure that it does not become a formidable new force behind arch-conservatives who are now ranged in opposition to the National Party.

And Professor Boshoff — who, informed sources say, will definitely run for another term of office — this week did little to dispel those concerns, making it clear he was going to make his bid on a unity ticket.

In an interview this week, he said the Broederbond was "open for discussion and negotiation with both political streams in Afrikanerdom".

He added: "In the spirit of the brotherliness of the organisation, it holds itself open to its ideal of Afrikaner unity as a priority."

"There are no reservations towards Mr P W Botha and his Cabinet. But, equally, there are no reservations towards the others as well."

Professor Wynand Mouton, chairman of the SABC and the Rector of the University of the Orange Free State, has been under intense pressure to carry the banner for the Establishment sector and to oppose Professor Boshoff.

Professor Mouton was holidaying this week and could not be reached for comment, but informed sources say he has declined to run for the leadership.

Professor Mouton, a feisty and independent figure in Establishment circles, is highly

regarded by verligtes, but has had several run-ins with the Government because of his resistance against interference in the affairs of the SABC.

Conservative Party men have also been seeking another candidate and, it is understood, have been pressuring Dr Andries Treurnicht to make the running. He is a former chairman of the organisation.

Asked to comment on the speculation this week, Dr Treurnicht laughed drily but declined to say anything.

But, sources in the organisation say, it is highly unlikely that Dr Treurnicht would stand. They say it would split the already divided organisation irrevocably and that such a high-profile political stamp would be counter-productive to the Conservative Party cause.

Also, if Dr Treurnicht lost, it would be a severe loss of face which he is regarded as unlikely to risk.

Another potential rightwing candidate is the prominent Port Elizabeth Afrikaans culture boss, Professor Marius Swart, although his standing took a knock recently when he failed in his bid for leadership of the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings (FAK).

Professor Swart also declined to comment this week.

There has been intense speculation about where this year's Bondsraad will take place. This week, however,

there are moves to change from the customary venue at the Broederbond's bushveld headquarters on the banks of Hartbeespoort Dam.

The most likely alternative venue is a farm in the Drakensberg which belongs to the FAK, the open cultural wing of the AB. The farm, between Harrismith and Bergville, has conference facilities and accommodation.

Speculation

A date for the meeting has been carefully kept secret, although sources believe it will be on Saturday.

There is also speculation about whether the Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha, will put in an appearance.

According to Dr Johan Gerber, the former Broeder who defected from organisation because he felt it was becoming too "liberal", the last Bondsraad in 1980 was attended by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Manpower, Mr Fanie Botha, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Mr F W de Klerk and Dr Gerrit Viljoen, who was then standing down as chairman of the organisation to take up his present position in the Cabinet.

Informed observers say the timing of the current row between Dr Viljoen and the Transvaalse Onderwysvereniging has been calculated to coincide with this week's Bondsraad.

Dr Viljoen could have a considerable influence in any leadership tussle in the organisation and mobilising the teachers corps against him now could be calculated to undermine that influence, they say.

Teachers, who make up the most conservative element, are the largest single group inside the Broederbond.

In this week's interview, Professor Boshoff confirmed that the divisions endemic in Afrikaner institutions were reflected in the Broederbond as well.

But, he denied this would cripple the organisation. "The Broederbond has never made itself dependent on political, religious or cultural unity," he said.

"It has always seen itself as an organisation to gather Afrikaners together in a contemporary involvement in the affairs of the day.

Pressing

"Political tensions are reflected in all Afrikaner organisations, but this does not break the Broederbond. It simply makes the necessity for discussion and debate

among ourselves more pressing.

"The struggle around the leadership is not very important, as if a single personality is the determining factor. The task of the organisation, goes on regardless of who is leader.

"The idea that the leadership question could completely split the Broederbond is a wrong evaluation."

The organisation has come under increasing pressure to drop its confidential nature.

This week a columnist in an Afrikaans daily newspaper suggested it was time the organisation publicly announced who its new chairman and executive council were and at the synod of the Ned Geref Kerk in Pretoria later this month a motion will be debated calling on the organisation to go public.

Professor Boshoff said the executive council had the right to make statements when it saw fit.

"We do not regard it as necessary to publicise everything. We certainly won't do that simply to satisfy people's curiosity.

"Whether we decide to announce the new leadership after the Bondsraad will be a decision of the council itself," he said.

● The glue that held Afrikanerdom together has perished: Opinion Pages.

Now the Glue That Held Afrikaners Together Has Perished

THE Afrikaner Broederbond, that once-awesome secret machine that wielded sufficient power to shape destinies personal and national in South Africa, has become an anachronism.

In a fast-changing world, the organisation has become almost as out of place as an abacus at a computer exhibition.

It was once cleverly defined as: Broeder-Bond, a secret glue that sticks Afrikaners together.

Today, the evidence is there for all to see — its mystery formula has lost its magic and the glue no longer works.

Afrikanerdom is rent asunder. Its politicians are at each other's throats and those that have stomped off into new political ventures cannot even unite in their hatred of the party they once served.

Its churchmen are soon to gather for their synod at a time when

deep differences split their devotion.

Its businessmen are engaged in sordid and public squabbles, its cultural bosses are at odds.

The Broederbond, whose raison d'être was always to define Afrikanerdom's goals and the strategies for achieving them, has failed to hold the folk together and now suffers the same divisions as its other institutions.

Once the arbiter and guardian of Afrikaner political and cultural

It now no longer has a homogeneous constituency. Even the description "Afrikaner" now defies stereotyping.

This diversity within its ranks must, say informed sources, debilitate its effectiveness as a political force.

By definition, the fact that its 12 000-plus members now comprise supporters of the National, Conservative and Herstigte Nasionale parties must rob it of any coherent political direction.

In the early days of the organisation's struggle for Afrikaner supremacy in South Africa, its goal was easy to define — as it was, in 1934, by the then-chairman Professor J C van Rooy.

"Brothers," he said, "the key to South Africa's problems is not whether one party or another shall obtain the whiphand, but whether the Afrikaner Broederbond shall govern South Africa."

After 50 years of effort, the first AB chairman and former Speaker in the House of Assembly, Mr Henning Klopper, was able to state with satisfaction at a Broederbond jubilee celebration: "Do you realise what a powerful force is gathered here tonight between these four walls?"

"Show me a greater power on the whole continent of Africa. Show me a greater power anywhere, even in your so-called civilised countries."

"We are part of the State, we are part of the Church, we are part of every big movement that has been born of the nation."

The Broederbond, with its steadfast spouse, the National Party, had achieved Van Rooy's ambition.

Throughout the upheavals of that turbulent 50-year period, the Broederbond had remained faithful to the National Party. At last, they could savour the fruits of that partnership.

Today's world is much more complex. Indeed, not only is the formerly monogamous relationship with the National Party broken forever, but there is no longer any certainty that the ruling party is the senior wife.

There is a strong likelihood that Dr Andries Treurnicht's Conservative Party enjoys greater support within the organisation than the Government.

The organisation has always been inherently conservative. The

largest single group by profession in the organisation are teachers, followed by dominees.

Afrikaans teachers, particularly in the Transvaal where they are best organised, comprise arguably the most conservative professional group in the country.

With notable exceptions, dominees do not lag far behind. Farmers and civil servants make up the next largest groups.

Its leadership has traditionally been highly conservative, interrupted only once and briefly when Dr Gerrit Viljoen (now engaged in battle with the Transvaal teacher corps) won the chairmanship.

The current leader, Professor Carel Boshoff, espouses political views distinctly in conflict with the Government's and in line with the Conservative Party philosophy, although he has been careful not to align himself.

The radically changing face of Afrikaner politics has thus resulted in a situation both paradoxical and, until even quite recently, inconceivable: an Afrikaner Government in South Africa suddenly feels threatened by the very organisation that, from nothing, helped create it.

Evidence of this Frankenstein unease has emerged strongly in public efforts by the Government to push the Broederbond out of the political arena and into a purely cultural mould.

Last year, Mr Chris Heunis, the Prime Minister's righthand man, made a highly significant speech in which he said Afrikaners had achieved maturity and could stop feverishly organising as if they were still the underdogs.

That view is shared by a probably increasing number of Afrikaners. In the developing sociology of South Africa, the need for sanction from a protective "Big Brother" is less compelling.

Modern concerns increasingly focus on where the next Mercedes-Benz is coming from and the state of the swimming pool at home rather than obsessive struggles for tribal advancement.

In some circles, such endeavours have become effete, faintly quaint relics of a previous passion.

But, such are the complacencies of people whose dreams have

been realised. Given Afrikanerdom's deep and bitter divisions, that is an indulgence only a section of the volk can enjoy.

And therein lie the roots of Government worries about the future of the organisation and the current leadership struggle that will be decided at next week's Bondsraad (the equivalent of a congress where, each time, a chairman and executive council are elected).

As long as the Broederbond is deeply split on ideological grounds, the chances of it becoming a political powerhouse again are not very good. As happened at this week's Rapportryers Landseeraad (national conference), it will be forced to find unity in the safety of uncontroversial affairs.

But if it is captured and colonised by rightwingers it could become a major weapon.

They have an unrealised passion. Relegated to the opposition benches, they have a fervent cause for which they could revitalise the Broederbond: to wrest power from what they regard as political deviants and restore true, separatist nationalism in its rightful place.

The ardour with which they pursue this mission has already been displayed on the public political front.

With reminders of how the Broederbond began as a vehicle for saving Afrikanerdom — then suffering severe imperial oppression — it could well mobilise similar zeal throughout the cell network of the organisation to topple the new "alien" forces ruling the country.

Better than anyone, the National Party knows how devastating such a call to arms can be. Its ascendancy and ultimate power was built on exactly such motivations.

And, it well knows its climb to eventual supremacy began on far lesser fortunes than the Conservatives now enjoy. Hence its need to neutralise the organisation as much as possible.

Debilitated the Broederbond may be at present, but it still remains a major prize for which Afrikanerdom's warring factions will fight desperately to secure.

ESHOWE MOVES TO ALLOW NONWHITES ON COUNCIL

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 3 Oct 82 p 11

[Article by Ticks Chetty and Fay Saleh]

[Text]

THE Natal town of Eshowe has made a move to allow Indians and coloureds to stand for positions on its town council.

Town Clerk Chris Gerber said this week the Eshowe Town Council had applied to the Administrator of Natal, Mr Stoffel Botha, for an amendment to the Local Authorities Ordinance to allow Indians and coloureds the vote and the right to stand as candidates in municipal elections.

Mr Gerber said the town council was totally opposed to the fragmentation of its municipal area by the establishment of separate local authorities for its different citizens.

This move is the first by a Natal town to open its town council to all races. The Kimberley Town Council made a similar move a few months ago.

The council, Mr Gerber said, was now of the opinion that it was the democratic right of every person who contributed to the prosperity of the town to have an equal opportunity in governing the town.

Fourth ward

Eshowe has already drawn up plans for the establishment of a fourth ward to incorporate the coloured area in the municipal electoral area.

Mr Gerber said that for six years the management committee of Sunnydale — the part of the town occupied by the 2 000-member coloured community — had been attending meetings of the nine-man council as observers.

Eshowe does not have an Indian group area but plans are well under way to establish one, according to Mr Gerber.

There are about 30 Indian families in the town.

The white population is about 5 000.

Mr Eric Lucas, secretary of the Sunnydale management committee, said the council felt coloureds should be given the vote and his committee and the council had worked towards this end "for a long time without luck".

Mr Yunus Moolla, president of the Natal Association of Local Affairs Committees, said he would support any move that tried to bring about fundamental changes in the country's ruling structure.

Mr Botha was not available for comment.

BUTHELEZI ON KWAZULU'S LEGAL VICTORY IN INGWAVUMA DEAL

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 3 Oct 82 p 2

[Article by Ivor Wilkins]

[Text]

THE KwaZulu Government would be willing to serve on a commission of inquiry into the conflicting claims surrounding the Ingwavuma land deal, its Chief Minister, Chief Gatsha Buthelezi, said yesterday.

Following KwaZulu's legal victory over the South African Government's efforts to seize control of Ingwavuma, Chief Buthelezi said: "A great moral triumph has been won, but the war is not over."

To the disappointment of people in opposition and the KwaZulu Government, the South African Government appears to be determined to press on with its efforts to hand over Kangwane to Swaziland and to provide the mountain kingdom with a corridor to the sea through KwaZulu.

The next step in the saga of Ingwavuma, which has unleashed passionate opposition to the Government's intentions, is a commission of inquiry under the chairmanship of former Chief Justice Rumpf.

The commission was first mooted during a meeting in Pretoria last month between the Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha, and the Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini.

Reports at the time said there would be three representatives appointed by South Africa and three by KwaZulu.

In a brief interview, Chief Buthelezi said the KwaZulu Cabinet had already committed itself in principle to serving on the commission.

The only condition he stipulated was that the terms of reference of the commission should be acceptable.

Chief Buthelezi said the KwaZulu Government saw the commission as a means of defusing tension over the issue and providing the South African Government with an opportunity to save face over the controversial issue, which South African spokesmen confess has been badly bungled.

But Chief Buthelezi made it clear that KwaZulu's position on the question of handing over land to Swaziland was unchanged.

"We are not prepared to abide by any changing of our borders," he declared.

KwaZulu has fought the South African Government's plans to hand over parts of its territory to Swaziland through several court battles, the last of which ended in triumph on Thursday, when the Appeal Court in Bloemfontein decided against the South African Government's efforts to seize control of Ingwavuma as a prelude to the handover.

Chief Buthelezi has said the court decision was a vindication of the need for black people to exhaust all avenues of non-violent resistance.

There were hopes in some circles that, following the Ap-

peal Court decision, the South African Government might drop the issue.

Barred

There was a feeling, even in some Government circles, that the issue had generated such widespread and bitter opposition and had been so poorly handled that it was an embarrassment.

But informed sources said this week that it seemed clear the Government intended pursuing the matter.

Having been legally barred from dispensing with the issue by proclamation — and the Government says it will abide by the court's decision — it now appears prepared to negotiate.

But, if all else fails, it could bring legislation to Parliament next year to excise the necessary land and hand it over.

There would be no legal recourse against such action, because in South Africa Parliament is sovereign.

Meanwhile, the Ingwavuma debacle has heaped yet more difficulties on the beleaguered Minister of Co-operation and Development, Dr Piet Koornhof.

The Ingwavuma and Kangwane deal with Swaziland has been largely a Department of Foreign Affairs issue, but it was left to Co-operation and Development to implement to the extent that it affected the two homelands.

SURVEY REPORTS BLACKS PREFER SA EMPLOYERS

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES-BUSINESS TIMES in English 3 Oct 82 p 32

[Article by Vera Beljakova]

[Text]

ONLY 15% of the black urban labour force would prefer to work for an overseas company or organisation as opposed to a South African one.

Of this number, half (or 7,5% of the workers) would opt for an American concern, says Market Research Africa's latest survey on black labour preferences.

Second favourite among foreign firms are the British, who score 33%, but only very few would choose to work for a Japanese, Chinese, French or Italian employer.

The desire for employment in an American company is more apparent in males (8%) than females (5%), and is especially strong in the 16-24 age group (9%), as well as in the higher-income bracket.

This study is partly confirmed by a local survey which examined almost all the JSE-listed companies.

The result shows that US firms are generally more concerned with the development of their staff, their social responsibility and their image than listed South African companies.

This conclusion was reached by Johan Bosch (department of business economics, University of Port Elizabeth) and Alwyn du Plessis (PE Technikon), who studied the background to the pension-fund-related strikes

in their region. They also found that relatively low priority was given by indigenous companies to social and people related goals compared with their American counterparts.

South African companies, say the researchers, consider the following issues only of secondary importance: labour relations, promotion of staff's future security, maintenance of a programme for continued staff advancement and staff education as means of increasing industrial stability.

The Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce (JCC) points out that so far employers have been urged to develop their own skills in labour relations and in dealing with disputes, "since neither the Department of Manpower nor the police can accept sole responsibility for maintaining industrial peace".

As it is the employer's duty to help educate his staff, "a co-ordinated programme to bridge the lack of communication must be embarked upon", advises the JCC.

Consequently, its labour affairs committee has formed an ad hoc committee to deal with — for example — the pension issues in liaison with the Government, trade unions and employers to formulate recommendations acceptable to all three parties.

BIG SURGE IN JOB-HOPPING REPORTED

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES-BUSINESS TIMES in English 3 Oct 82 pp 1, 3

[Article by Stephen Orpen]

[Text]

JOB-HOPPING South Africans cost private sector employers a staggering R1 500-million in the year to end-July.

At least three million workers of all races switched employment. As surprising, turnover among white staff in the period February to end-July this year leapt an unprecedented 40%-plus to 34%.

This compares with only 24% in the previous six months, in which turnover subsided.

These findings emerge from the most comprehensive employment and salary survey yet conducted in South Africa, covering more than 500 companies and 550 000 employees.

The survey was conducted by the survey unit of the P-E Consulting Group, the country's largest firm of management consultants.

Ian Hipkin, manager of the P-E survey unit, notes that the figures "represent a staff turnover rate of about 30% of the country's entire economically active population".

He says Asians were the most mobile, at a whopping 36%, followed by whites.

Coloureds came next, on 33%, while — another surprise — blacks were the most stable on 26%.

Women changed jobs more frequently than men, and Transvaal companies saw more new faces than industry elsewhere.

Mr Hipkin: "The relatively high turnover among whites could indicate that the demand for highly skilled staff has not been affected by the downturn in the economy.

"Usually, for instance, we see construction sector people hanging on to the jobs they've got more grimly, and sooner, than employees in

other areas.

"Of course, this is because construction typically reacts first to any change in the economy's groundswell.

"Yet this time round the construction industry was by far the most fluid employment sector."

Other leading personnel and placement specialists are bewildered by the new figures.

Says one: "Job-hopping has typically been cyclical, increasing during boom times and contracting during recessions.

"Suddenly the trend appears contra-cyclical, which can mean only two things.

"Either we're not yet in true recession but in a phantom one. Or the shortage of skills at all levels in the country has become so acute that, even in conditions of zero economic growth, we are desperately short of good workers, so that employees can afford to risk switching between organisations.

"If the second case applies, one wonders how we will ever have another boom, which

will demand another upswing in employment.

"The leap in the turnover among whites is perhaps understandable, as in this sector we still have virtually full employment.

"But the movement among blacks, although much more modest, is puzzling."

Artisans continued to be the most nomadic employees in the primary production, mining and manufacturing fields, although they were overtaken by clerical and secretarial staff as the most mobile job-hoppers.

General administration personnel and operations and management staff filled the third and fourth positions respectively.

The survey also revealed that 75% of resignations and dismissals in the participant organisations occurred within the first two years of service, with the first year being the most susceptible period.

"By far the most stable bracket was that embracing people with 10-15 years service, where there was very little movement, whilst the mobility rate slackened off noticeably after three years," adds Hipkin.

Significantly, amongst wage earners the highest turnover was in the R1,25 and R2,50-an-hour bracket, which accounted for 65% of the mobility figure.

The unpredictable construction industry, and mining and manufacturing concerns, were the major employers involved.

Salaried staff receiving pay slips for less than R750 a month made up two out of every three job changes, followed by those in the R750-R1 000 bracket, who experienced a 16% turnover.

The survey stresses, however, that these figures are not categorised on racial lines.

When age is taken into account, employees in the 21-25 grouping seem the most likely to seek greener pastures or fall foul of their superiors.

They made up 40% of job-

hoppers and were closely followed by the 26-35-year-olds, who scored their 36% mainly in the primary production, manufacturing and service industries.

"When it comes to reasons for leaving, pay still ranks first ... although there has been a noticeable shift in the order of some other factors that influence job mobility," says Hipkin.

It seems that companies are increasingly trying to reduce their skilled and less productive labour forces to minimise costs.

Dismissals, due to misconduct and absenteeism, and retrenchment and redundancies, were listed by a number of companies as prime reasons for their turnover rates.

These reasons increased in rank during the survey period, a factor that can largely be attributed to management's efforts to minimise labour costs during an economic downturn.

"Leaving for better conditions" was the second most popular reason, then came more attractive career prospects, dissatisfaction with the job/personality conflict and — surprisingly high up on the list — dismissal because of unsatisfactory conduct or poor work effort.

Retrenchments and redundancies, dismissals through absenteeism, dismissals due to unsuitability, uncontrollables (death, retirement, pregnancies, etc) and desertion completed the scale.

Hipkin identifies the most intriguing aspects of the survey as:

- The increase of staff turnover (all races) from 28% to 30% over the last six months.

- White staff turnover increasing from 24% to 34% over the period February 1982 to July 1982, despite a drop in the previous six months.

- The remarkable shift in reasons for staff turnover from pay as the most common to a combination of dismissals and retrenchment.

FORMER NGK EXECUTIVE CRITICIZES CHURCH'S ROLE

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 3 Oct 82 p 10

[Article by Madeleine van Biljon: "The Years That I Lived a Lie"]

[Text]

A FORMER chief executive of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, Dr Frans O'Brien Geldenhuys, has accused the church of acting as a brake on political reform in South Africa.

Dr Geldenhuys, who resigned as chief executive officer two years ago because of differences with other church leaders, has written a controversial book which is highly critical of the NGK's role in today's climate of political upheaval.

He also reveals fully the church's involvement in the Info scandal and says he realises that "for four years I lived a lie" as a key link between the church and a secret Information Department subsidy.

In the book, "Stroomversnellings" (Accelerating Stream), published by Tafelberg this week, Dr Geldenhuys says the NGK, a captive of its own commitment to segregation, is unable to make a meaningful contribution to a new and defensibly Christian dispensation — not even when Nationalist politicians themselves see the inevitable necessity for it.

"On the contrary, its influence is inhibiting," he says.

Dr Geldenhuys believes the NGK owes it to its members to explain, from the scriptures, why the accepted order — which it enthusiastically pleaded for and supported for so many years — must now be drastically changed.

Hope

"I am convinced that the solution for South Africa's

political problems starts with the Christians, however much they may differ.

"If my black brother and I, who prayed together on Sunday, meet at the conference table on Monday, there must be more hope of success than if we should meet in fear or as antagonists," he says.

"I believe that forced integration is just as wrong and unworkable as forced apartheid. But I believe that the white can no longer struggle alone with the political structures of the future."

Noting the stresses between the NGK and its "daughter" churches, Dr Geldenhuys says the NGK can make a beginning towards resolving them by acknowledging that its missionary policy was never meant to protect the interests and identity of the whites by means of unfair measures.

A key figure in the secret involvement of the NG Kerk with the now-defunct Information Department, Dr Geldenhuys tells of meetings with former Information secretary Dr Eschel Rhoodie, and his assistant, Mr Les de Villiers, who convinced the moderation of the NGK that it could play a leading role in counteracting the onslaught of the World Council of Churches.

Dr Geldenhuys headed a special ecumenical office created for this purpose. The Information Department

could only contribute limited funds while the rest of the money for the running of the office would come from well-wishers in the church.

Such donations were few and far between and members of the moderation were worried about their financial dependence on the department and about what the reaction would be if the secret agreement were to become public knowledge.

The Information subsidy had to be handled "in the strictest secrecy" and only the church's most senior executives — six men — knew the truth.

"It was an enormous shock when the Information bomb exploded during 1978," Dr Geldenhuys writes, in a chapter entitled: "apartheid must be sold!"

Storm

"I immediately realised that although there was nothing irregular about the funding we had received, and that we were under no obligation to testify before the Erasmus Commission, we would not get off scot free."

The storm struck, with enormous repercussions. Dr Geldenhuys states that he still has a clean conscience about the manner in which he carried out his duties.

"But the further I stand away from the events, the clearer it becomes: for four years I lived a lie."

For Dr Geldenhuys the lesson learnt was that a critical distance should always exist between Church and State.

"We paid a high price for our share in the effort to sell apartheid!"

GROWTH OF BLACK TRADE UNIONS IN PRETORIA REPORTED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 6 Oct 82 p 23

[Article by Sheryl Raine]

[Text]

Pretoria, with its rapidly growing motor industry, is fast becoming the Port Elizabeth of the Transvaal, complete with increasingly powerful, predominantly black trade unions.

In the past four years — and particularly during the last 18 months — motor assembly plant workers have become unionised at an unprecedented rate.

The Transvaal motor industry has come a long way since a controversial wildcat strike at the Sigma Motor Corporation in 1980, which caught fledgling unions and managements unprepared.

Indicative of the trend to unionisation is the growth of the 3 500-member National Automobile and Allied Workers' Union (Naawu), an affiliate of the Federation of South African Trade Unions (Fosatu).

Naawu will meet BMW representatives tomorrow for talks in a new attempt to win recognition.

It is a non-racial union, and already has a fifth of the Pretoria motor assembly labour force in its fold, ac-

cording to regional secretary Mr Taffy Adler.

The emergence of Naawu as a force to be reckoned with in the Transvaal is part of the union's plan to become the first national industrial union.

Mr Adler estimates Naawu has at least 50 percent of BMW's assembly plant workers enrolled as members and estimates support in general at BMW to be 80 percent.

Naawu is fully recognised at Sigma and claims 45 percent membership at Bosal. It has also won recognition at two other motor industry concerns.

A recruitment campaign launched recently at Datsun is going well with about 100 new members enrolling with Naawu every week, according to Mr Adler.

Other Kosatu affiliates operating in the Pretoria district are the Metal and Allied Workers' Union — with a strong following in Brits, the Transport and General Worker's Union and the Sweet, Food and Allied Workers' Union.

With a national membership of 18 000, Naawu operates on a

voluntary basis, emphasising the role of shop stewards and shop floor control.

It appears to be becoming a deeply-rooted part of the working community.

This could have far-reaching implications on a broader community level.

A rival union, the United African Motor and Allied Workers' Union, has 30 percent membership at Datsun and is also working towards recognition at the plant.

The union claims to have about 5 000 supporters in the Pretoria region.

While Datsun is prepared to grant stop order facilities to union members, it has not yet recognised either union active on its premises because neither is considered representative.

Industrial relations director at Datsun, Mr Nelis Strydom, noted the increase in union activity in the past two years, although he did not readily associate the growth of unions

with labour unrest.

But the three major motor companies in the Pretoria area have had strikes or work stoppages in the last two years.

Mr Adler says the industrial climate in the Transvaal differs from that in the Cape.

"Many of the companies in the Transvaal are not multinationals but locally owned subsidiaries with technical agreements with overseas concerns," he stressed. He said this made for tougher relations with trade unions.

Companies such as Ford and Volkswagen had handled strikes "with kid gloves," according to Mr Adler. He considered the stance of some Pretoria managements harsher and less compromising.

Union organisers are watching the court case of two Brits union officials charged under the new and broadly phrased Intimidation Act.

CSO: 3400/88

CENSORSHIP COMMITTEES' ROLE DETAILED

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 4 Oct 82 p 1

[Article by Sheryl Raine]

[Text]

More than half the publications submitted to South African censorship committees last year were declared undesirable.

The committees reviewed a total of 1 021 publications, which included a few "objects."

About 55 percent (565) were found to be undesirable in terms of the Publications Act, and the rest (453) approved.

The committees also prohibited the possession of 250 publications — most of them concerning state security.

The Publications Act does not provide for pre-censorship — rather a system of control after submission and examination.

Special exemptions can be granted to universities, research organisations and certain people to consult undesirable publications. Last year this facility was used to a greater extent than before.

Of 337 full-length films admitted to the censors, 26 were banned, 182 approved unconditionally, and 129 allowed with age restrictions or cuts, or both.

According to the annual report of the Department of Internal Affairs, there was considerable trouble last year over video cassettes.

Operators were trying to avoid complying with the strict requirements on films in the Publications Act — and this is being investigated.

Films are the only publications which have to be passed for viewing before they can be distributed.

Appeals

The Appeal Board dealt with 27 film appeals last year — most

of them by distributors. Twelve were banned, three approved unconditionally and 12 with restrictions.

The board also dealt with 41 publication appeals. Of these, 24 were found not to be undesirable.

The advice of the Committee of Literary Experts was sought on five occasions.

There were only two appeals concerning public entertainment. Both were allowed on certain conditions.

SWEEPING POWER GIVEN TO KEY POINTS GUARDS

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 28 Sep 82 p 40

[Article by Trevor Jones]

[Text]

New regulations regarding the powers of guards at National Key Points give them sweeping powers of search and arrest almost equal to those of a police officer.

The regulations also make owners of Key Points responsible for training, equipping and administering guards.

The rules, published recently in a Government Gazette, require security guards at Key Points to undergo approved training by next August. The regulations add to the Government's already broad powers under the National Key Points Act to compel owners of strategic installations to improve security measures.

The introduction of the new regulations is the first time that a form of quality control has been placed on South Africa's burgeoning security guard industry.

The chairman of the National Key Points Committee, Brigadier P S Cilliers, said he expected that six or seven of every 10 guards would be trained by next August. "Some un-

dertakings will find a year too short, while others may find that all their guards can be trained in this time.

The Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, promulgated the regulations under section 11 of the National Key Points Act of 1980.

The stipulations include minimum qualifications of a security guard, his powers of arrest and search, and the penalties for contravention of regulations. The use of "reasonable force," including firearms to effect an arrest is also provided for.

Clauses laying down the limits to which these powers may be exercised are included in the regulations.

Brigadier Cilliers said that under the regulations security companies wishing to train guards would have to apply to the National Keypoints Committee for registration.

Once registered, training companies would be subject to periodic checks to ensure that standards are maintained.

The syllabus includes training in fire prevention and fighting, hand-

ling of weapons, weapons which saboteurs are likely to use, first aid, public and private law, physical education, communications, search and any other subjects the Minister decides to include.

The owners of Key Points will have to apply to the committee to register each guard, and the committee has the power to withdraw the certificate of registration.

The executive director of the Security Association of South Africa, Colonel Pat Venter, welcomed the new rules and said he saw them as the first step towards regulating the training and supply of security guards and officers throughout the industry.

However, he felt that many companies would not fulfil the registration requirements because they could not offer bilingual training as laid down.

The cost of supplying security equipment and the training of guards will be borne by the owners of Key Points, but these expenses will be allowed as tax deductions, retrospective to 1973.

The Ideal Key Point Security Guard Should

- be over 18 and under 40
- have at least a Std 6 certificate
- be competent in fire prevention and fighting; handling of weapons; first aid; security laws; physical education; communications

The Ideal Key Point Security Guard Should Not

- be an unrehabilitated insolvent
- be a mental patient;
- have been fired from a job for misconduct; nor found guilty under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Internal Security Act or the Protection of Information Act
- in the 10 years before his application, have been found guilty of theft, fraud, forgery, perjury, or any offence involving dishonesty, unlawful possession or supply of a weapon or causing bodily injury

The Who, What, Where, Why, When--and the How Much

The duties, powers and qualifications of a Key Point security guard and the penalties for contraventions of the regulations have been set out at length in a Government Gazette.

The guard's function is primarily to control the movement of people, goods and vehicles to and from the Key Point and to patrol and guard the security limit.

A prospective guard must supply the addresses of places where he lived and worked in the five years before his application, his marital status, citizenship, educational qualifications as well as details of any convictions.

Guards must be between 18 and 40 although the Minister may approve the appointment of a guard over 40.

A person who is an unrehabilitated insolvent, is a mental patient, who has been dismissed from a position of trust for misconduct or who has been convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Internal Security

Act or the Protection of Information Act may not become a guard at a Key Point.

Guards must carry firearms unless specifically directed otherwise.

A Key Point guard can be dismissed for, among other reasons, negligence, drug taking, becoming financially embarrassed and for dereliction of duty.

A guard may search any person entering or leaving a Key Point and any person he has arrested. Searches must be done with "strict regard to decency." As far as possible, women should be searched by women.

Anyone attempting to enter a Key Point without permission or who has done, or is about to do, anything prejudicial to the Key Point can be arrested by a guard.

But the person must be told why he is being arrested. If anyone resists arrest or flees, the guard may use reasonable force, including firearms, to make the arrest.

Breaches of these re-

gulations include outsiders pretending to be a security guard, causing information about the security of the Key Point to be published and using the powers confessed on a security guard outside a Key Point.

Anyone convicted of breaching the regulations faces a fine of up to R10 000, a maximum of three years jail, or both.

Big 'Gap' in Training Methods

Security is big business, worth at least R500 million a year and growing every day.

But there are fears that a lot of money is misspent and that the training of guards is sometimes far from adequate.

A security guard may have had months of intensive training or he may have donned uniform only hours earlier.

There is no overall quality control, said Colonel Pat Venter, executive director of the Security Association of South Africa.

Colonel Venter said the only real standards that existed were the Bureau of Standards' specifications for safes and the recently introduced regulations regarding the appointment and powers of guards at National Key Points.

He said people starting security training firms had to register with the Department of Manpower.

"The department just does not have the manpower to judge the quality of training offered," he said.

Colonel Venter referred to some security advisers who offered full security courses over a few days.

However, he said security training firms offering reliable service would take several weeks.

Many companies were being forced to cut back on productive manpower while the increased security threat required tighter security measures. This had increased the need for cheaper security, he said.

Colonel Venter hoped the new regulations which gave security guards at National Key Points powers of search and arrest could later be applied to all security guards.

"We do not want these powers to be given to ordinary security guards without minimum qualifications and training standards also being laid down," he explained.

Colonel Venter would also like to see security firms graded which would enable them to decide how much they were prepared to spend on security and to choose a system accordingly.

The call for the security industry to be professionalised was supported by Professor B F Smit of the University of South Africa's department of criminology.

DETAILS OF GROSSKOPF COMMITTEE REPORT DISCLOSED

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 1 Oct 82 p 9

[Article by Steven Friedman: "Report They Wouldn't Publish"]

[Text]

THOUSANDS — perhaps tens of thousands — of black people in the cities would have won the right to remain there permanently with their families if Dr Piet Koornhof had accepted the report of a committee he himself appointed.

But Dr Koornhof largely ignored his committee — he did not even publish its report despite the fact that it urged him to do so.

Instead he introduced a Bill which critics have dubbed the "Genocide Bill" because, they say, it will condemn all but a privileged minority of blacks to poverty and possible starvation in the rural areas.

The committee was chaired by Mr Justice E M Grosskopf and was appointed to review Dr Koornhof's three Bills which provoked an outcry when they were released in 1980. It reported in May last year.

The committee's findings were roughly in line with those of the 1979 Riekert Commission: a major extension of rights to city blacks and a tougher crackdown on those in the country who wanted to come to the cities.

Thus the committee says that "economic and social realities require some curb on the settlement of black persons in urban areas".

Like the Riekert report it says employers who hire "unauthorised" workers should be "severely punished". People who have "illegal" workers on their premises should also be prosecuted and possibly evicted if they have leased their property.

These measures apparently found favour with Dr Koornhof. The new Bill suggests a R5 000 fine for employers of "illegals" and a R500 fine for those who "harbour" them.

But the Grosskopf committee's other influx control recommendations are in sharp conflict with the Bill. The committee found that "continued (black) urbanisation should be regulated but cannot be halted".

It stresses that the existing rights which some blacks have to stay permanently in the cities under Section 10 of the Black Urban Areas Act "should not be taken away". All black people who have these rights at present should retain them. It adds that "it is the essence of permanent residence that a person is entitled thereto even if he becomes unemployed or loses his accommodation".

It recommends, however, that a large category of other workers in the cities should also acquire these rights.

Firstly, that "a person who wishes to live an urbanised life and is able to maintain himself and his family adequately (in the cities) should be entitled to do so.

Thus "relatively affluent" black people, usually those with "above average skills, experience and ability" with "adequate" accommodation should be allowed to stay permanently in the cities.

A suitable criterion would be that person's financial ability to buy "immovable property".

Secondly, people who live legally in the cities (as tem-

porary "contract workers") should, after a time, "be regarded as permanent residents if they so wish".

Thus, in its most far-reaching recommendation, the committee urges that all people who have been living legally in one or more urban areas for "a substantially continuous period of five years' lawful residence" should qualify for permanence.

The wives, husbands and dependants of permanent residents should also be entitled to these rights.

The five years' rule should apply retrospectively. "This will mean that all persons who have been lawfully resident in urban areas for five years or more at the inception of the new Act will immediately become entitled to permanent residence".

The people who qualify in this way will have worked in the cities as contract workers and should acquire these rights even if they returned to the countryside to renew their contracts or for a brief period while out of work. Citizens of "independent" homelands would also be entitled to these rights.

There is an exception — workers who have been working under contract and "are in single accommodation supplied by their employer" — mainly mine workers, some in the civil service and some construction workers.

The committee is also opposed to the present rule whereby people with criminal convictions cannot acquire city rights.

"The failure to acquire permanent residence rights

should not be added as, in effect, a further penalty."

People who acquire these rights would be able to move freely from city to city and to the countryside without losing their rights. They would not need official permission to take up a job.

The committee accepts that allowing thousands of people city rights for the first time would place a strain on housing in the cities and urges all parties to provide this housing.

Temporary residence in the cities should be granted to contract workers who should be allowed to change jobs with the permission of a labour bureau.

The committee also proposed a major extension of contract worker rights — if these workers are unemployed, they should be allowed to stay in the cities for "a reasonable period (say six months)" to seek new jobs.

Black visitors who have no jobs should also be allowed into the cities for up to 90 days a year without a permit. But it would be up to their host to tell the authorities of the visit within a week.

Hospital patients, schoolchildren and hotel guests would also be entitled to temporary residence.

The committee urged that blacks who applied for city rights but were refused them should be able to appeal to a magistrate's court "merely by noting an appeal". Further appeals could then be made to the Supreme Court.

Like the Riekert Commission, the committee says influx control must be enforced "at the place of work and the place of residence, and not on

the streets".

This would be done through the higher fines and by compelling employers to keep a register of all their workers and details of their urban residence rights. Employers would have to produce these to inspectors within 24 hours.

Raids on houses to discover "illegals" would continue — but a search warrant would be required.

If workers do not have housing or employment, they would not escape the influx control net, the committee said. They would be subject to arrest and removal under anti-squatting legislation.

The committee also recommended the scrapping of curfews for blacks. This system would remove the need for blacks to carry passes.

"If, as we recommend, the mere presence in any area is not subject to control, there can be no purpose in any legal provision which requires a person to produce an identification document on demand, and these provisions should be repealed."

However, documents would still be needed at the place of residence.

In sum, the recommendations would still make it extremely difficult for rural blacks to come to the cities and would tighten control on those who could not qualify for city rights — as the Riekert report did.

But it would open up important new rights for thousands of workers already in the cities and sharply increase the number of black people allowed to remain in them — something Dr Koornhof's Bills certainly do not do.

URBAN FOUNDATION OFFICIAL GIVES DETAILS ON BLACK VENTURE

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 30 Sep 82 p 13

[Text]

The first black-owned industrial park in South Africa was opened by the Urban Foundation in Katlehong, on the East Rand, yesterday. Mr Jan Steyn, executive director of the UF, disclosed their plans for getting regulations changed to encourage black economic activity, and outlined the UF's attitude towards black local government.

THE Katlehong Industrial Association Complex was unique in that it was the first black-owned industrial park in South Africa. Mr Jan Steyn, executive director of the Urban Foundation (UF), said yesterday.

Speaking at the opening by the UF of the Katlehong Industrial Association Complex on the East Rand, Mr Steyn said each of the participants would acquire joint ownership through a share-block subsidiary. Each of the premises was designed to meet the particular participant's needs and each participant would be helped to license his own business.

Adequate premises with sufficient power, water and telephone communication — as opposed to uncertain backyard working conditions — would improve output, quality and marketing opportunities.

To provide access to more efficient business management for participants in the industrial park, the UF aimed to bring about changes in regulations and practices. Mr Steyn said. These would

include:

- involving the private sector directly in the stimulation of economic activity in the townships;
- amending the 99-year leasehold to make provision for manufacturing land use;
- amending the requirements of the Factories Act to recognise the characteristics of the informal sector "and make it affordable for emerging backyard entrepreneurs".

Mr Steyn said all community development, including economic, had to be within the correct framework. This was where the role of the local authority became critical.

The foundation had studied the Black Communities Development Bill in detail and felt that, subject to amendment, the Bill could, together with the Black Local Authorities Act, become a constructive legal framework for many aspects of black community development.

The UF welcomed the decision by the Government to consider the Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill only after it had considered the Black Community Development Bill and after black local authorities had been established in accordance with the Black Local Authorities Act.

"A reasonable inference is that this highly contentious issue will be negotiated with the black leadership that assumes the responsibility and accountability generated by a viable, truly representative system of local government," Mr Steyn said.

"Quite apart from the very extensive powers conferred

by the Black Local Authorities Act on the elected representatives of the people, the Government's decision to hold back any legislation controlling influx until after the election of local authorities, demonstrates the standing authority and real negotiating platform which these leaders may well have.

"This will be even more so if a real devolution of power is also to take place."

If the Government could provide a mechanism for generating the necessary financial resources, the way seemed to be clear for the "emergence of a cadre of black representative leadership" which could play a real role in the future constitutional and socio-economic development of South Africa, Mr Steyn said.

He said business development, housing and education were the three most important areas of Urban Foundation activity. In housing the foundation had launched some 60 projects at a cost of R13-million, in education some 206 projects worth R14-million and in business some 25 projects worth R2 500 000.

The UF had also researched and worked for the removal of barriers which inhibited the growth of business in black communities and has tried to create channels of communication to increase black businessmen's access to finance and expertise in the private sector.

To this end the UF had worked with the various Chambers of Commerce, the National African Chamber of Commerce, the Small Business Development Corporation and the major banks.

OUTCOME OF WALVIS BAY ELECTION DISCUSSED

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 1 Oct 82 p 8

[Article by Koos Coetzee]

[Text]

A MIXTURE of bread and butter issues and South African and South West African politics will determine the outcome of the Walvis Bay election on November 3.

The extremely high cost of living in the South African enclave, where a Sunday newspaper costs R1 and a loaf of wholewheat bread R1.21, will play a major role in this small constituency of only 3 630 voters.

There is widespread discontent among South Africans in the railways, harbours, municipality, schools and hospitals, that their salaries have not been adjusted to the high cost of living.

Fishermen feel bitter that restrictions are placed on their fishing, while foreign vessels may catch freely.

The mayor, Mr Nico Retief, who will contest the provincial seat as an independent, fighting only for the economy of the town, said 90% of the residents did not regard Walvis Bay as their home and therefore had to be recompensed for working in the town.

Mr Retief said he had been asked many times by voters: "Where will politics bring me?"

When a man's pocket is empty he is not interested in politics, Mr Retief said.

Other canvassers called Walvis Bay voters "politically dead", said they had been living on an island for too long and were not strongly for or against any party.

But those voters at all interested in politics could choose from an array of confusing viewpoints on South African and South West African politics, although the battle line between the National Party on one hand, and the Conservative Party and Herstigte Nasionale Party on the other, is becoming increasingly clear.

Mr PW Botha's assurances last week that Walvis Bay would stay South African territory after independence were dismissed as "idle talk" by HNP parliamentary candidate, Mr Attie Treurnicht.

And Dr Alkmaar Swart, who is organising the CP in Walvis Bay, said a Swapo government could strangle Walvis Bay by building a new harbour.

Dr Swart advocated a return to old style apartheid for SWA: "The nations of SWA must be placed on the road to self-determination." And Mr

Peet Joubert, CP parliamentary candidate, asked last week for the return to the Odendaal Commission plan drawn up in the sixties, which tried to impose a homeland framework on the country.

The conservative parties will also exploit the integration taking place in SWA by saying that, if SWA is taken as an example, South Africa would follow the same road. The mixed government in existence, as well as the new mixed government planned by Mr P W Botha, would be used as a stick to chastise the NP.

The conservative parties point out that Mr Botha's new plan only emerged after the Germiston District by-election shock, and say that he wants to placate the Right-wing in South Africa.

Ex-Senator M C Botma, the NP parliamentary candidate, said voters in the constituency welcomed the new plan as they also felt that the current government was not representative.

His party would, however, completely ignore the internal politics of SWA and would concentrate on the new constitutional dispensation in South Africa, he said.

MILITIA TO BOLSTER ARMY, POLICE FORCES

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 11 Oct 82 p 9

[Text]

HARARE. — Zimbabwe will have a 20 000-man people's militia to reinforce the work of the army and police, the Deputy Minister of Defence (Paramilitary), Mr William Ndangana, said at the weekend.

The force would work hand-in-hand with the Zimbabwe National Army, the police and the central intelligence organisation and would be established over a period of four years.

"Our target is to train 20 000 men and women for the entire people's militia," the Minister said in an interview with the Herald newspaper. Already 700 men have been trained in the Gokwe area.

Mr Ndangana explained that there would be 2 500 militiamen in each of the country's eight provinces broken into districts.

All people between the

ages of 16 and 65 were eligible for recruitment, including those who had been demobilised.

"All people are free to join the people's militia. We look for people who support the government," said the Minister.

Special precautions would be taken to screen people joining the force, to ensure that dissidents and bandits did not take advantage of the exercise which would be carried out through local leaders such as MPs, District Councillors and Party chairmen.

Mr Ndangana said the militiamen would be the government's watchdog and only those loyal to the State should be recruited.

Discipline was being enforced vigorously to ensure that militiamen did not harass the people they were supposed to protect. They were also being taught how to co-operate with other security forces.

NEED FOR REFORM CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Oct 82 p 6

[Editorial]

[Text]

WE HAVE a Government committed to reform, but terrorist attacks continue — and will continue, since the "liberation" movements do not want reform but a takeover of South Africa.

Should there be reform, then?

The answer was given by General Magnus Malan, the Minister of Defence, when he said that the lessons of Africa had shown that if a revolutionary war was lost, the result was chaos.

Portugal and Rhodesia had not lost militarily, but politically.

South Africa was winning militarily, but it was essential to win the political struggle — and this could happen only if there was common cause in pursuing fixed political goals and those concerning economic growth, freedom and stability.

In other words, we need a political solution to our problems.

The argument

Unfortunately, we are not only arguing about the nature of reform but about reform itself.

On the Right wing of Afrikanerdom, the Herstigtes completely reject reform. They want a return to the days of wit baasskap.

The Conservatives are not necessarily against reform, but they reject the kind of reform the Government has in mind.

The New Republic Party accepts reform, though it has objections to some of the proposals.

The Progressive Federal Party is not in favour of reform if the Blacks are not part of it, but who knows what attitude the PFP will finally adopt under pressure from its money sources?

Our own view is that reform is essential for the sake of the country, not for the sake of the revolutionary forces within or outside our gates, which will never be satisfied with anything but capitulation.

But reform should not be just a matter for the ruling Nationalist Party.

The Government should consult the communities affected and at the same time listen to the valid criticisms of Opposition parties about important aspects, including the powers of the executive, and especially those of the executive President.

Not that the Right will have anything at all to do with the reform plan, but the Government should try to achieve a broader consensus than that of the NP alone.

As for America's support for what it hails as "dramatic" change in South Africa, we are pleased that Washington now considers that change is so broad-based as to deserve international recognition and support.

The US told the United Nations committee debating racial discrimination and self-determination:

"Clearly change as an organic process is under way in South Africa, even in the political sphere.

"Once a process of reform is in motion, it gathers a momentum of its own that becomes virtually irreversible" — which the US hoped was beginning to happen.

The US had "adopted a policy of positive support" for this process, he added.

Not that we should have to satisfy the US. As we have said over and over again, we must do what is best as we see it, not as America wants.

But the fact that reform is receiving recognition in America is important in that it gives South Africa a positive image rather than the one of a grotty, unchanging, regimented, authoritarian land of no hope.

Latest clash

Meanwhile, the terrorists continue to infiltrate the country, and in the latest incident, involving a series of running gun battles in KwaZulu at the weekend, a South African security policeman and a terrorist were shot dead and a second suspected terrorist was wounded.

Terrorist attacks will not change our purposes for, as General Malan says, under no circumstances will the Government allow South Africa to be destabilised by hostile elements in the subcontinent.

We can argue for or against reform, or the nature and extent of reform, but the peace and security of South Africa come first among all sections of the population, whatever their political affiliations.

ECONOMIC CARDS STACKED AGAINST US, SAYS SEIFSA

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Oct 82 p 25

[Text]

CONTINUING inflation, the large balance of payments deficit, the significantly lower gold price for much of the past year, high short and long term interest rates, the poor agricultural season for 1981/82 and the failure of the economies of our major trading partners to show any signs of recovery are inevitably having a severe impact on the South African economy.

This was argued in Johannesburg yesterday by Mr J E D Bramwell when he addressed the annual general meeting of the Steel and Engineering Federation of South Africa (SEIFSA).

In his vice-presidential address, Mr Bramwell said the past year had been one in which the SEIFSA group of industries had had to contend with increased pressures in a number of areas.

"In last year's address to the annual general meeting, my predecessor drew attention to the factors giving rise to a slowing down in the overall economy. In the past 12 months this process has intensified and the South African economy is now entering a potentially serious recessionary phase."

While the buoyant conditions of the previous

two years extended into 1982 for some sectors of SEIFSA, most sectors of the metal industries were now being affected by the current conditions.

A major exception was the sector involved in the ongoing expansion programme in power generation.

"On the positive side, it must be noted that the major Western economies have made real progress in reducing inflation, there are signs that interest rates are coming down and the energy crisis appears to have passed, albeit temporarily," Mr Bramwell said.

By contrast, no real progress in reducing inflation in South Africa had been achieved and a high level of inflation, at a time when the economy was in recession, had all the makings of serious difficulties ahead.

While many employers had made efforts to keep redundancies as low as possible, significant numbers of workers were having to be retrenched.

It was also evident that inflation was tending to reduce the competitiveness of our industries, both internally and overseas, despite the declining value of the rand.

A major initiative was required if South Africa

was to make progress in cutting its inflation rate.

The SEIFSA group of industries constituted a major sector of the South African economy and its well-being was essential for the country as a whole.

The annual gross output of the metal and engineering industry sector of the economy was now some R11 000-million and constituted a third of the total manufacturing output in the Republic.

The workforce of all population groups exceeded half a million and represented more than one third of the total manpower engaged in all manufacturing activity.

New capital investment in this group of industries over the past five years had amounted to some R2 600-million.

During 1981, output of steel ingots was 8,8-million tons, down 0,9 per cent on the peak level of 1980.

"In the course of the past year, SEIFSA has embarked on a number of initiatives in response to the developing industrial relations situation in the country, with particular emphasis on the national industrial council for the iron, steel, engineering and metallurgical industry.

"The past year has been continuing industrial unrest within the metal industries, the major issues being wages, alleged unfair dismissals and victimisation, trade union recognition at company level and demands for the withdrawal of pension contributions.

"The challenge now is to achieve a situation where Black workers seek to resolve their difficulties within the give and take of collective bargaining and not through industrial action. In responding to this challenge, SEIFSA has sought to emphasise this objective," Mr Bramwell said.

Following the Government's proposals to introduce compulsory preservation of pension contributions and the industrial unrest that followed, the board of management of metal industries group pension fund had set in motion a process of consultation with members through their trade union and company level representatives.

Flowing from this consultation process, the rules of the fund were amended to give members the opportunity of withdrawing their contributions if they had been out of the metal industry

for six months.

The rules were also amended to provide for the option of early retirement to be exercised at the age of 55, as opposed to 60 on an improved discount formula.

With the slowing down of the economy and continuing inflation it could be anticipated that the annual negotiations for a new wage agreement would be difficult.

The shortage of skilled workers had for many years constituted a major restraint to the industry's progress and had been an important contributory factor to the high levels of inflation in recent years.

"It is therefore pleasing to note the steps being taken at both company and industry level within the metal industries to overcome this problem with the removal of artificial barriers based on colour," he said.

"It has become increasingly evident that, with the rapidly changing environment in which business operates, there is a need to improve communication between SEIFSA and its members. A start has been made in this area and it is hoped that this effort will continue," he concluded. —

LIVING STANDARDS ON WAY DOWN, VOLKSKAS REPORTS

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Oct 82 p 23

[Article by Daan de Kock]

[Text]

THE man in the street should not labour under any illusions that the average increase in wages over the past three years will be maintained.

Taking inflation into consideration, it should come as no surprise if the real per capita personal disposable income of the population declines in what is left of this year, in 1983 and perhaps even in 1984.

This warning note is sounded in the latest Volkskas Economic Spotlight.

The bank makes it clear that lower living standards are to be expected for the country as a whole.

Volkskas says the implications are obvious and highlights some of them.

One of the implications is that the financial positions of households will deteriorate substantially. The individual will have to adjust to his poorer financial position, despite a reluctance to abandon a given standard of living

once one has become used to it.

The bank says the individual would rather reduce his savings or try to borrow money to protect a certain standard of living.

"We would like to appeal to the individual to accept the realities of the moment. These are inescapable," the bank says.

It goes on to say: "If you are not prepared to make the necessary adjustments of your own free will, you may have to pay a heavy price in that your financial position will be further weakened and you may even find yourself in serious difficulties."

The bank says another implication is that the individual buyer will become much more concerned about his purchases. This will strengthen the free market mechanism by promoting competition.

Volkskas also appeals to the individual to look after his job. "You should

remember that it is better to work for the same salary, or even less in real terms, than to have no income at all," it says.

It also points out that real private consumer spending is already declining and the expenditure on durable consumer goods is bound to drop even further.

"This state of affairs has implications for commerce and industry and companies will have to watch their cash flow situation carefully."

The bank goes on: "Finally, the issues raised will also have implications for the State's finances. There can be no doubt that the growth rate of tax receipts is declining and will drop even more."

"This means that the Minister of Finance will have to tighten the reins on Government expenditure. Indeed, he may find it very difficult to acquire sufficient revenue to avoid the use of bank credit or too much by way of additional loan funds."

TERRORIST SHOOT-OUT IN KWAZULU REPORTED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Oct 82 p 2

[Text]

A terrorist and a Security policeman were shot dead and a second terrorist was wounded and arrested in KwaZulu at the weekend.

Police disclosed yesterday that the two terrorists were fully-trained and were sent on a mission of terror and sabotage to northern Natal by the ANC's chief guerrilla tactician, the exile communist, Joe Slovo.

Det-Sgt Bhekuyise Vitalis Makhaye (53), who was stationed at the Security branch at Melmoth, KwaZulu, and one ANC terrorist were killed in a shoot-out in the Mthlungweni area near Nkandla on Saturday at 4 am.

Security police, who confiscated a Russian made Makarov pistol, did not release the names of the two ANC terrorists.

According to a police liaison officer at Headquarters in Pretoria, two armed Black men ap-

proached Mr Clement Knosi of the Mibilani tribe in Mahlabatlini in KwaZulu on October 1.

One of the men fired at Mr Nkosi after an argument and wounded him in the right thigh.

Police established that Mr Nkosi was wounded with a Russian Makarov pistol and the armed men were identified as suspected terrorists.

On Saturday at 4 am, Det-Sgt Makhaye and a colleague, went to investigate a kraal at Mthlungweni near Nkandla.

As they approached, the terrorists opened fire on them from a hut. Sgt Makhaye was fatally wounded in the chest, but still succeeded in killing one terrorist by shooting him twice in the head.

The other policeman, who has not yet been identified, was not hurt in the shooting.

The second suspected terrorist escaped.

Security police have established that the dead man was a fully-trained terrorist and under the instructions of Joe Slovo.

Police launched an extensive search for the second suspected terrorist who escaped.

On Sunday, at 6 pm, he was found about 7 km from Nkandla.

As policemen approached his hiding place, he opened fire. After a short gun battle, the terrorist was wounded in the shoulder.

When he was arrested he was found to have a Russian Makarov pistol.

Lt-Gen Johan Coetzee, acting Commissioner of the SA Police and Head of the Security Branch, has extended his sympathy to the relatives of Sgt Makhaye, "who served his country till the end."

The sergeant was married and he had five under-age children. He had served in the police for 30 years.

CSO: 3400/85

BROEDERBOND INFLUENCE ON CHURCHES DEPLORED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Oct 82 p 4

[Article by Keith Abendroth]

[Text]

BOND domination of the three main Dutch Reformed sister churches — and an obsession to knuckle under to pacify outside world opinion — were claimed in Pretoria last night on the eve of the all-important synod of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk.

The Rev Jan Jooste, former minister of the church and a founder member of the Herstigte Nasionale Party, as well as founder of the mushrooming Afrikaanse Reformatoriese Kerk, made the claim in a biting attack on Broederbond control of the churches.

He said the formation of the ARK had been dismissed as being politically inspired, when in point of fact the move had been forced by the political involvement in the main churches of leading members who were Broederbonders.

He said the ARK had been formed as a direct result of the alienation and disillusionment of faithful members of the three sister churches.

"In fact, with our foundation we went out of our way not to ask the people joining us what the reason

was for their alienation, in the hope that we could go ahead without hairsplitting," said Mr Jooste.

The trouble in the sister churches could be laid directly at the door of ministers and members who were members of the Broederbond.

Because of this a group of "concerned" church members had formed the Afrikaanse Reformatoriese Bond in a bid to solve the church's problems.

Hundreds of ministers who were known to be members of the Broederbond were sent circular letters "in a bid to solve the problems" — but there were only three replies, two of them denying Broederbond membership.

We discovered then that Broeders were instructed by Broederbond headquarters not to reply to us."

A letter to try to get comment from ministers of the three churches also went largely unanswered.

"Then we considered laying official charges at church executive level — but how do you in practice charge ministers and several thousand members when for the most part you don't know who they are?" Mr Jooste asked.

INFLUX-CONTROL SYSTEM ABHORRED

Johannesburg SOWETAN in English 8 Oct 82 p 6

[Editorial]

[Text]

THE FACT that some of these strange things were said at a National Party congress may say something about their extraordinary import. Still, it is about time that Nats and white South Africa get one thing straight — blacks consider the whole country as much theirs as whites do.

Let's take first Dr Piet Koornhof, who is the official spokesman for the pervasive view that we should be kept out of so-called "white" areas. Among the incredible things he is reported to have said was that legislation would be effected to overrule a Supreme Court ruling to make the abhorrent influx-control system more effective.

He is also believed to have said a way of stopping blacks from coming into the cities was to urbanise rural and homeland areas.

Dr Koornhof and his ilk seem to miss this essential point. Blacks do not want to live in rural areas only, but they want to settle anywhere in a country that is, after all, theirs.

We are aware this may sound crazy to their ears. But we blacks are, in like manner, amazed and disgusted that so many plans are afoot to get us, and keep us, out of the best parts of the country. It is time people got this straight and tried to work from this premise, if only for the academic exercise.

There is no need to get into the housing problem and views that we are over-running the so-called "white areas".

As we have got that off our chests, as setting straight the thinking in many white sections about our stand, we could perhaps touch on the other amazing things said at this Nat congress in East London.

There was, for instance, a resolution that there should be stricter implementation of influx control, which is insane but was to be expected.

More Alice in Wonderland suggestions were that there should be border control and roadblocks to keep blacks out of, especially, the Western Cape. Dr Koornhof, quite sensibly in the circumstances, made it clear that the Government had tried to implement all these hazy suggestions. He did not say that they had all failed resoundingly.

The reasons for the failure are pretty obvious, but maybe we might have to repeat them, if only for the record.

When, we are forced to ask ourselves, will the Government rid itself of the pipedream that this country is not a unitary state? South Africa will function smoothly and peacefully only if this basic thing is understood — that we are one country and that we can work viably

only as one.

All the divisive measures and balkanisation of the country under the guise of peace and harmony will never work. They are fathered more by greed, fear and selfishness, all negative factors that do not create. Blacks, like all workers, will keep on doing what comes natural to them, which is to look for a place in the sun for themselves and their children. As long as attempts are made to stop that, there will never be peace.

Finally, we wish to repeat that South Africa belongs to all its people — all of it. The fragmentation that is hidden under the skirts of deceit and greed will lead only to untold misery for all the people of the country.

CSO: 3400/85

DEPOPULATION OF RURAL AREAS FEARED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 11 Oct 82 p 4

[Text]

THE depopulation of rural areas in the Free State and Northern Cape is causing great concern among leaders in agriculture. Some farmers in border areas are moving away and in the Northern Cape the problem is acute.

The chairman of the Orange River Farmers' Union, Mr Roy Lubbe, says that what is particularly disconcerting is that well established farmers are leaving their farms.

The economic plight of the farmer is put forward as one of the main reasons for the depopulation of rural areas, and Mr Lubbe says that to halt the process in the Northwest Cape the Government will now have to bring into operation that part of the Drought Aid Scheme which provides for stock reductions.

He said drought aid would also have to be given for the feeding of cattle. In the Karakul industry, aid that had long been sought, was now overdue.

The Northern Cape

Agricultural Union is conducting a survey to establish all the reasons for the depopulation of rural areas. The secretary of the union, Mr J C van der Westhuizen, says a report will in due course be handed to the government in the hope that the agricultural sector will receive attention on the same basis as decentralised industries.

He said the Riet River irrigation scheme was one of the parts of the Northern Cape which was being worst affected by depopulation. He believed in that case the process would only be halted when the scheme was provided with a permanent supply of water.

The general secretary of the Free State Agricultural union, Mr Piet van Rooy, says the union had already, in conjunction with the South African Agricultural Union, made representations to the Government for financial aid to border farmers.

He said a policy had to be approved by the agricultural and the govern-

ment under which farmers would be able to obtain the required financing on a continuous basis. The unfavourable financing setup with which farmers had had to cope since 1976 was a major contribution to the depopulation of the plateland.

Mr van Rooy said the union would like to see existing irrigation schemes receiving preference over the development of new schemes. He said several emergency aid schemes had been started to assist farmers in times of crisis.

The dean of the Faculty of Agriculture at the University of the Free State, Professor H A Kotze, said the full potential of farming areas should be exploited.

More farmers could be accommodated around irrigation schemes.

If enough farmers could be attracted to rural [words in] create new distinct for township development and create more job opportunities, which would counter depopulation.

ECONOMIST WARNS OF POSSIBLE TAX INCREASES

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 13 Oct 82 p 14

[Article by Marilyn Cohen]

[Text]

SOUTH Africans could expect further tax increases in the next Budget even if the gold price was to rise suddenly or the rand was to appreciate, Mr Andre Hamersma, group economist of the Standard Bank, said yesterday.

He was addressing the Manpower and Management Foundation of Southern Africa's 21st Business Outlook Conference in Sandton.

It was imperative, he said, that the current recession be allowed to run its course without interference, and even to deepen further in the months ahead.

Despite the recent rally in the gold price, the world wide stock market boom and declines in interest rates overseas, the restrictive economic measures now in use needed to be carried

through in the interests of a sound recovery and longer-term growth.

This was because necessary adjustments still had to be made in several critical areas of the economy, he said.

Mr Hamersma predicted that from a growth point of view, the economy's performance in 1983 was likely to be disappointing and the downward movement would start bottoming out only in the latter part of the year.

Consumer spending, he said, would come under a great deal of pressure from increased unemployment levels, reduced working hours and "less generous employers" as well as from high mortgage rates, record consumer finance charges and persistently high inflation levels.

Government-sector capital spending programmes were also likely to be

trimmed further.

Exports were probably the only segment of the economy which might face improving demand next year but that too would depend on the strength and timing of the world economic recovery.

With a little help from a better export performance and a somewhat higher gold price than this year, Mr Hamersma said that rapidly falling imports could well create a position where the current account of the balance of payments could move into surplus by mid-1983 and the year could even close on an overall surplus on current account.

However, the country would still be left with a large accumulation of external debt which needed to be reduced.

Mr Hamersma said inflation should ease progressively next year, but not by much.

Very Prospects Slim, Conference Told

THE prospects for a major international economic recovery were not very encouraging, Professor T M

Rybczynski, economic advisor to Lazard Brothers and Company in the United Kingdom, said in Sand-

ton yesterday.

Speaking at the 21st Business Outlook Conference, he said the best one could hope for was a "very weak and hesitant" recovery.

He did not dismiss the possibility that there could be another major international economic shock.

In addition, any form of economic recovery was likely to be accompanied by fairly high unemployment, declining nominal rates of interest with real interest rates falling only very slowly and also by continuing turbulence in the foreign exchange and financial areas, he said.

"The old rules of economic behaviour have now disappeared and the new ones have not yet

emerged, and uncertainty is the dominating feature of the international scene."

There were doubts about the ability of the financial system to withstand the pressures on the international financial system because of the large volume of international and domestic indebtedness.

This debt burden, he said, was "very heavy and unsustainable" and the question asked today was whether or not the burden could be reduced without a world depression or without prolonging the present downward phase or without significantly weakening the momentum

and duration of the recovery phase of the economic cycle.

He, personally, did not think it could.

The reasons he gave were that it was possible a number of medium-size debtors would find it cheaper and politically necessary to default on their debts and that the number of countries experiencing difficulties simultaneously would be large, resulting in existing institutional arrangements not being able to cope.

"Also, there is a possibility that a major political upheaval — will render the existing arrangements unworkable," he said.

Right Wing 'No Threat to the Nats'

THE political swing to the right among White voters was not strong enough to unseat the present National Party Government, Professor Lawrence Schlemmer, director of the Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the University of Natal, told the Business Outlook Conference.

Research had shown clearly that the NP would gain support marginally if it were to move constructively in a reform direction, he said.

Even in the Transvaal, where the conservative vote is the strongest, the NP would have a 10 to 12 percent advantage over the Conservative Party, he said.

He stressed that this view did not contradict the results of the Germiston District by-election in which the NP squeaked

home against the Conservative Party and Herstigte Nasionale Party and in fact had polled less than the two Right-wing parties combined.

"Germiston District is precisely the kind of White, lower-middle-class to working-class constituency in which the CP is strongest, with the exception of perhaps some rural constituencies.

"Furthermore, it must be remembered that at a time of inflation, housing shortages and pending recession, by-elections penalise sitting governments."

Black attitudes would become more critically hostile for a period because of the economic recession and the delays in reform brought about by the upheaval in the NP, Professor Schlemmer said.

BROEDERBUND PROCLAIMS UNITY, REELECTS CHAIRMAN

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 11 Oct 82 pp 1, 2

[Article by Jaap Theron]

[Text]

THE Afrikaner Broederbond (AB), has emphatically confirmed its "service character" and made it clear in a public statement that Afrikaner unity is so important that it will not expel from its ranks members who are not members of the National Party.

At the same time, the AB announced at the weekend that its chairman, Professor Carel Boshoff, had been re-elected unopposed at a gathering of the Bondsraad in the Drakenstein mountains, near Wellington.

Prof Boshoff's re-election as AB leader is considered significant as Press speculation over a long period was that a verligte opponent, Prof Wynand Mouton, would oppose his chairmanship.

Prof Mouton, however, withdrew from the race for this top position in Afrikaner cultural circles some time before nomi-

nations closed.

Allowed

Four other men initially allowed their nominations to go through, but they eventually withdrew in favour of Prof Boshoff.

After the formation of the HNP, the Bondsraad decided to expel all members who were known to have joined the new party. Those expelled included Dr Albert Hertzog and Mr Jaap Marais, both leaders of the HNP.

Recently, it became known that certain leading figures in the HNP were members of the AB and that their membership had been allowed although they warned their own branches of the AB that they were backing the HNP.

When the Conservative Party was formed after a split in the NP earlier this year, a considerable number of AB members joined the CP, including Dr Andries Treurnicht, himself a former AB leader.

Wishful

In a statement issued

yesterday Prof Boshoff noted that Afrikaner unity and solidarity remained despite political differences. It had been decided to issue this statement to avoid unnecessary speculation and wishful thinking.

The statement said:

"The Bondsraad of the AB met last week (Friday and Saturday) in good spirit, in unity and in solidarity and looked penetratingly into the following issues:

"The whole constitutional issue, including the new constitutional system; the expansion of regional development; the consolidation and development of national and non-independent states, and also the constitutional position of the Black man outside the national and non-independent states.

"The discussions were open-hearted and took place in a spirit of unity.

Facts

"The AB was, among other things, described as an evaluating body which

would, through analysing of relevant facts and tendencies and what resulted from them, give guidance to the Afrikaner and motivate the Afrikaner to become involved in contemporary affairs.

"It was again emphasised that the AB was a service organisation and not one seeking benefits

for its members.

"The purpose of the AB was to obtain unity among Afrikaners, and amid discord on other levels, to preserve Afrikaner unity, and also to promote the calling of the Afrikanervolk amid the presence of other nations in South Africa.

"The Chairman, Prof Carel Boshoff, was re-elected unanimously

the statement said.

It was pointed out by top Afrikaner sources last night that the AB had now clearly taken up the task of uniting the entire Afrikanerdom — without polarising the various political groups — following the crucial split which emerged when the Conservative members broke away from the NP in February this year.

CSO: 3400/85

MANPOWER CRISIS IS EXAGGERATED SAYS ETHEREDGE

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 9 Oct 82 p 17

[Article by Patrick McLoughlin]

[Text]

THERE were a number of arguments that could be mustered to support the view that the manpower crisis was exaggerated, the head of Anglo American's gold division, Mr Denis Etheredge, said yesterday.

Mr Etheredge, who was speaking at the Institute of Personnel Management (IPM) convention in Sun City, said he had been accused of exaggerating the skilled manpower shortage in South Africa.

But according to a National Manpower Commission report, no "serious attention" needed to be given to the high level manpower shortage, despite the apparent rising trend since 1977.

The report showed only a 3.6 percent short of high-level manpower in 1979, which was not impressive.

Mr Etheredge said many of the largest companies had resorted in 1980 and 1981 to recruiting campaigns overseas and a large number of skilled and professionally qualified people were brought into the country.

Overseas recruitment had now fallen because immediate shortages had more or less been overcome.

Another point was that the country had run into a recession and fewer skilled people were required in these circumstances.

It was also likely that some would become redundant in their present jobs as expansion schemes were cut back or deferred and factories worked under capacity.

Mr Etheredge said some chief executives with whom he had discussed the matter seemed satisfied that efforts made — and which continued to be made — were overcoming the manpower shortage in their own businesses.

Finally, there was evidence that many businesses had been under-employing skilled manpower during the good years.

"We like to pretend that this is not the case in our particular business, but I guess the situation is widespread and contributes significantly to the lower level of White productivity."

Mr Piet du Plessis, Iscor's divisional head of manpower planning, had recently said most companies over-estimated their skilled manpower requirements at engineer, technician and artisan level and that the first step in manpower planning should be a revision of job requirements.

"The other side of the coin, is that there are thousands of people at chief executive, senior and middle management levels who work too hard, carry heavy burdens of stress and do not live to the average dying age of the White population," Mr Etheredge said.

"Working hard, working longer hours, thinning down your staff — all these contribute to overcoming the skills shortage," he said.

From the five arguments, it certainly appeared that the shortage of skilled manpower was being exaggerated.

"I wish to suggest to you, however, that if these arguments have any validity, it is only in the very short term, but that the longer term outlook is grim."

TRADE WITH MAURITIUS TO CONTINUE

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 11 Oct 82 p 8

[Article by Tim Clarke]

[Text]

THE new Left-wing government in Mauritius will definitely not cut trade links with South Africa, according to four Durban businessmen who have just returned from the Indian Ocean island after interviewing several cabinet ministers and leaders of commerce and industry.

Independently, the four men came to the conclusion that the Prime Minister of that country, Mr Anerwood Jugnauth is a pragmatist who realises the value of South African links.

Two of the businessmen interviewed the past week claimed that the situation could change once the Mauritian economy became stronger, but the other two were adamant that South Africa would still remain the main supplier of goods to the Indian Ocean island.

Perturbed

One of the businessmen, who returned to Durban on Thursday, said that he interviewed Foreign Minister Mr Jean Claude de l'Estrac in Port Louis for more than two hours because he was

very perturbed about ties between Mauritius and South Africa in view of the manifesto pre-election time of the new government.

He said that Mr Jean Claude de l'Estrac was very emphatic that nothing would be done at present to disturb the ties between South Africa and Mauritius and this included South African Airways' landing rights on the island.

"Although I found the Foreign Minister particularly hostile to the Republic's internal politics, he struck me as being a man with a pragmatic approach.

"The Foreign Minister said that Mr Jugnauth was particularly keen to increase the number of South African tourists coming to the island. At present South African tourists make up about half of the total number of visitors going to the island.

Economy

"I do not believe that the Mauritian government with an ailing economy, and with 60 000 people unemployed, will cut ties easily."

The second business-

man held much the same views after interviewing leaders of commerce and industry in the country.

He pointed out that the Mauritian economy was almost totally reliant on International Monetary Fund loans to balance its budget and meet its financial commitments.

He also expressed the view that the economy was so run-down that help from anywhere, including "racial South Africa" was very welcome.

Future

The other two businessmen, both born in Mauritius, were not so optimistic about future ties. They said that the new coalition Left-wing government was "biding its time" about relationships with Pretoria.

They said that Mr Paul Berrange, the real force behind the coalition government, was totally opposed to South Africa's policies and privately supported the ANC.

Both of them said that is a sad form of Nordic brotherhood. "Sweden's devaluation is a sad form of Nordic brotherhood. Going against the spirit of

thelezi as being
"stooges".

The verdict of the two men was: "Don't be too optimistic, the situation could change in five years and SAA landing rights could be withdrawn because of pressure from the Organisation of African Unity."

CSO: 3400/85

LIVE WITHOUT HATE, PW URGES

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 11 Oct 82 p 11

[Text]

RIEBEECK WEST. —
The Prime Minister, Mr P W Botha, said at Riebeeck West on Saturday night that South Africa's top priority was to live, more than ever before, without hate.

This was essential because the message of communism was one of hatred.

"We can only be victorious through greatness, love and truth. We must be great enough to live without hatred.

Three great men who had played a leading role in South Africa were born in the valley between Wellington and Riebeeck West. They were Gen B Hertzog, General Smuts and Dr Malan.

Mr Botha devoted most of his speech to paying tribute to Dr Malan. "If we want to be like him we shall have to be less materialistic, less selfish and less interested in our own affairs. We have as a singular purpose to stand together in unity.

"The national purpose is to look past himself to what is greater. It is vital that we have our priorities right.

"The question is: Do we have the ability to arrange our priorities properly?

Mr Botha stressed that

all South Africans had to ensure that the country was safe behind the young men on the border.

"The world is full of trouble and doubt. We must not act out of fear, because fear and panic are twins and do not bring victory.

"We must develop a spirit of mutual respect and learn to look far into the future."

Mr Botha was speaking at a function celebrating the 125th anniversary of the NG congregation at Riebeeck West. The tiny hamlet about 15 km from the heart of the Western Cape wheatfields, Malmesbury, is steeped in South African political history.

It is here that two former Prime Ministers, Dr Malan and General Smuts were christened in the white steepled Dutch Reformed church.

The hamlet also has a connection with the present Prime Minister. Mr Botha as a junior party organiser, held his first political meeting here; addressing a junior branch meeting in the "voorhuis" of the farm Allesverloren.

The State President, Mr Marais Viljoen, took communion with the congregation yesterday. —

SWART CALLS FOR REPEAL OF BAN ON INDIANS

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 13 Oct 82 p 11

[Article by Tim Clarke]

[Text]

LEADING members of the Indian community in Natal have fully supported a call by Mr Ray Swart, the Provincial leader of the Progressive Federal Party, for immediate scrapping of the law which prohibits Indians from settling in the Free State

Mr Swart, MP for Durban Berea, says the law which prohibits "Arabs, Chinamen, coolies and other Asiatic coloureds" from settling in the Free State should be repealed immediately. He said it was repugnant and an insult to the Indian community in South Africa.

He was supported by several Indian leaders interviewed by The Citizen yesterday. Some were under the impression that the 93-year-old law had been scrapped long ago and said they were "more than surprised" that it was still on the Statute Book.

They appealed to the Prime Minister. Mr P W Botha, to abolish the law immediately.

A resolution on the is-

sue will be raised at the Provincial Congress of the PFP in the Free State next week.

Mr Swart said that the Prime Minister should act immediately, particularly in view of his constitutional plans to include non-whites in a new dispensation.

He said that the "archaic law," promulgated in 1889 when the Free State was known as the Orange River Colony, had long caused the Indian community distress, and was an insult to their dignity.

However, a spokesman for the Administrator of the Free State, Mr L J Botha, said he had not heard of any move to scrap the legislation. He declined to comment further and said that the Department of Internal Affairs should be asked to comment.

The Minister of Internal Affairs, Mr F W de Klerk, was not available for comment as he is overseas.

His deputy, Mr P J Badenhorst, was said to be away from his office for the day.

VILJOEN: SADF CAN REPULSE ANY ATTACK

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 9 Oct 82 p 4

[Text]

IN THE military sphere he had no doubt that the South African Defence Force could repulse any enemy attack, conventional or unconventional, the State President, Mr Marais Viljoen, in Witbank said yesterday.

Presenting the Witbank Commando with its Colours, he said this did not mean that South Africans should rest on their laurels.

"The building up of arsenals in Southern Africa and the increase in terrorism in this region make it essential for the South African Defence Force to be prepared to meet the demands of the task.

"This involves another requirement, namely, that the military striking power and battle-readiness of the Republic be adapted as warranted by circumstances.

"Clear proof of the

willingness of the Defence Force to adapt is the fact that the Government has deemed it necessary to revise the National Service system through legislation.

"In this way the defence commitment has been extended over a broader spectrum of the population while the manpower supply to the Commando Force, in particular, can be increased," he said.

Tasks

Mr Viljoen said the Commando Force had been given a new dispensation which could only enhance the prestige and facilitate the tasks of commando units.

"But the assurance has also been given that the SADF will only utilise such manpower as it requires to fulfil its task, taking into account the

economic implications in order to maintain a proper balance.

"The injunction to prepare for war is intended for our security forces in the first place. But it does not end here because we live within the framework of a different onslaught — one which does not only manifest itself on the battlefield but which also operates in every sphere of our lives.

"The question that I want to ask is, therefore: Are we prepared and able to defend ourselves against this all-out onslaught? Can we display the required courage and conviction to resist the psychological onslaught on our national identity and morale? "These are all questions upon which we must reflect most seriously, otherwise we will not be able to carry out the injunction, to be prepared.

CSO: 3400/85

SRI LANKAN CRICKET TOUR CALLED OFF

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 9 Oct 82 p 4

[Article by Mervyn Orchard]

[Text]

THE Sri Lankan cricket tour of South Africa is off, the SA Cricket Union president Mr Joe Pamensky announced yesterday.

"It had to be aborted at the 11th hour when the Sri Lankan Government impounded the passports of all leading players in that country," he disclosed.

Dr Ali Bacher, director of the Transvaal Cricket Council, bemoaning the fact, added: "If we had only had one more week of secrecy, the tour would have been on."

Dr Bacher told a Press conference: "It is only fair to let the cricketing public of this country know that there is no question of a tour here at this present moment."

Mr Pamensky showed more optimism when answering questions, he said: "Given a likely situation, a package, and a product that can be marketed, SACU would still be interested in going ahead with a tour."

Party of 15

The Sri Lankan tour, Mr Pamensky divulged, would have been financed

by the SACU. "No sponsorship was involved."

The side would have consisted of 14 players and a player-manager, all but one of whom have played test cricket in the past 18 months.

Individual contracts with players were signed "by a SACU representative in Sri Lanka".

Mr Pamensky refused to name the team members because "I don't believe it would be fair to them now that it's off".

He said that a tour itinerary had not been made final but it would have included two full tests, five one-day limited overs internationals, one of which would have been a floodlit night match, and provincial and invitation side matches as well as one or two warmup games.

Seven stars

Mr Pamensky said: "If we had had that one extra week of secrecy, we would have foiled the

politicians. The side should have flown here on October 19, and it would have included the seven star players on Sri Lanka's recent Indian tour."

The tour would have lasted to December 10, he added.

The Sri Lankan tour of Zimbabwe in December was still on, Mr Pamensky said. "The SA visit would have overlapped it a little, but this could have been ironed out."

Dr Bacher said: "We are in for a big local season, with a number of English stars guesting here. This should provide great entertainment for cricket fans who must reconcile themselves to there being no overseas team here this year."

"The experience of Geoff Dakin (SACU vice president) and myself when we were in England recently, is that the players — of all races, White and Black — want to come here."

"It is only the politicians stopping them," Dr Bacher said.

SRI LANKAN CRICKET TEAM'S TOUR ANNOUNCED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 18 Oct 82 pp 1, 2

[Article by Derek Amoores]

[Text]

SOUTH Africa smashed out of international cricket isolation yesterday when a 14-strong Sri Lankan Test-class team left Colombo for a seven-week tour of the Republic.

The tour, in defiance of the Sri Lanka Government and the International Cricket Conference, will include two full-scale Test matches, five one-day internationals, matches against provincial teams and some warm-up games for the tourists.

South African Cricket Union president Joe Pamensky, who said two weeks ago the tour had been aborted because of pressure on the team by their Government, was delighted yesterday.

"The team, contracted to the SACU, has left safely from Colombo and will probably arrive early next week.

"The tourists will be led by the former Sri Lankan captain Bandula Warnapura and will include a strong nucleus of Test players."

Reports from Colombo yesterday indicated the team had slipped out of Katunayake international airport on a flight to Hong Kong and would arrive in South Africa this week.

Mr Pamensky refused to give the exact arrival date. "Let's get them here first and then we will also release the names of the players," he said.

The Sri Lankans could have flown from Hong Kong to Australia's Perth to board the South African Airways flight arriving late tomorrow, or they might arrive in the Republic on an SAA flight from Taipei on Thursday.

Reports last week intimated the Sri Lankans had each been offered R65 000 for the man-breaking tour, which has brought the Springboks out of a 12-year Test wilderness.

Sapa reported yesterday from Colombo that Test players Lalith Kalperuma, Nilmal Hettiaratchi, Mahesh Gunatilleka, Bandula de Silva and his brother Ajit are also in the touring party.

Members of the party have been dubbed "lepers" by the Sri Lanka Cricket Board of Control president, Mr Gaminin Dissanayaka, who is also the country's Minister of Lands.

"It is apparent that the lure of filthy money has taken its toll. The lepers are stealthily worming their way to South Africa to sell their birthrights for a few rands," he said.

The SLCBC has urgently advised the ICC of the tour and said the players would be banned from future Tests or other matches played by Sri Lanka.

Sri Lanka, given Test status in July last year, joining England, Australia, the West Indies, Pakistan, India and New Zealand, is also sending a team to Zimbabwe this month for a three-week tour.

Zimbabwe Cricket Union president Mr Alwyn Pichanick was not available for comment last night, but told The Citizen last week that the tour was still on and had been arranged at Government level.

However, a former ZCU president and SACU Board member, Mr David Lewis, said from Salisbury yesterday: "The South African tour has certainly set the cat among the pigeons and I wonder what sort of Sri Lankan team we're going to get?"

The tour, arranged solely by the SACU, who had an agent in Sri Lanka, has left the country in uproar.

In response to requests, Colombo police have promised protection for the families of the tourists. But while Sri Lankan cricket and Government circles are furious, the general feeling among cricketers themselves is "let the boys earn some money."

Warnapura's wife said in Colombo her husband was upset over being de-

posed as the Test captain in favour of Duleep Mendis, who is reportedly due to lead the team going to Zimbabwe.

Mr Justice Blen Franklin, president of the South African Tennis Union, has described the news of the tour as "wonderful", writes Mervyn Orchard.

"This is the way to do this sort of thing. Announce it only when it is a fact," he said.

"I am interested to see what repercussions there may be following the renewed version of the Gleneagles Agreement during the recent Commonwealth Games in Brisbane".

S A tennis impresario Keith Brebnor described the news as "a great breakthrough".

"Now perhaps I can chase Indian tennis players to tour here," he said.

Howa Angry

MR Hassan Howa, president of the South African Cricket Board, has slated the South African Cricket Union and its president, Mr Joe Pamensky, over the tour by Sri Lankan cricketers.

"This is not a tour of South Africa by Sri Lanka and will not be recognised by the International Cricket Conference and will do South Africa tremendous harm for the fu-

ture," he said.

"The SACU, by arranging a tour through the back door, have set South African cricket back years and years.

"They must be desperate to have gone to this extreme in negotiating a tour of South Africa against the wishes of the Sri Lankan Government.

"The tour will not be recognised as it is by a group of private individuals who are beyond

contempt.

"The cricketers who tour here can forget about playing Test cricket again. This is the end of their cricket careers.

"The SACU and the Sri Lankan players are going against the Gleneagles Agreement and the ICC's wishes.

"Now all hopes of South Africa getting back into Test cricket have faded."

COMMENTARY ON PFP'S ROLE IN REFORM ISSUE

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 18 Oct 82 p 6

[Editorial]

[Text]

We can understand the Progressive Federal Party's dilemma, even if we cannot accept the relevance of its answers.

The PFP was for years the party of reform. Now that reform has arrived, it cannot go along with it mainly because there is no place in the scheme of things for Blacks.

In accordance with its political philosophy, the PFP favours a system which will lead inevitably to Black rule.

But this is precisely what the Government hopes to avoid, even though its critics say that it must inevitably follow the Government's reforms.

The dilemma of the PFP is heightened by the fact that its Big Business supporters, who do not fear Black rule provided it is of the kind that can ensure the safety of their investments, are no longer pressing for the same kind of deal as the Profeds wish to see.

These Big Businessmen are saying: Reform must start somewhere. Let's support P W Botha. For what he proposes, however inadequate, is a start. And once reform begins, there will be no going back and no end to it.

These businessmen are also heeding warnings from National Party Ministerial fund-raisers that the alternative to a moderate, reformist PW Botha regime is a Conservative Party back-to-doctrinaire apartheid set-up.

Dr Treurnicht is the new bogeyman, just as Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd were in their time.

Ideologically, however, the PFP cannot support the Nationalist Government.

As Dr Van Zyl Slabbert, the PFP leader, told the party's Natal congress at the weekend, "getting together" with the Prime Minister would mean the PFP, as a party, "is, in effect, saying: loss of citizenship for Blacks is in order, influx control can be condoned, detention without trial is acceptable, the Group Areas Act can stay as long as there can be limited 'healthy' power sharing between Coloureds, Asians and Whites."

He therefore rejects "getting together".

On the question of the reforms set out by the Prime Minister and endorsed by National Party congresses, he is equally adamant that the PFP cannot give the Government its support.

Dr Slabbert gives three reasons:

Blacks are excluded from the new constitution;

An executive President can be chosen effectively by 50 Nat Party caucus members without any indication as to what the constitutional limitations on his powers will be;

And no collective decision-making, even between Coloureds, Indians and Whites on matters of common concern is possible, and White domination is entrenched in all the crucial decision-making structures.

"The best help we can give the Prime Minister and South Africa is to state clearly that these

proposals (the reform plan) are simply not good enough," says Dr Slabbert.

They are not a step in the right direction, he says, but a step towards constitutional frustration and futility.

Professor Marinus Wiechers, the director of the Institute of Foreign and Comparative Law at the University of South Africa, told the congress that the Government's constitutional proposals merited their being not only closely studied but actively supported, however qualified and cautious such support might be.

Predictably, the congress supported Dr Slabbert's viewpoint.

So there we have it:

The party of reform (the PFP), which hasn't a snowball's hope of ever ruling the country and applying its policies, is against the reform plan of the party that rules and can in-

troduce reform.

Will the PFP maintain its latest boycott — against reform — despite the pressure of its financial backers? We think it will.

Will the PFP hold the balance of power, as Dr Slabbert thinks it will? We doubt it very much.

Will the PFP be even more irrelevant than it is now, as the verligtes and conservatives of Afrikanerdom shape up against each other in the battle for and against reform?

We think it will be, since a negative policy cannot be of any importance now that the NP has taken on the mantle of reform from the PFP.

The question of the day is reform, Government style, or no reform, CP and HNP style.

The PFP has no real role in this battle.

CSO: 3400/115

ALL-RACE TOILETS ROW LOOMING

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 13 Oct 82 p 15

[Text]

A MAJOR row appears to be looming in the densely populated area of Durban Point because of a city council suggestion that public toilets should be opened to all races.

The Point area is often used by holidaymakers because of the extensive network of holiday flats.

The Point Ratepayers' Association says in a statement that it will object if the council opens public toilets to all races because of fears this would increase the incidence of venereal diseases among Whites.

The city councillor for the area, Mr Clarence Check, who is also a member of the executive of the Point Ratepayers' Association, said yesterday although the matter had yet to be debated in the council, reports had been called for on toilets which could be used by all races.

He said the association would lodge a formal objection with the town clerk of Durban, Mr Gordon Haygarth, and would call on other ratepayers in the Durban area to follow suit.

Dr N Becker, the deputy medical officer of health in Durban, has expressed an opinion that if toilets were integrated there would be a greater chance of White users picking up secondary syphilis and advanced gonorrhea from toilet seats.

The Citizen spoke to several doctors in Durban yesterday over the issue. Some agree with Dr Becker but others said that there was no medical proof that VD could be caught from toilet seats.

A recent article in the journal of the Medical Association of south Africa stated emphatically that VD could not be passed on in this manner.

CSO: 3400/85

PROTECTION OF OIL FINDS ASSURED

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 12 Oct 82 p 12

[Text]

SOUTH Africa's interests will be protected "at all costs" should oil exploration off the Mossel Bay coast lead to further discoveries of fuel in commercially viable quantities, a spokesman for Soekor said yesterday.

Since last week's announcement of an oil find 136km south-west of the town — yielding 900 barrels a day — speculation has been rife that big-time oil conglomerates will step into the area to conduct probes themselves.

But, says the Soekor spokesman, there is little chance of any international firm showing interest until the existence of large oil reserves has been proven.

"We know ourselves whether there's enough oil there to turn it into a commercial proposition. That first has to be established before any big firm considers the area. And even then they may not think it worth their while.

"Should there be over-

seas interest however — and this is a long-term idea — we will certainly make sure it is to South Africa's advantage.

"The benefit would be this country's. We'd make sure of that."

Meanwhile, Soekor's beneath-the-sea-search for oil is continuing. Drilling at a new site close to last week's EG2 find is scheduled to begin within the next few days. The new borehole will be the ER1.

Further drilling from the rig above the EG2 hole will receive top priority after a detailed seismic survey in the area has been completed. The EG3 and EG4 holes are also on the short list for boring.

CSO: 3400/85

OIL STRIKE GIVES FUEL FOR THOUGHT

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 6 Oct 82 p 22

[Editorial]

[Text]

SOUTH AFRICA'S search for oil over the last 17 years has been a story of highs and lows, of euphoria and disappointment. At first reports of traces of oil were greeted with tall headlines and champagne in airliners at 30 000 ft. More than R300 million later we have learnt caution. Yesterday's news of the best strike so far was taken calmly in the national stride. Against a desirable minimum of 100 000 barrels a day for 30 years, 900 barrels a day will not keep South African wheels turning; on the other hand, it may be a prelude to the real thing. We hope so. A viable oil find would protect South Africa's Achilles heel, offer job opportunities and, with any luck, check the runaway prices which fuel inflation.

Oil is the one natural blessing this land lacks. If it flowed in profusion we should go a long way towards solving our balance of payments problem. Indeed, throughout the world

the lack of domestic sources of this precious commodity has weakened economies. Ironically, as in the case of Mexico, having oil has actually brought its own economic difficulties. Similarly, some economists say that the rocketing gold price was not all good news for South Africa.

Whether South Africa ultimately finds oil or not, she will have to come to terms with the balance of payments problem which has caused Mr Horwood to ask the International Monetary Fund for a huge loan. Spending more money abroad than we receive is due to several factors, including having to pay a premium price for oil, but if this country is forced to continue to arm on the scale of, say, Israel, we could all become involved in a very difficult decade indeed. That is one reason why it is important for the reform momentum to be maintained and to find a solution in Namibia.

LAY-OFFS SWEEP EAST RAND INDUSTRY

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 6 Oct 82 p 9

[Article by Erik Larsen and Sarah Pennell]

[Text]

Retrenchment, an indicator of a slumping economy, is sweeping the East Rand.

During the past few months, more than 1 700 people are known to have been laid off on the East Rand.

Most of these were unskilled workers in the steel industry, although many companies report retrenchments across the board, affecting even senior management.

These statistics do not provide a comprehensive picture of retrenchment in the region.

But the figures, obtained from the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (Mawu) and some big companies which have laid off workers, are symptomatic of a trend. Many smaller businesses too are feeling the pinch.

It is difficult to obtain an overview of retrenchment as employer federations usually do not require such details from their members.

More than 21 East Rand companies are known to have laid off workers within the past three months.

Management at these companies have blamed the move on the downturn in the economy.

Retrenchments range from 500 workers at a large Benoni foundry to four employees at a panel-beating company.

Predictions are that redundancy will increase as the economic position worsens.

To protect workers who are being laid off the Metal and Allied Workers' Union (Mawu) has drawn up guidelines on retrenchment.

But these guidelines have not been widely accepted by companies and many workers are finding themselves destitute and without the prospect of re-employment.

Bodies such as Seifsa and the Federated Chamber of Industries also provide affiliated employers with guidelines on retrenchment.

Industry sources believe there is no foreseeable end to the recession and this will mean employers will have to continue to retrench workers or seek other cost-saving measures.

NO CASH RELIEF FOR JOBLESS METAL WORKERS

Johannesburg RAND DAILY MAIL in English 30 Sep 82 p 4

[Article by Steven Friedman]

[Text]

SKILLED and semi-skilled metal workers who are out of work because of the state of the economy have found they cannot claim unemployment money from the metal industries — because of an agreement made some years ago between their unions and employers.

The agreement, which could prompt a white and coloured worker backlash as unemployment mounts, means money paid into the giant metal industries' provident fund by workers can only be paid out when they die or retire — not, as in some industries, when they lose their jobs.

And yesterday four metal workers who have lost their jobs claimed their families were "starving" because they could not find jobs or claim money from the fund.

They claimed they were not consulted by their union, the SA Boilermakers' Society, when the agreement was made and compared their position to that of furniture workers who, they said, were getting unemployment pay from their union. They said "hundreds" of workers were in the same position.

But a union spokesman said the men "have their facts wrong".

In several industries unions and employers have set up funds which enable workers to claim money when they are unemployed.

But as a result of requests by established unions, the Metal Industries' Life and Provident Fund, to which workers in higher job categories belong, does not allow workers to withdraw contributions until they retire or die.

The same provision also applied to the Metal Industries Group Pension Fund, which applies to workers in the lower categories.

But in the wake of last year's pensions unrest employers agreed to allow workers, who have left the industry for six months, to claim their money.

If these workers lose their jobs, they can claim from the Unemployment Insurance Fund for the first six months.

But workers in the top job grades cannot withdraw their money because of established union requests that the money be "frozen" until retirement.

Yesterday the four men, who asked not to be named, said they lost their jobs a few months ago and could not find new ones despite asking at factories almost daily. Three are welders and one is a machine operator.

They said the union had been unable to find them jobs and, concerning unemployment relief, had told them "that we can only get our money when we die or turn 65."

One man said he did not qualify for UIF benefits because he had earned more than R1 000 a month, two said they had had difficulty claiming from the UIF and the fourth had not applied.

They said they had between five and 17 years' experience in the industry.

A spokesman for the Boilermakers Society said yesterday the men had "got the wrong end of the stick".

He said the union had little trouble placing retrenched members in jobs and denied there were "hundreds" of workers who could not find work. "There is no need for members to starve — the union can find them jobs," he said.

COST OF ELECTRICITY UP FROM JANUARY

Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 13 Oct 82 p 3

[Text]

THE price of Escom electricity will be increased by an average of 16,3 percent from January 1983.

Escom announced in Johannesburg yesterday that expected increases in the price of coal delivered might add about two percent to that during the year in terms of existing coal contracts.

The increase applies only to electricity used. Extension charges and other fixed charges remain unchanged.

Escom's senior general manager, Mr I D van der Walt, said the commission regretted that such a large increase had to be introduced, particularly at a time when the economy was slowing down, and every effort was being made to keep prices down.

"In addition to the continuing high inflation rate, a number of factors have recently emerged over which Escom has no control," Mr Van der Walt said.

These included:

- The effect on loan servicing costs. Escom's capital expansion was financed from loan capital and about a third of its annual costs was for debt servicing.

- The value of the

rand compared to the US dollar declined by as much as 30 percent. This means the cost of imported equipment and technology had shown a considerable increase.

- The need to protect the electricity supply system had meant improved security measures and techniques at all Escom's installations. This had added to the cost of electricity.

"It is expected the effect of these factors will be felt for the foreseeable future, and it may not be possible to limit tariff increases to the inflation rate.

"Future tariff increases will, to a large extent, depend on the growth in the demand for electricity, levels of cost escalation and the cost of financing," Mr Van der Walt said.

He said that unlike most businesses, which could cut expenditure and growth during times of recession, Escom had to plan for the country's electricity needs in the longer term and had to expand continuously if it was to meet this demand.

"It takes up to 14 years to plan and build a power station and this spans a much longer term than the usual periods of cyclic

change in the economy," he said.

The January 1983 tariff increased differ in Escom's various regions.

The highest increases are in those areas which have enjoyed the lowest electricity prices, namely the Rand, Free State, Natal and the Eastern Transvaal.

The lowest increases are in areas where the price of electricity is historically higher than in areas closer to the coalfields, namely Border, Western Cape, Northern Cape and Orange River.

"Although this adjustment does not do away with regional differences in the price of electricity, it does represent a move towards a more uniform tariff for the whole country," Mr Van der Walt said.

"In the four years from 1978 to 1982 the price of Escom electricity has risen on average by 12 percent a year, while the Consumer Price Index increased by an average of 14 percent a year.

"If the January 1983 tariff increase and the adjustment to the coal price are taken into consideration, and an inflation rate

The regional increases in the price of electricity, excluding increases in the coal price are:

Rand license area	17,2 percent
Rand and OFS extension area	16,3 percent
Natal	17,1 percent
Eastern Transvaal	17,9 percent
Western Cape	11,8 percent
Northern Cape	12,4 percent
Orange River	15,4 percent
Burder	18,1 percent
Weighted average Eskom total:	16,3 percent

of 14 percent for 1983 is assumed, both the price of electricity and the CPI over the five years (1978-1983) would have risen by an average of 14 percent

annually.

"So, the compound effect of increases in the price of electricity during this period would be virtually identical to the inflation rate."

Price Rise 'A Blow to Mining Industry'

THE large increase of more than 16 percent in electricity charges was a "severe blow" to the mining industry, Mr W W Malan, president of the Chamber of Mines said yesterday.

Mr Malan said last year Gold and Coal members of the Chamber had spent R397-million on the purchase of electric power.

"This price hike will therefore add about R64-million a year to their annual bill," he said.

Mr Malan said working

costs of South African gold mines were already cause for great concern.

"This new increase in power costs imposed on the industry is disappointing, and it comes at a bad time with inflation rates already well above those of our international trading partners and competitors, and with the mineral industry at the same time being badly affected by the recession in the world's industrial countries.

"The fluctuating gold price is also creating diffi-

culties for the industry."

Mr Malan said that over the last 10 years the consumer price index had risen by an average of 12 percent a year while electricity costs had gone up by an average of 15,5 percent a year.

"In the difficult environment in which the mining industry is operating, this increase by Eskom is unfortunate and could not have been more badly timed as far as the mining industry is concerned."

Eskom Rise Regretted

SOUTH African industry "regrets" the electricity energy tariff hike which will reflect in the initial cost base and erode national competitiveness, according to Mr R J Ironside, president of the South African Federated Chamber of Industries.

Mr Ironside said in the Press statement that FCE was disturbed by the fact that the cost of coal contracts is not included in the corporation's generation and transmission

charges, since further coal price increases could now simply be added to Eskom's tariff base.

"The FCI believes that a careful study must be made of the tariff and financial policies of all South Africa's parastatal corporations to ensure, inter alia, that they have the freedom to invest during periods of economic downturn without raising tariffs which fuel the fires of inflation as the demand

for services declines, thus amplifying the effect of the business cycle.

"Because the problems are complex, better surveillance and the application of sound business principles are needed.

"The chamber has also noted the narrowing of the rates differential between regions.

"The FCI advocates a cost-related tariff structure warning against the cross-subsidisation of one region by another."

PLATINUM THIEVES FOIL SECURITY IN HISTORIC HEIST

Johannesburg SUNDAY TIMES in English 3 Oct 82 p 9

[Article by Norman Chandler]

[Text]

MASTER THIEVES who pulled off the biggest platinum theft in history literally salted away their R13-million haul.

Over three months they removed more than one ton of the metal in salt form, say authoritative sources in the industry.

But the gang behind the brilliantly planned heist are now up against a new, foolproof method of identifying stolen minerals.

The technique, called "fingerprinting", was developed in South Africa to prevent thieves selling their haul on the open market.

As the story of the spectacular theft from Matthey Rustenburg Refinery in Wadeville, Germiston, unfolded this week, the company refused to say how its tight security was foiled.

But research scientist Dr Ron Edwards, of the Council for Mining Technology, said:

"It is probable that the platinum was taken out in salt form as platinum ammonium chloride.

"This salt cannot be detected by metal detectors or X-ray equipment.

"It is the only way they could have done it."

South African refineries — including the Germiston operation, which is the world's biggest and newest — supply half the West's platinum needs.

Platinum reaches it in metal concentrate form, containing between 20 and 60 percent platinum.

Drums

The first step is to dissolve the ore in strong acid.

Then the eight precious metals in the concentrate are separated by chemical processes.

Finally, it is broken down into a salt or "metal sponge" — a form of metal granule — before being shipped out.

In some instances, 44kg drums are used to transport the material.

The thieves' massive haul consisted of 750kg of platinum and the rest of the 1.2 tons made up of minerals in the platinum family.

All are vitally important to the West.

They are used in the car and space industries, oil refining, fertiliser manufacture, dentistry, jewellery and many other processes.

Turnouts that the theft was in fact an auditing mistake were dismissed by Mr F J L Wells, executive director of Johannesburg Consolidated Investments (JCI), the holding company of Rustenburg Platinum Holdings, which has a half-share in the refinery.

He told the Sunday Times: "It most definitely was not a mistake on the part of our auditors.

"The figures were checked and double-checked."

A JCI spokesman said the platinum had "under no circumstances" gone through security X-ray machines at the R80-million refinery, opened in October, last year.

Flaw

One theory is that the thieves studied the refinery's security system for some time before finding a flaw.

A security official said: "There is no doubt that this was a well-executed job which had to be foolproof to succeed.

"We have not ruled out the possibility of industrial espionage.

"But in view of the amount of platinum taken, it hardly seems possible that someone would want to destroy R13-million worth of ore."

Easy

A source closely connected to the industry told me:

"Obviously, the most difficult part was getting it out of the plant.

"But once that was done the thieves would have had an easy task taking it out of the country.

"I would suggest that the theft was done with the full knowledge of the foreign refinery where it is to be processed.

"The theft shows just how vulnerable our metals industry is to big-time thieving."

A police spokesman said the SAP was alerted as soon

as it became apparent that a large amount of platinum was missing.

"We are continuing our investigations," he said.

Hopes of preventing the thieves selling the platinum rest mainly on the technique of "fingerprinting" minerals.

A specially designed microscope can pinpoint where the ore was mined and how it was processed.

A spokesman for the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research in Pretoria explained:

"There are certain impurities that cannot be removed without throwing away half the sample.

"The technique, known as mass spectroscopy, provides traces of the ore's history, such as where it was taken out of the ground and what processes were performed on it.

"This is unambiguous identification of that particular metal."

The "fingerprint" cannot be masked.

"Anyone trying to erase the distinguishing mark will have to find out what the 'fingerprint' really is.

"That could take him a very long time and make the cost prohibitive.

"But if you are working with very smart people, they could have the resources."

The technique, which is not

used elsewhere, has been successful in South African court cases involving the theft of platinum and gold.

News of the refinery theft was revealed this week by Rustenburg Platinum Holdings in a cryptic paragraph in its preliminary annual profit statement.

Market

It said that "a significant quantity of semi-refined materials" had been stolen from the refinery this year.

The theft has amazed the metals market of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.

"The fact that it took 5c off the dividend proposed by Rustenburg shows the extent of the theft," a stock exchange source said.

One broker said there was a ready market for platinum.

"Four years ago the amount of platinum on this market was about 150 000 oz. Now the figure is nearer 600 000 oz — which makes it easier to dispose of the loot.

"One thing worth noting is that Rustenburg and Impala sell to their recognised buyers.

"Anything appearing for sale elsewhere might just be traceable."

I am told platinum sales are worth about R40-million a month — 50 percent less than earlier this year.

CSO: 3400/88

BRIEFS

SYNOD MEETING REPORT--A report which appeared in a Sunday newspaper describing a closed meeting of the NG synod was described by Church men as a deliberate effort to generate dissention among the readers. According to the report, South Africa's Director of National Intelligence Service, Dr Neil Barnard called on delegates not to retreat into a "laager," but to extend contact with Churches internally and internationally. Together with the Chaplain of the SADF, Maj Gen van Zyl, delegates were allegedly surprised to hear of the need for a more flexible approach to the Church. The scribe of the Church, Ds D.J. Viljoen said in Pretoria yesterday that he had not seen the report but considered it to be insignificant and not worthy of discussion. He said he would have been fully prepared to discuss more important issues and said he had expressed his view in private on leakages to the Press, but declined to elaborate. [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 18 Oct 82 p 11]

GROWING UNEMPLOYMENT OVERSHADOWS PROSPERITY

Johannesburg THE STAR in English 1 Oct 82 p 11

[Article by Jasper Mortimer: "Croc-free Drifts in a Croc-ky Economy"]

[Text]

MEABANE — When King Sobhuza proclaimed Swaziland independent on September 6 1968, he said that as one of the last states to achieve freedom Swaziland had been able to study the progress of others.

"We have watched them crossing rivers," he said, "we have seen them being swallowed by crocodiles."

"We shall try to cross through crocodile-free drifts to a peaceful, independent Swaziland," he resolved.

For him the economic crocodiles were socialism, nationalisation, strong trade unions — in short anything that might repel investors.

The clear drifts were a conservative, market economy with a generous attitude to profit repatriation and the encouragement of export industries.

The formula has worked well in the modern sector. Development has been rapid. Government revenue rose from R29 million in 1973/74 to R139 million in 1981/82 (though half this money comes from the Customs Union) and Swaziland now has one of the higher per capita in-

comes in sub-Saharan Africa.

Capital and aid have streamed in. Manufacturing has grown to providing about 25 percent of the GDP, and the money inflow also meant Swaziland avoided a balance of payments deficit until 1979.

"We have had aid at a level equivalent to that of countries with 10 times our (600 000) population, I guess," a Finance Ministry spokesman said proudly.

"It's certainly a reflection of our ability to spend. Once you have a reputation for spending aid productively, it keeps coming in."

One reason for the Swazi success is that the State leaves the management of joint ventures to the private-sector partner. The State and the Tlbiyo fund (the King's commercial arm) have substantial shareholdings in all the big concerns, but they believe management is "the prerogative of the promoting technical partner."

What has impressed well-known industrialist Reg Taft about Swazi economic policies is the

"down-to-earth, commonsense approach."

"There's been no flamboyant talk of highflyers. If a project seemed risky, it has not gone ahead — with the exception of the Swazi shipping debacle." (The State acted as a guarantor for a shipping line, resulting in charges of corruption in a protracted court case and World Bank criticism).

Mr Taft's one criticism is that the State's decision-making has been slow. Rights to build and operate factories can take a long time to obtain.

Others have criticised the development emphasis on sugar.

Swaziland has had diversified economy, with revenue from a wide range of agricultural products (sugar, pulp, cotton, fruits, beef), mining asbestos and coal, manufacturing, tourism and the Customs Union.

But, in the last decade sugar has been developed to the point where Swaziland is poised to become Africa's second largest producer. In 1981 sugar brought in 50 percent of export revenue.

This very growth has

made Swaziland vulnerable to world price fluctuations. When the price dropped this year it made what the Finance Ministry spokesman called "a marked impact on our budget expectations."

The main problems in the modern sector is that it is not growing fast enough. Unemployment is alarming. Since 1968 the Government rightly made education a priority, but this means 7 000 school-leavers now enter the job market each year. The present three percent growth rate creates a maximum of only 1 700 jobs a year.

Perhaps 20 000 to 30 000 Swazis migrate to South Africa for work. But the greater migration is within the country, from rural homes to the towns and plantations.

It is these rural homes — where the bulk of the population lives — that have been left behind by the post-1968 development. They remain reservoirs of cheap labour, and the wages on the small farms and plantations (apart from the sugar plantations) are the lowest in Swaziland.

Fion de Vletter, the director of the social science research unit at Swaziland University, has surveyed the income of rural homesteads.

His preliminary results found the average homestead of eight resident members receives a total of no more than R60 to R70 a month from its wage-earners.

The State Rural Development Areas project is trying to improve farming methods on homesteads in about 25 percent of the country to make them self-sufficient in food. Peasants are reportedly receptive to tractors, advice, fertilisers and loans but strongly oppose resettlement — even if it aims to make their plots more viable.

Sources say there is a lot of potential in the State's providing irrigation and training to start commercial smallholdings for sugar or, in the Lowveld, cotton. Such schemes have worked well in places — notably the Vuvulane sugar estate of 260 smallholders — but are opposed by the chiefs who see them as undermining their authority and creating rural elites.

ECONOMIC SITUATION SAID TO CONTINUE TO DETERIORATE

Paris AFRICA AFP in French 15 Oct 82 pp 1-2

[Article by Francois Robinet]

[Text] Dar-es-Salaam, October 13--Tanzania has for some weeks practically stopped settling its debts, but is still refusing conditions set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in exchange for aid.

Agricultural and industrial production is increasingly hit by a lack of raw materials, spare parts and fuel, which the country cannot afford to buy, and each week the press reports the closure of yet another factory for technical reasons.

Foreign currency reserves can only cover two or three days' imports, and all day-to-day goods imported from abroad are missing from the shops of Dar-es-Salaam, the capital and the country's main port.

The World Bank was the first to sound the alarm.

The bank has suspended virtually all its current projects in Tanzania (representing an injection of about 70 million U.S. dollars a year) until the government repays 14.7 million dollars in outstanding interest charges.

The finance minister has promised to pay off the interest before the end of the month, but that will not settle other outstanding debts.

Economic observers here say most western states have decided not to extend new loans to Tanzania, which can no longer meet interest payments on its external debt, estimated to stand at more than 1,600 million dollars.

IMF Envoys Return

An IMF delegation arrived in the capital this week to start a new round of negotiations with the Tanzanian Government following the failure of the talks last June. But the government continues to tell anyone willing to listen that its position has not changed.

For the past two years President Julius Nyerere has steadfastly refused to devalue the Tanzanian shilling and rejected IMF funds for big cutbacks in the budget as a pre-condition for aid with the balance of payments problem.

A devaluation would not provide any more dollars for coffee exports, the country's main cash crop, Planning and Economy Minister Kighoma Malina told AFP recently.

"But on the other hand it will increase the cost of our sales organisation, particularly petrol to transport the coffee, spare parts, fertilizer," he said.

Diplomats here believe that the devaluation sought by the IMF (which is in the region of 50 to 60 per cent) is the only way to reduce the difference between official and real price of goods which would clear the way to a new start for the economy on a surer foundation.

Western Aid Cut Back

Despite the huge deficit in its balance of payments--exports cover about 40 per cent of the imports bill--Tanzania has just managed to keep its head above water, relying increasingly on foreign aid.

Western countries, and particularly the Scandinavian states, have repeatedly come to the aid of Tanzania, eager to see the results of Mr Nyerere's brand of African socialism. This year alone they have provided some 600 million dollars, which is equivalent to about 25 per cent of the Gross National Product.

This makes Tanzania the best loved African state in the international aid ratings, with 33 dollars per inhabitant. By comparison, the continent's poorest country, Ethiopia, only gets five dollars a head in foreign aid.

But the financial situation has continued to deteriorate, and now the majority of donor countries have decided that a change of economic policy is essential.

A sign in the window of one of the best shops in town says "nothing to sell," which just about sums up the state of the economy. No soap, no light bulbs, no batteries, no toilet paper, no overseas newspapers. Just about everything in daily use has disappeared from the usual sales circuits.

Products in short supply can be found on the black market at a much higher price. Half a litre (quart) of oil can be found at 60 shillings, which is three times the usual price, while fresh fish sold straight from the boats can fetch up to 300 shillings a kilo (2.2 pounds).

Many office workers and artisans, who earn perhaps 600 or 700 shillings a month, literally live off maize meal, which is abundant mainly thanks to international food aid. It is sold for 2.5 shillings a kilo which is less than cost price in Tanzania.

The crisis is now so general that even existing foreign aid is difficult to use since to some extent it relies on other factors. Several factories in Dar-es-Salaam, Dodoma, Pemba and Mwanza have been funded from overseas, but the projects remain incomplete for lack of access roads, electricity and water connections, or fuel shortages. (AFP)

HOUSING CALLED 'NUMBER ONE PROBLEM' IN KAMPALA

Kampala UGANDA TIMES in English 30 Sep 82 p 5

[Article by Abdul Isodo]

[Text] Enough has been said about the tribulations of the unemployed person in Uganda today, but while we must sympathise with him we should not forget the tribulations of the young school leaver before he lands on a job somewhere.

From four or six each year, large numbers of student applications letters leave schools addressed to company managers and government officers for jobs in the coming year. The students write these letters with great expectations. They know it is not easy to get a job but they hope somewhere a job exists for them.

In some cases these people get jobs through a relative or friend. In most cases, the recipients of these letters do not care to answer at all. But the letters are written with a lot of passion and enthusiasm. This is the first frustration a student must suffer.

When employers answer it is usually a curt reply declaring there is no job in their firms. The student may feel cheated and insulted. Sometimes, even before the student writes his application, he already knows there is a job in the company but has no one to introduce him to the employing officer. If he has no well placed relative, the student blames the whole social fabric for not caring for the poor.

A couple of years ago, a student landed on a job in the industrial area of Kampala. He was earning 700/- per month. Of course the student was elated. He was jubilant for, though his former classmates tried to tell him he was placed there by a relative, the young man for the first time in life believed he belonged to this nation.

Then came the next problem in the city. He was earning a small salary and was expected to live in a house. He trudged the whole of the city looking for a house to hire but could not get a house that he could afford.

Though happy for landing a job, the young man was extremely frustrated by the prevalent lack of housing. He read through the columns of the dailies

but all the houses he could find catered for people who earned far in excess of his income. He finally managed to persuade some landlord to give him a small room.

The room was a hole below stairs. The landlord fixed a door leaving a small aperture at the top so that the tenant would not suffocate at night. "I go in with my legs first," the young man told me, "and for this I pay 200/- per month. I am happy in this cave for I do not want to go to the slum areas," the young man continued.

At night he would light his jiko and the "cave" would be transformed into a smoky burning cavern. He would be heard choking with smoke as he prepared his evening meals. It goes without saying that the cave has no running water toilet or bathroom. "In the morning, we queue outside the toilet or bathroom waiting for our turn to wash or go to the toilet" he says.

Another young girl said she has rented a small 6ft by 4ft wide room. "This one must have been a store in the old days when the former tenants lived in these quarters," the girl said. "I do all my cooking outside and only come in to sleep. After cooking, I push my utensils under the bed for this is the only room remaining after placing my 3ft-wide bed," she says. She says she is lucky to have got the store near her place of work. "I do not have to spend large sums of money on transport each day."

Soon the young form 4 or 6 leaver learns that landing a job is not all. One said that he would have wished to study and advance himself but with the cramped room in which he lives, he cannot even stretch his legs. Another young man who landed a job after form six says that after the 3rd of each month, he is forced to walk from his place of work to his house each day. "I wish I had become a teacher after school, at least in teaching you work and live in the same institution" the young man said.

A few years ago, the International Labour Organisation called these categories of people the "urban poor". People who earn a salary but cannot afford to rent themselves a house at the current rate. Many people now believe a house is a poverty causing agent in our urban areas especially in Kampala. They believe that though our trade unions and employers are doing everything possible to uplift the standards of the workers, the money they give is soon gobbled by housing.

People say that just as the government has tried to control prices of certain goods, distribution and availability of food, it shall do the same for housing. They question the wisdom behind feeding a man without housing him.

They say that the house comes immediately after food in an individual's list of basic needs. These people insist that housing should be made a business of the government.

In many countries today, and especially socialist countries housing has been nationalised whereby the revenues so generated are immediately ploughed back into housing business. I know some people will at once point

out that the National Housing Corporation is trying just that but the houses it is building are negligible in number when compared with the demand.

Other people question the wisdom of continuing to build houses for overpaid individuals whereby each house costs over 2 million Shillings. "These people should know that anybody who can afford to raise this money already is well-housed" one man said.

Unless real measures are taken to house the newly employed, the numbers of the urban poor will continue to increase in our city and towns.

CSO: 3400/99

FISHNET PLANT REPORTED RESUMING PRODUCTION WITH IDA AID

Kampala UGANDA TIMES in English 1 Oct 82 pp 1, 8

[Article by Betty Matovu and Tom Okello]

[Text] The resumption of production at the Uganda Fishnet Manufacturing Company is a giant step towards achieving restoration of normal industrial life.

The Prime Minister, Mr Otema Allimadi said this on Wednesday on the occasion marking the resumption of production at the factory and the opening of the UPC branch there.

He went on to say that the Fishnet factory was a focal position in industrial life because the commodities produced there are user goods.

This, he pointed out gave the factory a character of its own because user goods produced locally cut out the necessity of spending huge sums of money in foreign exchange.

The factory has realised over 40 million shillings in revenue between the month of May and August this year. [as published]

The Company produced about 16,000 pieces of nets and 15,103 kgs of cords and twines of which 10,000 pieces of nets and 3,328 kgs of cords and twines were sold.

The General Manager, Mr Oketayot has made all efforts to increase production by adding a transnight shift starting from 7 pm to 6 am.

According to the Manager, the additional shift has doubled production from 250 pieces of nets per day to over 600 pieces and 50 workers have been recruited.

Mr Oketayot said the factory became operational in May this year as a result of 1m dollar (IDA) reconstruction credit which was allocated to it and the government made efforts to import the vital raw materials, spare parts and other inputs.

He said that the company ranked among the first few industries which succeeded in utilising aid from the International Development Aid (IDA).

"This success was partly due to our raw material suppliers Nichiman Corporation of Japan to whom we greatly express sincere gratitude for the competent manner they handled our orders", he said.

Talking about extension he said that this would include factory building stores, and the care-taker's flat" "but emphasis is on rehabilitation of existing building and machinery."

CSO: 3400/99

BRIEFS

AID TO WIDOWS--The government will not confine its assistance to widows whose husbands were victims of the Amin regime, but to all those who lost their husbands as from 25th January 1971, the Deputy Commissioner for Rehabilitation Mr Bwanika Bbaale has said. He was presenting sewing machines, bales of textiles and radios to the Kampala East Widows Association at City Hall, Kampala. He noted there was segregation [as published] between the widows whose husbands were killed by Amin's men and those whose husbands died of natural causes. As a result, he said, many widows were not registered so that they can utilise the assistance provided by the government. [By Tom Okello and Ndyakira Amooti] [Excerpt] [Kampala UGANDA TIMES in English 29 Sep 82 pp 1, 8]

JAPAN SENDS RELIEF GOODS--About 40 tonnes of goods sent by the people of Ichikawa City in Japan have been handed over to the Ministry of Rehabilitation. They include clothes, children's toys, shoes, spoons and books. Receiving the goods, Minister Patrick Masette Kuuva paid deep gratitude to the people of Japan and Ichikawa City in particular for the tremendous love and friendship they had shown to their brothers and sisters in Uganda. Mr Masette said the ten years of misrule had doubtlessly left the people of Uganda in great need for essentials like clothes and shoes. Such generous help, therefore, is always much appreciated by Ugandans. [By A. Thomiko] [Excerpt] [Kampala UGANDA TIMES in English 30 Sep 82 p 3]

CSO: 3400/101

BRIEFS

OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS--The overthrow of President Mobutu is the principle aim of an opposition grouping called the Front Congolais pour la Restauration de la Democratie (FLD). The group was formed recently in Brussels and claims to represent two opposition movements, the Union pour la Democratie et le Progres Sociale (13 founders of the UDPS are presently in prison in Zaire for attempting to start a second political party), and the Parti pour la Revolution Populaire. The coalition was announced by M. Dikonda Wa Lumanyisha, a member of the UDPS. He said the visit of President Mitterrand to Kinshasa for the Franco African Summit showed a tacit approval by the French President for a regime which oppresses its people. [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English No 3401, 11 Oct 82 p 2682]

CSO: 3400/129

END

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

Nov. 9, 1982